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Overhauling Child Abuse Law

When you pull over for the wail of sirens, and shut off your engine so the smoke can clear enough to see what's behind you, and it's a fire engine, it's too late for a tune-up. The ol' clunker's due for a major overhaul.

I have documented horror stories from Iowa parents complaining about the DHS, by studying their court records. I have read Register reports of abused children not protected by the DHS, while loved children were removed. (As of 3/29/92, the lead letter in the Register website forum on state government is a letter about "the Child Molester Protection Division".) PBS had a stunning documentary on runawqay abuse charges at the Little Rascals day care cennter in, I think, Pennsylvania. I studied, and reported, the investigation of the San Diego child protection bureaucracy by a San Diego grand jury in 1993 which inspired a "plank" (political position statement) in the Iowa State Republican Convention in 1994, calling for a similar Grand Jury investigation of Iowa's DHS.

But the most compelling evidence for me, that Iowa law needs to be changed, is my reading of the law itself. Just knowing how human beings operate, and reading the law, leads to the conclusion that if there are NOT problems just like those alleged by so many sources, it would be a miracle.

Overhauls, unfortunately, are generally not quick and simple, and this article cannot, unfortunately, be short. However, this journey into the abyss of Iowa child abuse law has all the elements of a popular novel that you don't want to lay down until you finish: plots, intrigues, and even sex and violence.

First comes a quick overview of the problems in the law, and then our detailed proposals for changing them, with easy to follow explanations.

The Adventures Ahead (Contents)

Proposed Overhaul of Iowa's Child Abuse Laws, chapter 232 of the Iowa Code (The Juvenile Code)

Part One, summary of issues

Part Two, The Proposals Explained (Concluding with articles about the Supreme Court's ruling on psychiatry)

Part Three, the entire Juvenile Code, marked so you can read it as it is and with the proposed changes

Part One, Summary of Issues

"Best interests of the child": oft quoted, never defined. (Can you believe the Juvenile Code never defines it? Let's create a definition that heals children and families)

"Parental Contract" (Parents are obligated to meet Social workers' demands in order to see their children again, but after the demands are met, the DHS is not obligated to return the children.)

"Imminently Likely to Abuse" (Child Protection Investigators have a hard enough life without requiring them to be fortune tellers, removing children from parents who have never yet abused them, but who soon might! Should we arrest somebody who seems "imminently likely to commit a crime", or should we follow tradition and wait until someone actually commits a crime, before we slap him in jail for it?)

"Child Abuse Defined" (A parent wanting to know if her parenting will "pass inspection" cannot get the same answer from any two social workers because specific parenting standards are nowhere published. There isn't even agreement, on whether spanking is permitted, between a CPI [Child Protection Investigator] and, say, the law.)

"Difference of Medical Opinion" (When a parent is following the treatment plan of the family's doctor, he shouldn't be ruled negligent just because a DHS doctor thinks the child ought to have different treatment.)

"Psychiatric Treatment" (They won't let parents spank, so when the child acts up they want to force the parents to spend the child's college savings on psychiatric help! Among other problems with this logic, Psychiatry doesn't help, according to the U.S. Supreme Court!)

"Children Divorcing Their Parents" (Did you know your friendly Child Protection Investigator is glad to help your child file divorce papers against you??)

"Mandatory Ineffective Treatment" (Should your state tax dollars remove children from their parents for not subjecting them to treatment which fails over half the time?)

"Retarded Parents" ("How can retarded parents give good care?" goes this stereotype. But if a supposedly retarded parent isn't providing adequate care, why can't the DHS base its intervention on the adequacy of the care, rather than by stereotyping the parents as "retards" and grabbing children from them even if there IS adequate care?)

"Attorney for a baby?" (The DHS and the parents both claim to represent the baby's best interests. Why have a third attorney who claims to better represent the baby, even though he has never met the baby and knows less about the baby than the parents and the DHS put together?)

"Closed Courtrooms" (Prosecutors usually want the public excluded from juvenile delinquency trials, "for the protection of the child". But sometimes innocent families are being railroaded, and it is the prosecutor who has the most to hide. If both child and parent want the trial public, maybe that should be a clue.)

"Accurate Reports" (The law wants bureaucrats obsessed with "increased" abuse reports. Let's change their obsession to "accurate" abuse reports.)

"Interview!" (Let's get videotapes of the first several hours of interviews of children after they are removed from their parents, to make sure no high pressure interrogation tactics are being used to plant bizarre testimony in the imaginations of impressionable children.)

"Mandatory Reporters" (Many professionals who deal with children report remote suspicions of abuse more out of fear than out of conviction. Let's remove the fear, and free them to exercise their professional judgment.)

"Parental Notification" (Should parents be informed when an abuse investigation begins against them?)

"Surprise Inspections" (The law doesn't even admit that these home interviews are unannounced, but they are. Parents need time to call witness to come over; otherwise the judge will believe whatever the CPI says she found and the parent will be helpless to prove otherwise.)

"Seizing Children, Storm Trooper-Style" (Police should have evidence of real abuse, before they storm into your home to seize your children, authorized by a judge's ruling from a trial of which you were not notified.)

"Hearsay" (Should the judge allow tyhe DHS to submit, into evidence, an inches-thick "abuse report", full of speculation, hearsay, and terrible grammar, with the parent having no right to object to hearsay in it, line by line, they way they do it in a real trial?)

"Open Records" (Shouldn't parents, in court, be allowed to read the written reports against them which the social workers show the judge? In fact, shouldn't parents have access to allegations against them before trial so they can prepare a defense?)

"Continuances" (Should county attorneys be allowed to postpone scheduled hearings without notifying the parents?)

"Termination" (TPR, Termination of Parental Rights, is appropriate when there has been serious physical injury, or sexual abuse. Not for mere neglect. CINA (Child In Need of Assistance) authority, which includes the authority to place children in foster homes, is sufficient to protect children from parents guilty only of neglect, without adding the devastation, to parent and child, of TPR.)

"Child Abuse Registry" (Should semi-public records classify you as a child abuser as soon as a CPI charges you? Or should you be declared officially guilty only after a court rules that you are guilty, the way every other court operates in America?)

Part Two, The Issues Explained

After each new topic headline is a paragraph that has some words in red and the next size larger, and other words in blue and the next size smaller. The red words are those we would like to add to the existing law. The rest of the words are in the law already. The blue words are what we want to remove from the law.

"Best interests of the child" defined ?? finally!

232.1  Rules of construction.

This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that each child under the jurisdiction of the court shall receive, preferably in the child's own home, the care, guidance and control that will best serve the child's welfare best interests of the child and the best interest of the state. When a child is removed from the control of the child's parents, the court shall secure for the child care as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by the parents.

232.2 Definitions

New paragraph: 4. "Best interests of the child" means the opportunity for the maximum continuing contact with both parents, including full custody in the parents, undiluted by mandatory services, unless a court rules that sexual abuse, a pattern of life- or health-threatening abuse, or a single instance of permanent physical injury as the result of abuse, indicates that the risk of abuse in the home is substantially greater than the risk of abuse in foster homes or state institutions. When risk exists, the Best Interests of the Child require the least restrictive physical separation between parent and child possible that will still protect the child from the type of abuse that has occurred. In any case the best interests of the child require sufficient communication that when medical questions are raised, the child's doctors will be able to question the parent concerning family medical history.

Explanation: Can you believe it? "best interests of the child" is not a concept defined in the Juvenile Code! (Though the phrase appears about 45 times.) Without a definition, it can mean anything a bureaucrat wants it to mean. The first phrase of this proposed definition is taken from Iowa divorce law, 598.2. The second phrase, "including full custody in the parents", is a logical extension and clarification of the first phrase. "undiluted by mandatory services" means families should NOT be forced to receive psychiatric or other "services" when abuse hasn't been proved. There are two important reasons for this phrase: (1) to force a non-abusive family to attend classes, submit to therapy, etc., imposes a bureaucratic vision of how to raise children on a family doing fine without it, causing serious stress to the family; and (2) "services" are provided by "mandatory reporters" who, sad experience confirms, sometimes use "services" as "fishing expeditions" to gather distorted bits of family information to weave into a false abuse charge.

"...unless a court rules that a pattern of life- or health-threatening abuse, or a single instance of permanent physical injury as the result of abuse, indicates that the risk of abuse in the home is substantially greater than the risk of abuse in foster homes or state institutions." This clause is a breath-catcher for readers who know the DHS' own reports acknowledge abuse is seven times more likely to occur under DHS care than in a child's natural home! That's why real abuse, and nothing less, should give the DHS jurisdiction. Permanent physical injury even justifies government jurisdiction over custody in Moses' law. (Compare Exodus 21:26-27 with Galatians 4:1.) It is reasonable to extend this concept to "a pattern of life- or health-threatening abuse", language which includes serious neglect. This language, of course, pointedly omits "mental" or "emotional" abuse. Not because it doesn't exist, but because it has not been our experience that government bureaucracy is able to prevent more of it than they inflict. Such abuse is simply too subtle for bureaucrats to treat, or even discern. The other problem, a very serious one, is that there is no way to objectively draw a line between the level of "mental abuse" or "emotional abuse" which is normal in a healthy family, and that level which justifies removing children. Without an objective boundary, there can be no possible consistency in enforcement of this law. Sure, anyone can think of egregious examples of a parent's emotional abuse. But it is actually easier to document egregious examples of DHS abuse of children, by taking children from nonabusive parents and giving them to people who love them less, using for their excuse some alleged "mental" abuse. The Iowa DHS simply has no competency in this area. It has no more ability to treat or even discern mental or emotional abuse than your plumber.

"When risk exists, the Best Interests of the Child require the least restrictive physical separation between parent and child possible that will still protect the child from the type of abuse that has occurred." This phrase would seem to go without saying, but the DHS routinely limits parental contact with their children to a single hour of "supervised" visitation a week, or even a month, when the abuse is very mild, or is not even abuse by any of the standard definitions. There is no sense of proportionality in the DHS: no sense of fitting the "punishment" to the "crime". Sure, if there is strong evidence of sexual abuse, take the child out of the home! Even under Moses' law the parent would not merely have lost their children, but their lives! But if the worst allegation is merely that the kitchen cupboard only had enough food for a day or two, there is no need to remove the children from the home for that! If you don't like their menu, the most you should do is take them out to eat. Don't remove them from the home!

"In any case the best interests of the child require sufficient communication that when medical questions are raised, the child's doctors will be able to question the parent concerning family medical history." This phrase is added because typically the termination of parental rights is so ruthless, so complete, that literally the child's doctor has no way of getting vital medical information from the parents!

Appropriate

232.2(4) New Subsection

4. "Appropriate"" means proportionate to the abuse alleged, before trial, and proven, after trial. Appropriate services are the minimum mandated services proportionate to the abuse alleged, before trial, and proven, after trial. Appropriate treatment is the minimum mandated treatment proportionate to the abuse alleged, before trial, and proven, after trial. Appropriate supervision is the minimum infringement of the family's privacy, proportionate to the abuse alleged, before trial, and proven, after trial. Appropriate removal of the child from his parents is the minimum separation proportionate to the abuse alleged, before trial, and proven, after trial.

For example, it would be inappropriate to order a parent charged with an unsanitary home to see a psychiatrist. The appropriate order would be to see a hygienist. It would be inappropriate to remove a child from a home and limit contact between parent and child to a supervised hour a month, if no violence or sexual abuse has been alleged, but only a diaper rash. The appropriate order would be spot checks over the next two months by someone with medical qualifications.

Inappropriate removal, supervision, treatment, or services are grounds for reversal in District Court.

Explanation: By these standards, virtually all DHS involvement is "inappropriate". Psychiatric "services" are mandated in ALL cases, even though mental injury is alleged in few cases. Removal of children and limitation of visits between parent and child to a single supervised hour week or less are the rule in almost all cases where abuse is "founded", even though abuse so serious you would worry about leaving parent and child alone together for even one hour is virtually never alleged.

Once you define "best interests of the child", you immediately realize that their enemy is inappropriate removal, supervision, treatment, and services.

The final sentence, about "grounds for reversal in District Court", means when "inappropriate" things are done, you can appeal from the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ, who is not really a judge but a lawyer appointed by the DHS) to a real Court. "Grounds for reversal" means justification for overturning the ALJ. "Reversal" has a broader meaning than merely correcting the specific error. It means overturning the entire decision. This would not require the District Court to reverse, but would only allow your case to come before the District Court, where you could make your arguments to try to persuade the judge to reverse.

The second paragraph, giving examples of what is meant, is highly unusual in writing laws. Perhaps it is unprecedented in Iowa law, even though it was the rule in Biblical law, both Old and New Testament. In this case I just can't think of how to make it clear to these people without examples.

The word appropriate is added, in this proposal, to the following sections of the Juvenile Code, Iowa 232: to modify the word "services", in 232.2(4)(f), 232.2(22)(b)(4), 232.2(22)(c), 232.2(24)(b), 232.2(24)(c), 232.2(57), 232.29(1)(e), 232l29(1)(f), 232.52(6), 232.67, 232.71B(1)(b), 232.71B(11)(e), 232.71B(12), 232.99(3), 232.102(1)(c), 232.102(7), 232.102(9), 232.102(10)(a), 232.116(1)(g)(3), 232.127(5)(c). To modify the word "treatment", the word appropriate is added to 232.52(2)(c) and 232.52(2)(c)(2).

"Parental Contract"

232.2(4)g [A Case Permanency Plan should contain].  The actions expected of the parent, guardian, or custodian in order for the department or agency to recommend that the court terminate a dispositional order for the child's out-of-home placement and for the department or agency to end its involvement with the child and the child's family. g. A Parental Contract with the biological parent(s) stating what parental actions must be taken, in return for which the Department [of human services] will physically return the child(ren) to the home of the biological parent(s), and those parental actions in return for which the Court will terminate all mandatory DHS involvement with the family.

Explanation: The difference between the existing law and the proposed replacement will seem subtle to those who do not realize the DHS routinely misleads parents into believing if they jump through their hoops, they will get their child back, while the DHS is only busy building a case for permanent Termination of Parental Rights. Knowing that, you see that the proposed replacement is not a mere implied promise, but a legally binding "contract". It shines a light at the end of the tunnel. It creates a promise parents can trust (let us make it a promise parents can trust!) giving them a serious incentive to cooperate.

A federal court in the landmark [still quoted by courts] case Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 406 F. Supp. 10(1975), said:

"[Parents should receive] notice of what they were doing wrong. They [should be] given a factual basis from which to predict how they should modify their past conduct, their 'parenting', to avoid termination."

The decision explained that when parents are not given explicit notice, their constitutional rights are violated, which brings child abuse cases under the jurisdiction of federal courts. The way parents' constitutional rights are violated is that,

Wary of what conduct is required and what conduct must be avoided to prevent termination, parents might fail to exercise their rights freely and fully. The risk that parents will be forced to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone" than is constitutionally necessary is not justified when the state is capable of enacting less ambiguous termination standards. The Court finds the aforementioned standards unconstitutionally vague in that they deter parents from conduct which is constitutionally protected.

Parenting plans, or Case Permanency Plans, are lists of things parents are ordered to do. Federal law orders the DHS to write them for every case. (Case Permanency Plans are created in only 1 in 10 "out-of-home placements", according to a foster care worker! But enforcing the law is another subject, of course. Here we focus on what the law should require.)

When plans are written, parents are only assured that they might get their children back if they follow them. State law should upgrade them from mere plans to contracts! The difference being that in a contract, each party is obligated to do certain things if the other party does certain other things. PARENTING CONTRACTS should specify whatever things the parents need to do which will unequivocally satisfy the state and return full custody to the parents.

The requirement to put the requirements in writing will serve as a protection against tyrannical requirements. Bizarre demands, in writing, would more easily embarrass the DHS and the Governor. Under current practice, many bizarre requirements are given only verbally, and may include mere insinuations or veiled threats which, besides being impossible to prove to the public, can be difficult to even decipher.

232.2(25).  "Informal adjustment agreement" means an agreement between an intake officer, a child who is the subject of a complaint, and the child's parent, guardian or custodian providing for the informal adjustment of the complaint. The agreement shall include a Parental Contract with the biological parent(s) stating what parental actions must be taken, in return for which the Department [of human services] will physically return the child(ren) to the home of the biological parent(s), and those parental actions in return for which the Court will terminate all mandatory DHS involvement with the family.

Explanation: This language is the same as we have added to the definition of a "Case Permanency Plan." This language protects what is insidious about existing "informal adjustment agreements". In principle, these agreements are like "plea bargains" in criminal court, wherein the accused can avoid the risk of a trial by accepting a lesser sentence. Plea bargains are a blessing to prosecutors who prefer a no-risk small win to a risky big win, and a blessing to guilty criminals who would rather serve a few years than many years. But there is a terrible difference between plea bargains and "informal adjustment agreements." With plea bargains, the accused knows, before he accepts the agreement, what lesser sentence the prosecutor will agree to support. More precisely, there is such a thing as a "sentence": that is, a penalty which, once served, will set a man free again. With "informal adjustment agreements", there is nothing corresponding to a "sentence". There is no thing which parents must do, which, once done, will set them free from the DHS. The only agreement parents receive is that if they obey the social worker, the social worker will not take them to court. For now. But they may remain involved in the family for years, taking notes that may be used in court later. Our proposed language is like "truth in lending" in the banking world. It lets parents know, before they accept an agreement, what they are accepting.

"imminently likely to abuse or neglect the child"

232.2(6)b. .  ["Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child:] Whose parent, guardian, other custodian, or other member of the household in which the child resides has repeatedly physically abused or neglected the child, or is imminently likely to abuse or neglect the child.

c. Who has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects as a result of either of the following:

d. Who has been, or is imminently likely to be, sexually abused by the child's parent, guardian, custodian or other member of the household in which the child resides.

Explanation: How can a parent defend himself against the vague, unsupported charge that they are "imminently likely to" physically abuse, neglect, or sexually abuse their child at some unspecified future time?! What support can there ever be that a parent is "imminently likely to" hurt their child, without a proven history of actually having done so, other than some bureaucrat's notion?

The Alsager case, Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 406 F. Supp. 10(1975), said when parents are accused under a vague law whose scope is anyone's guess, they are "faced with establishing that their conduct fell outside the potentially boundless scope of" the law!

If you really think it can objectively be determined whether a parent is "imminently likely to" abuse a child, then amend it to say, "...or is imminently likely to abuse or neglect the child, as determined by a fact-finding process that is scientifically testable, refutable, and falsifiable." (See the article about the Daubert decision at the end of this article.) However, it should be so obvious on the face of it that there can be no scientific, objective way of determining whether a parent is "imminently likely to" hurt a child, that the only reason for this latter amendment would be to prove a point.

However, it could be an effective strategy for one legislator, in committee and in floor debate, to offer the first version, which repeals the absurd phrase, and then for another legislator to offer an amendment that would leave the absurd phrase but with the latter amended sentence. I would like to get a tape recording of THAT debate!

Child Abuse Defined

232.2(6)c(2)

["Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child (c.) Who has suffered...either of the following:] (2) The A pattern of failure of the child's parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of the household in which the child resides to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child. meet the objective criteria of a Chart of Uniform Standards, defining "neglect", "denial of critical care", and "minimum care in supervising the child", which the DHS shall make publicly available, and which shall describe violations of minimum care standards in sufficient detail that any parent can determine with precision whether or not a social worker will find them in compliance.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Supervision, shall take into account the age and intelligence of the children in need of supervision, the amount of time they are left unsupervised, the frequency with which they are left unsupervised for a given length of time, and the ages of any older children into whose care the younger children are left.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Food, shall be specific enough that any parent can inventory their kitchen and know whether it would pass a DHS inspection.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Shelter, shall define minimum shelter ratings with enough specificity that landlords and real estate agents can rate their properties in their advertising.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Clothing, shall define minimum wardrobe criteria objectively enough that any parent, grandparent, teacher, or social worker can inspect a wardrobe and agree whether it meets standards.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Hygiene, shall specify unacceptable levels of unwashed dishes, clothes, diapers, animal waste, and air pollutants. The specified levels shall be objective and measurable.

The published standards defining "Neglect" and "Denial of Critical Care" may also mean any lack of provision for the child whose minimum measurable levels are published by the Department. No instance of neglect whose limits are not clearly published and made freely available to the public shall be permitted as part of any child abuse report.

The Chart of Uniform Standards shall be written in simple language, and approved as Administrative Rules, as well as published and made freely available to the general public.

 (We propose adding this language also to 232.2(42) and 232.68(2)(a)

232.68(2)d. The failure on the part of a person responsible for the care of a child to provide for the adequate food, shelter, clothing or other care necessary, whose minimum levels are published by the Department in a Chart of Uniform Standards pursuant to 232.2(42), for the child's health and welfare when financially able to do so or when offered financial or other reasonable means to do so....

232.71B(4)(f).  Unless otherwise prohibited under section 234.40 or 280.21, the use of corporal punishment by the person responsible for the care of a child which does not result in a physical injury to the child shall not be considered child abuse. Nor shall it be made part of any child abuse report.

Explanation: (Regarding Vagueness in "Neglect":) Parents should be told, before their children are removed for violating DHS standards, what the standards are. Currently, there are none, except in the minds of individual CPI workers, which are as diverse as their hair length.

Hundreds of thousands of Iowa parents have lost their children for "not enough food" (which is routinely charged even if the child shows no physical indication of malnutrition), to a "dirty home" (tell me where you draw the line between a dirty enough home to be abusive, and the typical model home of a DHS worker), to "leaving the children alone" (though for how long or at what ages is long enough to be "abusive", is nowhere defined, other than in the personal opinions of CPI workers).

I once wrote a newspaper column about this section of law:

"I found the law that allows Child Protection Investigators (CPI) to take children just because they live in "dirty homes".

"It's 232.68(2)d. It says "child abuse" means "The failure on the part of a [parent] to provide for the adequate food, shelter, clothing OR OTHER CARE necessary for the child's health AND WELFARE...."

"Pretty broad, huh? Wouldn't that also cover the child not having a big enough TV, or his own remote control ?? which would require the child to do his channel surfing inches from the screen, which would hurt his eyes?

"Wouldn't that cover anything an individual CPI decides a child ought to have for his own "welfare"? "Dirty homes" are only the introduction!

"Not that I think taking children away from a "dirty home" is a bad idea, mind you. I say, if you can find enough clean homes to put all the dirty kids in, do it! It will be a novel experience for them! Of course, as soon as you put them there, those homes will be dirty. But that's OK. By that time the parents in some of the homes they were taken out of will have had a chance to clean up, so they can sign up to be foster parents and get some other seized kids. Maybe not their own, but hey, kids are kids."

If the DHS dares to publish standards that define violations they prosecute now, and newspapers get to reprint their bizarre notions of what constitutes abuse, they will lose the honor of news reporters, school teachers, courts, and others they rely on to make their lives comfortable. They are immune from public scrutiny now because when you accuse them of, say, removing a child from a father who tickled her, they answer, "Oh, but we would never do a thing like that." Then if you say "But you did exactly that in William Palmer's case", they answer "Oh, but we can't discuss individual cases. That would violate their confidentiality."

That's another reason it would save innocent families to require them to publish the standards they actually use, and then not allow them to apply any criteria in any case, which has not been published.

We don't want to take away from the DHS their authority to "save" children from really dirty homes, because some homes are really pig sties! Some people really do let pet feces and filthy, mouldy, unwashed clothes foul the air. It could not be terribly wrong to "save" children from them.

But it is terribly wrong to take children from homes without any prior published warning to parents of what constitutes neglect!

A single working mother who wants to know how long is too long, in the eyes of the DHS, to leave her child alone, can't get a consistent answer from any two Child Protection Investigators ?? if she gets any answer at all! They will say that's too complicated to be able to determine in advance: they need to "weigh each individual situation". If the DHS can't figure out, and publish, when "lack of supervision" crosses over into "abuse", the DHS ought to stop expecting individual parents to figure it out.

Paragraph "g", a little later, relates to the same problem. It should be changed to: "g.  Whose parent, guardian, or custodian fails to exercise a minimal degree of care pursuant to 232.2(42) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing or shelter and refuses other means made available to provide such essentials. "

"Pursuant" means "as directed by". This addition makes paragraph "g" subject to the definitions we proposed for 232.2(6)c(2)

Regarding the use of the word "neglect": Iowa law defines the word entirely differently than the way the DHS routinely uses it. Not a big problem, just a little confusing - one of the problems solved by our proposed amendment.

"Neglect" and "Denial of Critical Care" are the reasons given for the majority of TPR's (Terminations of Parental Rights) even though "Denial of Critical Care" is a phrase found nowhere in the Iowa code, and "Neglect" is defined as a deliberate physical injury to the child. It is not even the unintentional provision of an unsafe environment in which injury occurs accidentally. It certainly does not mean any mere failure to provide basic needs.

(232.2(42). "...'neglect' means any nonaccidental physical injury suffered by a child as the result of the acts or omissions of the child's parent." Obviously the legislature's intent, when it enacted this definition of "neglect", was to cover situations where a parent would deliberately injure a child, though indirectly, (not by actually striking the child), so as to avoid child abuse charges. We can only imagine examples: deliberately placing a toddler at the top of stairs, perhaps. Shutting a child outside in the snow without a coat. Leaving the diaper unchanged until the rash requires medical treatment. Starving a child to the point evidence of malnutrition appears. Chaining a child to the bed post until welts appear. Really mean stuff which, without this language, would escape prosecution. )

The only place in the Juvenile Code which actually describes the sort of parental deficiencies which the DHS calls "neglect" and "denial of critical care" is a place which uses neither of these terms. ("Child abuse means: 232.68(2)d. The failure [of the parent] to provide for the adequate food, shelter, clothing or other care necessary for the child's health and welfare...") The law already uses the word "care" to describe the provision of these necessities, and it is reasonable to call these needs "critical", so "Denial of Critical Care" is a reasonable extension of the language of the law. The drafting of the proposal here makes the interchangeability of "neglect" and "denial of critical care" official.

Explanation Regarding Spanking: Is spanking "abuse", or not? Parenting classes say it is, and spanking is often mentioned as part of child abuse reports, but the law certainly doesn't say that, to which DHS officials have alluded to get us off their backs, flatly telling us, when we complain because they remove children from parents for spanking, "spanking is not child abuse"!

Let me go over that again: the law absolutely does NOT define spanking as child abuse! Just read 232.71B(4)(f). above. The closest the law comes is to define, as abuse: bruises, welts, or redness lasting over 24 hours. And yet the DHS removes children from parents for spanking. So then when we activists complain, they answer "(Oh, you're worrying about a problem which never existed. I'm sure I don't have any idea what you amateurs are talking about.) Spanking is not child abuse." So then we stumble over ourselves, trying to figure out how to explain to them that we're not complaining about Iowa law, which of course doesn't make it child abuse, but only about the law they have taken into their own hands. Spanking is not child abuse in any law book, but only in child abuse reports, and in the "parenting classes" which spanking parents are forced to attend.

Let's clarify the law! Not even parenting classes offer a "bottom line" to discipline that is as effective as spanking; and when parental discipline has no bottom line, children get out of control, and then parents risk being charged with "lack of supervision"!

It's not just God's laws that are thumbed by a system that punishes parents for disciplining their children. It's their own everyday practice. When THEY encounter children out of control, they put them in institutions which use restraining straps, electric shock torture ("treatments"), and personality-suppressing drugs - barbaric treatments for which parents would be thrown in jail, not just lose their children! Only hypocrites condemn parents for spanking. Hypocrites who do, themselves, worse than those they accuse.

Can you imagine doing away with police, courts, and laws, for adults? Then how can you arrive at the conclusion that children are so much better self-disciplined than adults, that they don't need the threat of punishment, with levels of punishment which increase proportionately to the offense?

You say, "Well, if 232.71B(4)(f). already clearly says corporal punishment is not abuse, what more can be said?"

We can say "not only is it not abuse, but it may not be made part of any abuse report."

You see, here is how they take nonabuse and turn it into abuse. They take something which is not abuse, like spanking, and put it on their form. They they take something else which is not abuse, like a dirty living room, and put it on their form. Then they might throw in being fat and ugly, which is not abuse; and having Campbell's Soup, which as we now know is for people who haven't grown out of their childhood, and several other items which do not constitute abuse, and after awhile your DHS Resume starts looking pretty bad.

In other words, they take 0 abuse, + 0 abuse, + 0 abuse, and keep adding zeroes until it finally equals One Abuse.

That's how they still manage to turn spanking into abuse, and that's why not allowing them to even mention spanking in their reports will finally make them follow the law. (We pray.)

The other thing we have added is that injury to the buttocks not requiring medical treatment shall not be considered abuse. That's because the existing criteria lists "redness lasting over 24 hours" as physical abuse. Not only is redness lasting over 24 hours, in our view, not necessarily excessive for a spanking, (not that we would like all spankings to be that severe, but in the hopefully very rare case of very dangerous misbehavior parents MUST have some means of making a lasting impression), but this restrictive standard is made worse by the lack of any requirement that the redness actually be observed by anybody! Under present practice, a child may merely allege that 10 years ago he was spanked, and yes the redness lasted 26 hours at least, and the DHS is happy to put the youth in foster care! So we want the law to read that even if there are also bruises, or welts, if it's on the buttocks and doesn't call for medical treatment, stay out of it, DHS: you're much worse, with your handcuffs, your "other restraints", your electric shock tortures ("treatments"), and your personality-altering drugs!

The sentence beginning "any other injury" is for the benefit of moms whose sons are too big to force into a spanking position. They need authority to physically punish, too, within reason, and for the benefit of the child.

"Approved as administrative rules": The last sentence of our proposed amendment says the Chart of Uniform Standards must be "approved as administrative rules". That's because Administrative Rules have a little bit of oversight by elected lawmakers. There is an Administrative Rules Committee, made up of a few Iowa legislators, who review every Administrative Rule passed by every department. They can recommend changes, which normally are dutifully made. But if a Department refuses to make the change, the committee can bring the issue to the attention of the entire legislature, which then has the ability (though seldom the time or the will) to reverse the rule. Usually, however, each state Department relies so heavily on the good will of lawmakers to enact the many changes they want every year, that they avoid offending them.

Administrative Rules, by the way, are "laws" written by State Departments, applying to operations of their department, to fill in the gaps left by vague or incomplete state law. These Administrative Rules fill several volumes for each Department. After you read the state law governing each department, then read the Administrative Rules for fuller understanding.

Difference of Medical Opinion

[232.2(6)e "Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child]

e.  Who is in need of medical treatment to cure, or alleviate, or prevent serious physical injury or illness and whose parent, guardian or custodian is unwilling or unable to provide such treatment, unless the family's doctor deems the proposed treatment unnecessary. The family's doctor shall incur no additional liability for recommending less treatment than DHS-contracted doctors. In any review of the family's doctor's recommendation, testimony against him by a doctor under contract with the DHS shall not be permitted, but shall be considered a conflict of interest.

Explanation: This sounds as if the Christian Scientists lost their religious rights, but actually this paragraph competes with 232.68(2)d, which grants them a specific exemption based on religion. Let's give some intellectual freedom to the remainder of parents, whose doctors have honest differences of opinion with DHS doctors! If lack of medical care results in actual injury or illness, THEN let the DHS intervene; but not just to "prevent" what MIGHT happen.

And especially lets trash that terrible phrase "or unable", which says children can be removed from parents at enormous legal, psychiatric, and other bureaucratic state expense, just because a parent may be financially "unable to provide" medical treatment that would cost a fraction of what the state will spend to forcibly intervene! That phrase is also at odds with 232.68(2)d, which provides that the parents must first be offered financial assistance.

Some may object that being declared a "child in need of assistance" does not necessarily mean the parents are bad, but only that they need assistance; for example, in this case, medical assistance. Indeed, many parents are persuaded to voluntarily sign their children into the program as needing assistance.

But the "Child in Need of Assistance" (CINA) bureaucracy is primarily focused on coercing bad parents, as a look over most of the definitions of what constitutes such a child will assure you. And this very paragraph, itself, provides for coerced medical help. So for the relief of parents who don't voluntarily sign up, and who have legitimate differences of medical opinion with DHS doctors, the assurance of the family's doctor that the child is not likely to suffer from not receiving the treatment, or may actually be harmed by it, ought to satisfy the bureaucrats.

The sentence about liability is added because without it, doctors who oppose child abuse bureaucrats could find themselves sued for negligence, with DHS-paid doctors testifying against them. It is a "conflict of interest" where you are trusted to say what you believe is the truth, while you are being paid to say what someone else believes is more important. Doctors should be free to doctor, free of self-serving intimidation from legal hounds.

When this is enacted in law, these phrases will need to be added in other sections of the Iowa Code that deal with liability in lawsuits, and review by medical boards.

232.101 deals with the same problem after the judge has already intervened.

Psychiatric Treatment

232.2(6).  ["Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child:] f.  Who is in need of treatment to cure or alleviate serious mental illness or disorder, or emotional damage as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others and whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unwilling or unable to provide such treatment.

Explanation: They won't let parents spank, so when the child acts up they want to force the parents to spend the child's college savings on psychiatric help! Among other problems with this logic, Psychiatry doesn't help!

It is the tyranny of foolishness to (defacto - for all practical purposes) outlaw the most effective, simplest form of discipline, simple spanking, without offering parents an effective substitute; and then when their children become wild, to order them to pay exorbitant sums to psychiatrists, whose own research proves they are unable to help anybody, or else they will lose their children for "neglecting" them! See also 232.101.

Additional problems with this paragraph are explained in the previous section, "Differences of Medical Opinion"

(For the Supreme Court case which shows the failure of psychiatry, see the articles concluding these explanations.)

Later in the code is the definition of a psychiatrist. Let's up the scientific standards and see how many still qualify: (You've got to read the article about the Daubert decision to appreciate this!)

Have you ever wondered why psychiatric "services" are ordered MOST child abuse cases we have seen, even though "mental injury" has not been alleged in any of the cases we have seen.

You say, "Why do you want to eliminate 232.71D(3)(f)(5), below, which targets parents for 'gross failure to meet emotional needs'? It's not like it goes after just any emotional neglect. It only goes after emotional neglect that is gross." Sorry, but I've see what can gross out a CPI worker. I don't feel protected because the law only removes children from parents for "gross" emotional neglect. I would feel safer if it acted because of "accurately and objectively measured" emotional neglect. Unfortunately, there is no way to accurately and objectively measure emotional neglect. Sure, you know when you feel emotionally neglected. But would you like a perfect stranger to have the authority to destroy your family because he feels you have been emotionally negligent?  

Psychiatry: when inappropriate services are mandated, that shows the agenda of the DHS is not merely to stop abuse, but to conver

232.68(6).  "Mental health professional" means a person practitioner of a discipline which is falsifiable, testable, and refutable and who meets the following requirements:

232.71D(3)(f)(4) (Reasons to place parents in the Child Abuse Registry)

(4)  Failure to provide adequate mental health care.

(5)  Gross failure to meet emotional needs.

232.98(2)  Following an adjudication that a child is a child in need of assistance, the court may after a hearing order the physical or mental examination of the parent, guardian or custodian if that person's ability to care for the child is at issue.

Explanation: This language is disingenuous. Nobody is going to send a parent to a medical doctor to investigate fears the parent may be unable to physically care for his child! What, are they going to put you on a treadmill to see if you have the stamina to follow around a 5-year-old? Obviously the only concern of the DHS in getting this enacted was authority to send the parents to the shrink. When they want to mandate "services" for children, we say let them be testable, falsifiable, and refutable. When they want to mandate psychiatric "services" for parents, who, as other laws make ruthlessly clear, will be sent the bill, we just say, "delete that".

Psychiatry part 2: Mental injury

232.2(35)

Our first choice: "35. 'Mental injury' means a nonorganic injury to a child's intellectual or psychological capacity as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment in the child's ability to function within the child's normal range of performance and behavior, considering the child's cultural origin."

Our second choice: "35. 'Mental injury' means a nonorganic injury to a child's intellectual or psychological capacity as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment, whose existence has been verified by a scientifically testable, refutable, and falsifiable fact-finding process, in the child's ability to function within the child's normal range of performance and behavior, considering the child's cultural origin."

Explanation: All our 2nd choice explicitly does is limit determinations of mental injury to those conducted by scientifically verifiable means. But the indirect effect will be that accused parents will be able to fight any charge of mental injury that has been determined by a psychiatrist, by pointing out that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Daubert, 113 Sup. Ct., 2786, established a standard of "the scientific status of a theory" by citing a 5 page article explaining how psychiatry is not a science at all, but a "pseudo [imitation] science", in the same category as astrology!

That article follows these proposals. Read it to understand the 3 magic words, "testable, refutable, and falsifiable."

Since a "mental injury" that is "observable" to other than a psychiatrist is difficult to imagine, this amendment would, in effect, repeal "mental injury" as a ground of child abuse.

Actually 232.98 says "The court may consider chemical dependency as either a physical or mental condition and may consider a chemical dependency evaluation as either a physical or mental examination." So the effect of the amendment would be to limit the definition of "mental injury" to chemical dependency ?? since "chemical dependency" would be the only remaining type of "mental injury" whose existence can be verified by a scientifically testable, refutable, and falsifiable fact-finding process!

It would make more sense to simply repeal this section. But there are many legislators who, regardless of what the Supreme Court says, actually believe mental injuries can be objectively diagnosed by professional psychiatrists, so that if you repeal it, you will be condoning parents who mentally abuse their children. For them, we offer our second choice. Merely asking that mental injury be scientifically diagnosed should appear to them, so long as they remain blissfully ignorant of the Daubert principles, a non-controversial phrase, which will only make psychiatrists a little more careful. Upon what basis could they object to it?

I don't mean to promise you they won't object. But it will be a show to see upon what basis!

The other reason state legislators will be motivated to keep "mental injury" in the code is because federal law conditions $333 million, as of about 4 years ago, on that phrase being in the code. So fine, we surely don't want to be accused of taking money from a lawmaker. So let them have their phrase; just define it so it doesn't destroy any more families.

There will be many readers who will say "What do you mean, the Supreme Court says psychiatry isn't science? Why, I've been to psychiatrists all my life, and they have been wonderful for me!"

Let me illustrate why scientific scrutiny of psychiatry, which has shown it incapable of helping more people than it hurts, matters.

I give guitar lessons to Saiid, from Bangladesh, who studied medical science in India and passed his boards in America to be a doctor, and is working in a pharmacy while waiting for an opening. I asked him "Are there folk remedies in Bangladesh which might be beneficial here but would not be permitted?" He answered "I don't believe in those remedies. I've studied medical science, and for every drug I dispense, I know the side effects. But at the medicine shows, they have a microphone, and they say something funny, and all the people gather, and they promise wonderful benefits about drugs where no one has studied or recorded the side effects. It may be fine for 100 people, but then a few may become sick or die. It is good to know the side effects."

This is of course reminiscent of the medicine shows that traveled America 100 years ago, with pretty dancing girls and minstrel bands, selling snake oil and wonderful elixirs promising to cure everything from baldness to sadness to scurvy to ugliness. And it is reminiscent of sales today of everything from collodial silver, to picnogenal, to peppermint oil, all with vast claims of miraculous cures and no information about side effects. In fact it is alleged there can be no side effects because they are all "natural".

For the same reason that dangerous medicines should be controlled, the studies made by psychiatrists, showing that as many people are harmed by it as are helped by it, ARE worth our consideration.

We are not asking that psychiatry be outlawed. We are only asking that when a treatment has a failure rate of 50%, that is an unacceptable rate; it is not successful enough for our police to force people to submit to it, and our courts to order parents to hock their homes to pay for exorbitantly expensive treatments, and then to remove children from parents unwilling to submit to such devastation.

The same language comes up again later in the Juvenile Code:

232.68(2)(b) Definitions. "Child abuse" or "abuse" means:

b. Any mental injury to a child's intellectual or psychological capacity as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment, whose existence has been verified by a scientifically testable, refutable, and falsifiable fact-finding process, in the child's ability to function within the child's normal range of performance and behavior as the result of the acts or omissions of a person responsible for the care of the child, if the impairment is diagnosed and confirmed by a licensed physician or qualified mental health professional as defined in section 622.10

232.83  Child sexual abuse involving a person not responsible for the care of the child.

1.  A complaint related to circumstances involving a child who is alleged to be a victim of an offense defined in chapter 709, 726, or 728 and an alleged offender who is not a person responsible for the care of the child shall be handled pursuant to section 232.81.

2.  Anyone authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation in response to a complaint may apply for, or the court on its own motion may enter an ex parte order authorizing a physician or hospital to conduct an outpatient physical examination or authorizing a physician, a psychologist certified under section 154B.7, or a community mental health center accredited pursuant to chapter 230A to conduct an outpatient mental examination of a child if necessary to identify the nature, extent, and causes of any injuries, emotional damage, or other such needs of a child as specified in section 232.2, subsection 6, paragraph "c", "e", or "f", provided that all of the following apply:

a.  The parent, guardian, or legal custodian is absent, or though present, was asked and refused to authorize the examination.

b.  There is not enough time to file a petition and hold a hearing under this chapter.

c.  The parent, guardian, or legal custodian has not provided care and treatment related to their child's alleged victimization.

Explanation: This section basically says if a social worker gets the notion that a child was sexually abused by someone outside the family, and the family disagrees, or balks at selling the house in order to pay outlandish psychiatric bills, then the child should be removed from the parents through "Child In Need of Assistance" proceedings.

Sexual abuse of a child is a matter for criminal court, whether it was by the parent or a stranger. If there is really enough evidence to prosecute, the criminal court will take care of services for the child in the course of gathering evidence. Certainly removal of a child from innocent, loving parents, because of a crime against the child committed by a stranger, should not be allowed without even proving in a court of law that there was even a crime!

232.98(1)(c) Physical and mental examinations

["...the court may commit the child to a...[medical or mental] hospital...for the purpose of examination for a period not to exceed fifteen days if all of the following are found to be present:"]

c.  The child's attorney, or if the child has no attorney, the child in an interview with the judge, agrees to the commitment. An examination ordered after adjudication shall be conducted on an outpatient basis when possible, but if necessary the court may commit the child to a suitable nonsecure hospital, facility, or institution for the purpose of examination for a period not to exceed thirty days.

The child's parent, guardian, or custodian shall be included at their option in counseling sessions offered during the child's stay in a hospital, facility, or institution when feasible, and when in the best interests of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. The child's parent, guardian, or custodian may establish a record of the sessions with video or audio recorders, and by bringing witnesses. If separate counseling sessions are conducted for the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, a joint counseling session shall be offered prior to the release of the child from the hospital, facility, or institution. The court shall require that notice be provided to the child's guardian ad litem of the counseling sessions and of the participants and results of the sessions.

2. Following an adjudication that a child is a child in need of assistance, the court may after a hearing order the physical or mental examination of the parent, guardian or custodian if that person's physical or mental ability to care for the child is at issue.

Explanation: The "interview with the judge" is necessary if our other bill, that would eliminate forcing unwanted attorneys upon children, is adopted.

Regarding "a record of the sessions": These "counseling" sessions are used as "fishing expeditions" to gather evidence of child abuse to present in court. If you don't believe it, read the final sentence of this paragraph, where the court requires everybody to keep the guardian ad litem posted on whatever happens during counseling.

As the law is now, the DHS has this "discovery" opportunity, to go on a fishing expedition for evidence for their side, and the DHS has exclusive access to any record made during their fishing trip. Without a verbatim record, parents are helpless to refute the spin later given of their words by the "professional" psychiatrist. An accurate record would make things more even for the parents.

You should get it out of your head that these "counseling sessions" have anything to do with "counseling". As the code language above indicates, they are fact-finding opportunities for the court, with secrets kept only from the parents, but not from the court. What is "counseling" without "confidentiality"? What psychiatrist would receive any business if he told his patients "Not only will I not hold anything you tell me in confidence, but I will use it against you in court"?! And yet that is exactly what this paragraph orders "counselors" to do. They are able to succeed as well as they do only by lying to their patients, telling them their confidentiality will be preserved. Only after it is too late do the patients go to court and hear their confidences betrayed not just publicly, but to their very enemies! "Counselors" is not even the right word for people in this role. The law should call them "police interrogators".

Notice the different approach we take in dealing with these mental health scenarios. Elsewhere we simply delete them. Here we let them be, but just bring our cameras so we can have some fun too. Maybe we should just delete the references to "mental" and "counseling" here, too, but this demonstrates there is more than one way to solve a problem.

Children Divorcing their Parents

[232.2(6)l. "Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child]

l.  Who for good cause desires to have the child's parents relieved of the child's care and custody.

Explanation: This grammar is pretty hobbled, but it means if a child no longer wants his parents to have custody of him, and if he has a good reason, "good cause", he can ask the DHS for what is, in effect, a divorce!

"Oh, but children are only allowed to divorce their parents for 'good cause'", you assure me.

You expect me to feel safer because I can trust the divorcee who is after my child, who keeps winking at the judge, to reverence fidelity, commitment, and family bonds more than whatever "reason" impresses her anti-Christian mind?

Considering what passes for "good reasons" for adult divorce these days, I don't hold much hope for clear thinking in this new area of law where there are no written standards whatsoever!

If there is abuse as defined somewhere, let THAT be grounds for Termination of Parental Rights! If there is some "good cause" that falls short of those grounds, let not the child's "desires" even be entered into the equation!

Don't put such a terrible burden on the backs of children! Every choice is also a responsibility. When something harmful is made a choice, then the choice brings in the temptation to do it for the most selfish of reasons, and the responsibility to not do it.

You wouldn't put a loaded gun by your child's dinner plate and tell him "Now Johnny, it would be very naughty to shoot me. I would be very disappointed in you. But I know that you need to learn to make choices, and I'm sure you'll make the right choices.".

If you wouldn't do that with a gun, why would you want the DHS to do it with a divorce, which is only a slower and more painful death?

"Oh", you say, "But that idea of the gun, to teach choices, is a great idea! I'm going to go out right now and buy a gun for my kid! Besides, I think children ought to learn about divorce while they are young so when they grow up, they will know how to do it themselves."

You scumbag! Stop reading right now! These protections aren't for you. You oughta have your kids taken away yesterday! Give me your name and I'll turn you in myself!

Mandatory Ineffective Treatment

232.2(6)m

["Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child] m. Who is in need of treatment to cure or alleviate chemical dependency and whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unwilling or unable to provide such treatment, provided that treatment is available, at least 50% of whose clients remain chemically free one year after treatment.

Explanation: Should your state tax dollars remove children from their homes because their parents won't subject them to treatment which over half the time? If treatment can't even offer a 50% chance of recovery, how dare state law threaten to seize children whose parents won't buy into it! And of course as we all know, only 20% of drug treatment graduates are still off drugs one year after treatment. Not very impressive. A Federal DHHS study in 1977 found 88% of Teen Challenge graduates were still off, even 5 years after treatment, but that doesn't count, because their treatment includes the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

But if legislators think they can't require effective treatment, because of "separation of church and state", then let's stop them from requiring ineffective treatment, and backing up that requirement with the threat of seizing our children! Especially when our children became addicted through their schools, and the "drug treatment" classes which treat drugs as some sort of (acceptable) "choice", the way they invite children to divorce their own parents!

"Services" (Mandatory Ineffective Treatment part 2)

New definition: 232.2

49. "Services" means any assistance offered or ordered to the child or the family whose anticipated benefits are scientifically testable, refutable and falsifiable.

232.52 Disposition of child found to have committed a delinquent act

2(c)(2) ¶2: A parent or guardian may be required by the juvenile court to participate in educational or treatment programs whose benefits are scientifically testable, refutable, and falsifiable as part of a probation plan if the court determines it to be in the best interest of the child. A parent or guardian who does not participate in the probation plan when required to do so by the court may be held in contempt.

Explanation: There are many places throughout the Juvenile Code where parents are forced to accept "services", up to and including interrogations by psychiatrists whose notes find their way into subsequent Termination of Parental Rights hearings. [232.2(4)b, c, d. 232.67.]

This language would end the pressure on parents and children to submit to psychiatry, but would continue to allow the DHS to require families to accept physical services, such as transportation, medical care, food, shelter if they have none, etc.

For example, if you offer transportation to a family, the stated benefit is that the family will be able to get home, or to school, or whatever. The fact that the family will indeed realize this benefit is scientifically testable, refutable and falsifiable. But if you offer psychiatry, with the anticipated benefit that the family will become less dysfunctional and the parents less abusive, there is no way anyone will ever be able to know whether the family will have realized these benefits, with any accuracy any more scientific than someone's personal opinion.

Notice that in 232.52, parents may not only lose their children, but may be found in contempt of court, which means up to 6 months in jail! Just for refusing to participate in psychiatry, whose alleged benefits are neither testable, refutable, nor falsifiable! (See article explaining these scientific criteria at the end of these explanations.)

"Retarded" Parents

232.2(6)n.  ["Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child:] n. Whose parent's or guardian's mental capacity or condition, imprisonment, or drug or alcohol abuse results in the child not receiving adequate care.

Explanation: This paragraph is unnecessary and, well, retarded, especially in the case of supposed mental incapacity. If there is inadequate care, as measured by the objective standards we want published, how does its cause make it worse for the child?

This law is only a testament to the arbitrariness of the determination of whether a child has received adequate care. This law assumes a social worker can't tell whether a child has received adequate care by looking at the care itself, so she has to determine it by stereotyping the parents! "If parents are retarded, they can't be good parents", goes the stereotype, without any regard for the marvelous gifts God gives the retarded, to compensate for what others perceive as retardation.

"Oh no," you say, "this law is only used when a parent's retardation actually causes inadequate care, not just because they are retarded!"

All right, then, if there is actually inadequate care, why can't the Child Protection Investigators determine whether the child needs help by looking at the care, rather than by stereotyping the parents? At best, this law serves no purpose. At worst, it codifies stereotypes.

Obviously if someone is in prison he will not be providing much child care, but just as obviously, you don't need to factor in the prison before you can see the lack of care. Just look at the care. Prisoners have families. Other family members are usually glad to step in. If they do, stay out. You aren't helping.

Alcohol abuse is more difficult to gauge the seriousness of, because care provided by an alcoholic is so inconsistent. But here again, other family members often step in to mitigate the harm. And it is so relative, that it is like mental abuse: how much does it take to justify intervention? How much is "normal", meaning, the amount of alcohol abuse engaged in by the average DHS worker? Let's just look at the quality of the care directly, and not worry about surmising what the care might be like, based on our stereotypes of the parents.

I don't mean to say I don't share some of these same stereotypes, on a personal level. If I learn a parent is an alcoholic, I become concerned for the children. I become suspicious that the children might not be well taken care of. But even on a personal level, my suspicion causes me to want to know more about the children's care; it doesn't make me automatically assume the children will never make it to maturity.

"Family in Need of Assistance" defined objectively

232.2(20)

20.  "Family in need of assistance" means a family in which there has been a breakdown in the relationship between a child and the child's. a judge has ruled that a child has been abused by his parent, guardian or custodian

Explanation: Do you know what the phrase "objective standard" means? Do you care? Do you know why it matters?

If you want a social worker to measure whether a family is "fat", and you define "fat" as 300 pounds or more, you can be reasonably confident that 100 social workers, measuring 100 families, will all agree which families are "fat". They will agree because the standard gives the evaluator no choice about how to interpret the evidence. That would, therefore, be an "objective" standard.

On the other hand, let's think of a really bizarre example of a "subjective" standard, where the evaluator has all kinds of discretion how to interpret the evidence, because the standard is vague, having no precise meaning. Let's see; how about, oh I've got it: how about asking social workers to measure whether there has been a breakdown in the relationship between a child and the child's parent? That's like asking a social worker to measure which direction the wind blows across a back yard: it kind of depends on which day, and sometimes which minute, the social worker shows up to do the measuring. Except that at least with the wind, you can measure it. How do you measure a relationship? Oh, I know. By how it reacts with the personality of the social worker. If the social worker feels good about it, that means the relationship has not broken down. If the interview puts the social worker in a real crummy mood, the family should be separated.

None of this vagueness is necessary. Child abuse should be the only grounds for DHS jurisdiction over a family, and court rulings are fairly simple to count. When they say "guilty" or "not guilty", they don't leave a lot of wiggle room for interpretation.

One reason the DHS wants vague language is to make it easier to require "mandatory services" to parents who have not been convicted (or even accused) of abuse. We reject the legality of this agenda. Let "mandatory services" exist only for those convicted. Before conviction, let all "services" be voluntary.

Do you understand why it is important that the standards used to intervene in families be OBJECTIVE? If you were a family being judged by such a standard, you would understand! You would feel more secure being judged by a standard as clear as a speed limit, so that you would know whether you are safe, and if not you would know what you have to do to be safe. You would be terrified if you realized the standard to be used to determine whether to tear apart your family and take your children from you is so devoid of detail that it encourages social workers to make up the details as they go! Yet that is precisely what happens with the existing vague standard.

Attorney for a Baby?

232.2(22)a.  "Guardian ad litem" means a person appointed by the court to represent the interests of a child who has asked a judge for representation, and who is mature enough to participate in any judicial proceeding to which the child is a party, and includes a court appointed special advocate, except that a court appointed special advocate shall not file motions or petitions pursuant to section 232.54, subsections 1 and 4, section 232.103, subsection 2, paragraph "c", and section 232.111. Before appointing a guardian ad litem, the judge shall be certain the child fully understands four options:

(1) court-appointed counsel in which an attorney representing the child is paid by the court and selected by the court, although the court will approve any attorney selected by child and will not approve any attorney which the child rejects;

(2) parent-retained counsel in which an attorney representing the child is paid for and selected by the parents;

(3) Pro-se defense, in which the child is permitted at the counsel table and may participate directly in the trial without legal representation, with or without the whispered assistance of an attorney, paralegal, or friend; or

(4) no separate counsel, where the child is a passive party to the case, the only active parties to the case being the parents and the state. But the parents may choose court-appointed counsel which the parents select but for which the court pays, so that the parents will have like opportunity with the DHS to present evidence on behalf of the child.

b. The budget provided court-appointed counsel, for either the child or parents, shall provide up to the number of hours used by the attorney for the DHS. The funds necessary, which are not available from other sources, shall come from the DHS budget.

232.71C (3).  In every case involving child abuse which results in a child protective judicial proceeding, whether or not the proceeding arises under this chapter, a guardian ad litem shall be appointed by the court pursuant to 232.2(22)a  to represent the child in the proceedings. Before a guardian ad litem is appointed pursuant to this section, the court shall require the person responsible for the care of the child to complete under oath a detailed financial statement. If, on the basis of that financial statement, the court determines that the person responsible for the care of the child is able to bear the cost of the guardian ad litem, the court shall so order. In cases where the person responsible for the care of the child is unable to bear the cost of the guardian ad litem, the expense shall be paid out of the county treasury.

Explanation: Regarding the elimination of "guardian ad litems" for babies: The Child Abuse Investigator claims to represent the interests of a baby. The parents also claim to represent the baby's best interests. Through their interaction the judge may have some hope of learning the truth. So what purpose is served by hiring a third attorney, supposedly to represent the baby, as if neither the DHS nor the parents are there for that purpose? The baby's attorney knows less about the baby than the DHS, and never bothers to even meet the baby, yet the baby's attorney's opinion is given perhaps more weight than the DHS attorney's, and the parents', together!

The consequence of this strange arrangement is that the parents, who can barely afford one attorney for even a few of the many expensive proceedings, are overwhelmed by having two attorneys opposing them at every single one of the hearings.

Of course, this cannot be the intended purpose of the DHS for enacting this law, since the DHS would never deliberately do anything unfair. However, even though it is only accidentally unfair, it is still unfair, and unfair to the child by distorting the voice of the parents who, after all, know the child better than the DHS and the "guardian ad litem" put together.

By the way, the "guardian ad litem" is paid out of the County Attorney's budget; the same office which provides attorneys for the DHS! Thus the County Attorneys, as they go about representing the DHS, have a lot to say about which private attorneys ought to be hired as "guardian ad litems", and how fat their budgets ought to be. Pretty handy arrangement, to control the budget of the "other" attorney as insurance against the "other" attorney thinking about opposing you. (If the County Attorney doesn't cooperate with the DHS to its satisfaction, the DHS can turn to the state Attorney General's office for representation, in which case the budget for the Guardian Ad Litem still comes from the County Attorney's office.)

Would you like an attorney representing you in court whom you have never met? Yet the paragraphs following these, in the existing law, point out that is exactly the case unless "the child's age is appropriate for the interview". How can they claim to have the foggiest notion of the best interests of a child they have never met? Notice also the existing law leaves it to the discretion of the attorney to decide whether the child is old enough to be worth interviewing, which may explain why quite mature children are often put through the charade of being "represented" by a perfect stranger working to tear them away from the parents they love.

To pretend there is a third party, who can represent what the child really wants better than the parents or the DHS, (other than the child himself if he is mature enough), is a poorly disguised excuse for stacking the deck against the parents. $50,000 is a typical legal bill for any parent willing to oppose the DHS, so many parents face the gauntlet with no attorney. Or worse, with an attorney with too small a budget to be effective, who expects to lose anyway, and therefore who is motivated to get it done as quickly as possible. Opposed to the parent are not just one attorney with an unlimited budget, for the DHS, but another attorney claiming to "represent" the child he has never met, who barely knows the parents either but who is real chummy with the judge and DHS folk!

The Guardian Ad Litem's budget is currently $320 in Polk County. That assumes he will do 8 hours of work, at $40 an hour. $40 an hour may be good wages for a hamburger flipper, but I don't think any attorney charges that little to the general public. 8 hours of work might be about right if the parent doesn't resist anything the DHS does, so that there are few hearings, and doesn't argue at any of the hearings, so that the hearings are short and don't require any preparation. Then, perhaps, a guardian ad litem might make money, if he has several such cases going at the same time. A guardian ad litem can request more pay for a particularly complicated case, but he is not likely to get it.

Parents overwhelmed at hearings by not one but two aggressive attorneys, when the parent can't afford one, and one of the hostile attorneys claims to represent the child he has never met, should be sensitive to these realities, and sympathetic with guardian ad litems. It's nothing personal, when they act hostile, seemingly just because you even showed up. It's not that they dislike you or anything. They're just nervously watching the clock.

Put yourself in the place of the "guardian ad litem". You have never met the child. You barely know the parents. What you know of the parents mostly comes from accusations against them in the record. Even if you had unlimited access to the parents to get their side of the story, your job is not to represent them. Meanwhile you have worked with the DHS attorney, the juvenile court judge, and the DHS staff, for years. You know their birthdays, their hobbies, the football teams they love, and their kids' names. You do lunch with some of them, and with all of them you at least have a working relationship. So then here you are in court, amidst all your friends, and in come the parents. The worst-dressed people of the whole group; no thousand-dollar duds like the rest of you can afford. Some don't even try to dress up. Or, more accurately, "dressing up" in their world doesn't call for the same styles as in yours. And what terrible accusations! Some accusations are so terrible that it almost becomes irrelevant whether or not they are true!

Besides that, you enjoy getting paid for your work. You like being able to turn in your hours on a job, and getting paid proportionately. You don't like getting hundreds of dollars less for a case than your hours on it deserve, and not finding out until you have put in the hours. It puts you in a real bad mood. So you are inclined to please the boys who make out your check. Even if they are in the same office with the boys representing one of "the other sides" in your case.

Tell me honestly: which side would YOU be inclined to favor?

Ask any parent who has ever opposed the DHS in court, whether this is not an accurate picture of the terror they faced!

How is justice served by forcing a small child to have an attorney not of his own choosing?

Faretta v. Brown, 422 U.S. 806, 820-821, says "The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant ?? not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists. ...An unwanted counsel 'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense."

The possibility that an unwanted attorney may have a different agenda than the child is exactly what many critics of the Child Abuse Industry have alleged is what happens. Among those critics is an entire Grand Jury, in San Diego, which investigated its DHS in 1992. (See the "Families In Crisis Report #2, a Report by the 1991-1992 San Diego County Grand Jury, Feb 6, 1992".)

It said, "In a seriously contested case, the Jury discovered that the attorney for the minors had not met her two young clients in the two years the case had been in Juvenile Court. The Jury found rare instances in which the minor's attorney had interviewed the parents and/or extended family.

"Ultimately, a family is billed for minor's counsel despite the fact that they have no input in the choice of this attorney. The approved list of panel attorneys is perceived as subject to political pressure. Panel attorneys told the Jury that if they are representing the child and oppose DSS, they fear removal from the list. One panel attorney, after 'challenging' the judge scheduled to hear a case, was immediately removed as the minor's counsel. PANEL ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING THE PARENTS ARE FEARFUL OF APPEARING TOO LITIGIOUS ON BEHALF OF THEIR CLIENTS."

That San Diego Grand Jury report became the impetus for a plank in the 1992 Iowa state Republican platform that called for a Grand Jury investigation of the Iowa DHS.

Regarding court appointed attorneys with tiny budgets: The public has no idea that court appointed attorneys have a miniscule budget compared with prosecutors! Which explains why court appointed attorneys push so hard for 1-hour plea bargains: That's about all the budget they have!

"But how can taxpayers afford attorneys for the accused?" you wonder.

Remember, our proposal is to eliminate the useless attorney in cases where the child is too young to be meaningfully represented. That budget would be available for court appointed attorneys for parents.

In many cases our proposal would result in considerable savings. The DHS would not push so hard in cases where they have no real case but just use attorneys with unlimited budgets like bludgeons to expand DHS jurisdiction over parents too poor to fight back.

But even if it would cause bigger budgets, our tolerance of inaccuracy can stretch only so far before we must ask, "if we cannot afford any greater accuracy than this, should we get out of the accuracy business?" Our goal is supposed to be "the best interests of the children". When the most loving and nonabusive of parents are effectively shut out of the legal process charged with determining those best interests, which are then left to be determined by relative strangers to the child, we cannot reach our goal.

Regarding a child representing himself pro se: ("pro se" means without a lawyer.) The general public has no idea how "pro se" defense works. But the provisions spelled out in our proposal are the way judges treat parents who defend themselves. A pro se defendant is allowed to have someone help him during trial, but the helper is not allowed to speak out loud to the judge or anyone else in the room. Which is a great hardship for the parent, when technical issues arise which the parent doesn't understand but the assistant does, and the parent must deal with them, following whispered instructions about things he cannot understand. In rare occasions an attorney is willing to offer this whispered assistance. But even then, the attorney is not allowed to speak out loud in the court room - unless the parent agrees to let the attorney speak for him all the time so that the parent may never again speak himself!

Rules like this do not originate in ancient law or custom, but are historically recent efforts to discourage people from representing themselves. One justification for not letting both the party to the case speak to the court, and the "assistant" when the party needs it, is that it would be too "confusing". Believe it or not, this is what they actually say. As if these keen sharp minds so high above those of commoners, cannot carry on a discussion with two people at the same time. Even though they love having two attorneys opposed to the parents, both claiming to represent the baby.

A more realistic explanation of the motives behind it is the money to be made by monopoly. Currently, Bar Associations enjoy a perfect nationwide monopoly in speaking for defendants on trial. Winning in court is as important to most defendants as fighting cancer, so defendants are willing to pay dearly for help, if dearly expensive help is all that is available. If defendants were allowed to bring in articulate, knowledgeable friends who could speak for them only when they got stuck on technical court jargon, the market for high price lawyers would drop, and hundreds of thousands of lawyers would not be able to pay off their college loans. Furthermore, the market would drop for law school tuitions. Without an absolute monopoly that silences everyone who has not graduated from a high price law school, law schools would have far less demand and could charge far less. With the salaries of lawyers dropping, the salaries of judges would drop too. But worse than the loss of money would be the loss of prestige. Non-lawyers would be found who are more successful than lawyers. With lawyers demystified, people would look at judges as not necessarily having more exalted intelligence, by virtue of their law degrees, than anyone else. Things might even revert to conditions a century ago, when Iowa candidates ran for 4-year terms as judges, and no one had to have a law degree to be a candidate. It was as bad as in Bible times, when judges were selected because they were "known" and were leaders among the people. Deuteronomy 1:15.

When our 6th Amendment Right to Counsel (attorney) was drafted, back in about 1791, these were not the rules! Then several categories of "attorneys" were available. Yes, back then, they did have lawyers who had graduated from 7-year law schools in England. But they were only about _ of the group. Those trained stateside usually got their training as apprentices. Basically their apprenticeship consisted of serving as human copy machines for practicing lawyers, in return for which they would get access to the lawyer's library, which might consist of a few dozen law books. Then there were those who "learned the ropes" by working in a courtroom and just watching, until they felt confident enough to hang out their shingle. Then there were the "private attorneys", meaning people who made themselves available to help just for an occasional case. Then there were just friends; or a mother, or brother. All of them had the same freedom to speak on behalf of the accused, while the accused had equal freedom to participate, orally, in his own defense. This was the sort of variety of options for "counsel" to which the 6th Amendment says we should have the right. This began changing about 100 years ago, as Bar Associations gained power and began excluding attorneys from courtrooms who had not graduated from 7-year law schools. (4 years undergraduate + 3 years in law school.)

Our proposal would subject willing children to these humiliations. However, we don't anticipate the judge would be as unreasonable with children as with adults. That would make the judge seem like an ogre, to impose rules on children which make no sense even to adults, when supposedly the whole show is being played for the child's own best interests. We anticipate the judge would give latitude to the children, though he would scream about having to do so as soon as the child is out of his hearing!

We anticipate this would be a healthy experience for courtrooms. Both by giving judges the experience of treating pro se defendants respectfully, and by giving children the experience of meaningful participation in a courtroom, which could produce amazing results in their adulthood.

232.11 Right to Assistance of Counsel

2. The child's right to be represented by counsel under subsection 1, paragraphs "b" to "f" of this section shall not be waived by a child of any age. The child's right to be represented by counsel under subsection 1, paragraph "a" shall not be waived by a child less than sixteen years of age without the written consent of the child's parent.

Explanation: (We're talking about "delinquency" hearings, where the child is accused of a crime; not abuse, where it is the parents who are accused.)

The existing law allows a 16-year-old to dump his court-appointed attorney by his own choice. (younger children need their parents' written permission) but only after he has been arrested, and during questioning. [232.11(1)a] But in several other matters, NO minor can dump the court pick. These matters are: (paragraphs "b" to "f"): a hearing to decide where the accused youth will be jailed, a hearing to see if the juvenile court will "waive" its jurisdiction so the youth would be tried in adult court, and the trial for the accused youth (called an "adjudicatory hearing" instead of a "trial", when it is for minors).

We want minors to have this choice at the other hearings, too, especially the trial

As Faretta states, a stranger who claims to speak for you, whom you don't want to speak for you, takes from you your right to present your defense; for it is the defense of another, not of yourself.

232.90  Duties of county attorney.

1.  The county attorney shall represent the state in proceedings arising from a petition filed under this division and shall present evidence in support of the petition. The county attorney shall be present at proceedings initiated by petition under this division filed by an intake officer or the county attorney, or if a party to the proceedings contests the proceedings, or if there are contested issues before the court, or if the court determines there is a conflict of interest between the guardian ad litem and the county attorney. The court shall presume there is no conflict of interest between the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. or if there are contested issues before the court

Explanation: Existing law actually encourages judges to rule that there is a "conflict of interest" between the parent and child! Isn't it enough that the issue before the court is whether or not the parent is still qualified to be the sole voice of the child in the adult world by virtue of self-sacrificing love and innocence of all abuse charges? A ruling of "conflict of interest" prejudices the very issue before the court. The real conflict of interest in abuse cases is between the guardian ad litem and the county attorney, who are both paid out of the county treasury.

Closed Courtrooms

232.39  Exclusion of public from hearings.

At any time during the proceedings, the court, on the motion of any of the parties or upon the court's own motion, may exclude the public from hearings under this division if the court determines that the possibility of damage or harm to the child outweighs the public's interest in having an open hearing, and if there is no objection from the child, or from the child's attorney, or from the child's parents if the child has no attorney and if the child is not participating in the trial. Upon closing the hearing to the public, the court may admit those persons who have direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.

232.92  Exclusion of public from hearings.

Hearings held under this division are open to the public unless the court, on the motion of any of the parties or upon the court's own motion, excludes the public. The court shall exclude the public from a hearing if the court determines that the possibility of damage or harm to the child outweighs the public's interest in having an open hearing, and if there is no objection from the child, or from the child's attorney, or from the child's parents if the child has no attorney and if the child is not participating in the trial.. Upon closing the hearing to the public, the court may admit those persons who have direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.

Explanation: If the only reason for closing the trial to the public is for the benefit of the child, then the child or his representatives ought to be able to deny that he would benefit from excluding the public. "But why", you ask, "would any child prefer to allow the public in?" Indeed, in most cases both children and parents appreciate the escape from public attention. But in a few cases the children and parents are innocent, and being railroaded, and it is the prosecutors who have the most to hide, while the child and parents want the prosecutor's cruel tactics exposed.

Overview

232.67  Legislative findings--purpose and policy.

Children in this state are in urgent need of protection from abuse, while nonabusive, loving families are in urgent need of protection from false abuse charges. It is the purpose and policy of this part 2 of division III to provide the greatest possible protection to victims or potential victims of abuse through encouraging the increased conscientious, accurate reporting of suspected cases of abuse, ensuring the thorough and prompt assessment of these reports, and providing falsifiable, testable, and refutable rehabilitative services, where appropriate and whenever possible to abused children and their families which will stabilize the home environment so that the family can remain intact without further danger to the child.

Explanation: This is the expression of the legislature's philosophy about child abuse. Presently it's a bit one sided towards removing as many children as possible, right or wrong. Let's restore some balance, and only remove children when it's right. Let's replace the focus on "increased" abuse reports with "accurate" abuse reports. Let's not just mandate any "services", but only those which are proven to help.

Interview!

232.68(3)

a. "Interview" means the verbal exchange between the child and the department investigator, and the child or any attorney or mental health professional cooperating with the department investigator, or with the guardian ad litem, for the purpose of developing information necessary to protect the child which may be used in court. A department investigator is not precluded from recording visible evidence of abuse. The first 7 hours of interviews must be recorded on video tape, and copies immediately made available without cost, to the child's parent, custodian and guardian, and any alleged perpetrator.

232.71B(6).  Facility or school visit.  The assessment may include a visit to a facility providing care to the child named in the report or to any public or private school subject to the authority of the department of education where the child named in the report is located. The administrator of a facility, or a public or private school shall cooperate with the child protection worker by providing confidential access to the child named in the report for the purpose of interviewing the child, and shall allow the child protection worker confidential access to other children for the purpose of conducting interviews in order to obtain relevant information. The child protection worker may observe a child named in a report in accordance with the provisions of section 232.68, subsection 3, paragraph "b". A witness shall be present during an observation of a child. The interview shall be videotaped pursuant to232.68(3). Any child aged ten years of age or older can terminate contact with the child protection worker by stating or indicating the child's wish to discontinue the contact. The immunity granted by section 232.73 applies to acts or omissions in good faith of administrators and their facilities or school districts for cooperating in an assessment and allowing confidential access to a child.

Explanation!" Let's get videotapes of the first several hours of interviews of children after they are removed from their parents, to make sure no high pressure interrogation tactics are being used to plant bizarre testimony in the imaginations of impressionable children.

A common theme in news reports about bureaucratic fabrication of phony child abuse charges is high pressure interrogation techniques to force bizarre confessions from children against their parents, using leading questions and threats.

In Twin Cities headline feature stories (in about 1995) where the children that testified against several adults 10 years ago could finally be interviewed because they are now adults, the children said it was the prosecuting attorney who took them to the courthouse for several hours each night for the first few nights away from their parents, for interrogation that would be high-pressure even for adults. So unfortunately, we can't even let attorneys out of this one. Headline articles in every major source from Public Television to Readers Digest have indicted attorneys, psychiatrists, and ordinary social workers for producing testimony of abuse in impressionable children.

A simple way to stop this, without inhibiting one single case of real abuse, is simply to require that the first 7 hours of interviews be recorded, so the defense can determine whether unethical leading questions and high pressure tactics were used. On the other hand, this evidence could help prove abuse, if indeed there was genuine abuse.

You say, "But showing these interviews to the parents would devastate the child! It would make the child afraid to criticize his parents! It would make an already abusive parent want to punish the child even more!"

You obviously don't understand the system. The child's accusations are already presented to the parents, and not diplomatically at all, but in their worst possible light, at the cruelest possible time: in court.

It's not as if this will violate any kind of confidentiality that is not already routinely violated. The CPI, psychiatrist, and attorney all routinely assure the child he may speak freely since all he says will be kept in "confidence", only to cruelly betray the child later as they repeat the child's most careless statements in the worst of all places, to the child's parents, and in court, and in such a manner as to destroy the parents! So the issue is not whether the child's confidence will be broken, but whether it will be broken, and the child's words then twisted too!

The videotapes will assure the parents of what the child really said, and in response to what pressure. In every case this is less likely to provoke a truly abusive parent, than the characterizations of what the child said, made by attorneys in court against the parents.

In short, this system will reduce abuse on all sides: it will provoke abusive parents less than the present system, and it will stop DHS staff and attorneys from abusing the legal system.

Recording Hearings

232.115  Reporter required.

Stenographic notes or electronic or mechanical recordings shall be taken of all court hearings held pursuant to this division unless waived by the parties. The child shall not be competent to waive the reporting requirement, but waiver may be made for the child by the child's counsel or guardian ad litem. Matters which must be reported under the provisions of this section shall be reported in the same manner as required in section 624.9. The child and parent shall be allowed to audio or video record the hearings.

Explanation: The hearings are endless, and court reporters charge $2.50 per page, and they double space the pages with large print, so a transcript can cost over $1,000 for a full day's hearings. Parents simply can't afford to keep this record of what was said. Of course, the other side has all kinds of money to buy transcripts, because you taxpayers give it to them. This gives the unfair advantage to the side opposing the parents.

"But all sides want what is best for the child", you say.

Sorry, but you've forgotten what system you are talking about. This is America, so we have the "adversarial" system. Lawyers are paid to win, not to tell the truth. Not to work for righteousness. Lawyers actually believe that if the lawyers on every side work as hard as they can for their client, whether wicked or righteous, the edge will go to the side with the Truth. That's the system they are so proud of. So no, if you stack the deck against the parents by giving the DHS two attorneys and unlimited expense accounts to buy transcripts and stuff, and give the parents a $320 lawyer which they have to pay back, it isn't Truth that is going to win in most cases. It's the DHS.

Mandatory Reporters

232.69  Mandatory and permissive reporters--training required.

Explanation: There is enormous legal pressure on the 12 categories of occupations listed just after this section, to report the slightest possibility of abuse. The threat of a lawsuit or of losing a professional license, for not reporting what somebody else thought ought to be reported, causes many professionals to allege abuse out of fear, more than out of conviction.

The most effective solution I can think of is to take the "mandatory" out of "mandatory reporters". Let them be trained and all, but let them keep their common sense and conscience.

The pros and cons of whether reports ought to be mandatory is illustrated by the case of Doctor Ball in Winterset, who didn't report sexual abuse which he had actually confirmed, but rather he noted in his personal record that he talked to the offending parents and the child, and was assured the sexual abuse would not continue. (I hope the abuse fell short of intercourse!) But a nurse saw the note, knew that he hadn't told DHS, reported it, and it nearly cost him his license.

You say, "That was criminal! You don't just let a parent say they're sorry for raping their children and forget about it! They should have been hung!"

Indeed, I agree, if the abuse was serious. But John Harvey was accused of sexual abuse by a teenager who alleged that when the teen was 2, John touched his privates. Which, to me, sounds like a description of changing a diaper.

So without knowing the seriousness of Dr. Ball's case, let's just consider a general principle: If a small pile of leaves catches fire from your barbecue, in your back yard, should you grab the garden hose and put it out yourself, and just forget it, or should you be required by law to let it burn while you call the fire department?

Should we let professionals exercise common sense and conscience?

232.69(1).  The classes of persons enumerated in this subsection shall may make a report within twenty-four hours and as provided in section 232.70, of cases of child abuse. In addition, the classes of persons enumerated in this subsection shall make a report of abuse of a child who is under twelve years of age and may make a report of abuse of a child who is twelve years of age or older, which would be defined as child abuse under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "c" or "e", except that the abuse resulted from the acts or omissions of a person other than a person responsible for the care of the child.

Explanation: After we replace "shall" with "may", most of this deleted sentence becomes redundant. However, a little more is struck out than redundancy: the idea of reporting, to child abuse workers trained in documenting abuse of children by parents and prosecuting them in civil court, criminal actions where the perpetrator is not a family member. Since when should the child abuse bureaucracy take jurisdiction over criminal court? I thought they were overworked. What are they doing, doubling their jurisdiction? What they will insist on doing next, teaching in our schools?

Further confusion is generated by reporting, to criminal authorities, actions of non-family members which are not prosecutable crimes even though the same actions on the part of family would be "abuse". Although I really don't know how far they take this, an example would be not feeding the child, which is abuse if done by the parent, but not if done by a stranger, and yet this paragraph would have the stranger reported to criminal authorities for it!

232.69(3)(b)  

b.  A person required to make a report under subsection 1, other than a physician whose professional practice does not regularly involve providing primary health care to children, shall complete two hours of training which shall consist of a video prepared by the DHS explaining the Chart of Uniform Standards described in 232.2(42), objective ways of measuring abuse, cautions about how to interview children without using leading questions which draw out fanciful stories out of impressionable young imaginations, and procedures relating to the identification and reporting of child abuse, within six months of initial employment or self-employment involving the examination, attending, counseling, or treatment of children on a regular basis. Within one month of initial employment or self-employment, the person shall obtain a statement of the abuse reporting requirements from the person's employer or, if self-employed, from the department. The person shall complete at least two hours of additional child abuse identification and reporting training every five years.

Explanation: If we're going to require education for "reporters", let's make sure they learn objective ways of measuring abuse.

Without the changes here, the following paragraph of law makes each state agency responsible for developing its own training curriculum, creating dozens of conflicting versions of how reporters ought to report! But the change here, which confines the 2 hour training to a single video prepared by the DHS, removes the burden from other agencies and makes training uniform, which also makes it possible for child abuse activists to know whether the training is anything to be concerned about and reported to lawmakers.

The information would also be better prepared and presented, by producing a video, than by leaving it to a rainbow of personalities with other priorities demanding their concentration to stumble through a series of oral presentations.

The training currently is taken quite seriously. A doctor in Knoxville didn't take the training and it cost him a $2500 fine from his licensing agency. A simple video, besides being more uniform and more subject to public scrutiny, and better presented, would be much simpler for professionals to view.

I actually think mandatory reporters should be discouraged from reporting, more than what I have proposed here. I believe training should teach the law and what to look for, but also ways evidence can be made into more than it is. I believe reporters should be encouraged to stay out of it if there is a reasonable interpretation of the evidence that is consistent with loving, nonabusive parents. Natural curiosity will compel them to ask questions or look for more confirming evidence. But if they don't find it, they should leave it alone. The Administrative Code says mere "suspicion" requires the "mandatory reporter" to make a report or risk his career. I believe that should be replaced with "reasonable belief".

Then why haven't I written these thoughts into the proposed amendment? I'm not sure. Half not sure it's necessary, half not sure I can think of a simple way to say it, and the third half not sure I can stay awake another minute worrying about it.

232.69(3)(d)  

d.  The person may complete the initial or additional training requirements as part of any of the following that are applicable to the person:

(1)  A continuing education program required under chapter 272C and approved by the appropriate licensing or examining board.

(2)  A training program using a curriculum approved by the abuse education review panel established by the director of public health pursuant to section 135.11.

(3)  A training program using such an approved curriculum offered by the department of human services, the department of education, an area education agency, a school district, the Iowa law enforcement academy, or a similar public agency.

Explanation: The preparation of the video by the DHS makes these paragraphs unnecessary, and makes life a lot simpler for a lot of people.

232.70  Reporting procedure.

1.  Each report made by a mandatory reporter, as defined in section 232.69, subsection 1, shall be made both orally and in writing. Each report made by a permissive reporter, as defined in section 232.69, subsection 2, may be oral, written, or both.

Explanation: This stricken language is simply consistent with our project of eliminating "mandatory" reporting and leaving only "permissive" reporting.

232.70(8)  

8.  If a report would be determined to constitute an allegation of child abuse as defined under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "c" or "e", except that the suspected abuse resulted from the acts or omissions of a person other than a person responsible for the care of the child, the department shall refer the report to the appropriate law enforcement agency having jurisdiction to investigate the allegation. The department shall refer the report orally as soon as practicable and in writing within seventy-two hours of receiving the report.

Explanation: This seems like the long way around the barn, to me. Why require professionals to report criminal assault to child protection investigators, who in turn you require to turn over the report to the county attorney? Would speed and accuracy improve if you just let professionals report to the county attorney?

232.75  Sanctions.

1.  Any person, official, agency, or institution required by this chapter to report a suspected case of child abuse who knowingly and willfully fails to do so is guilty of a simple misdemeanor.

2.  Any person, official, agency, or institution required by section 232.69 to report a suspected case of child abuse who knowingly fails to do so or who knowingly interferes with the making of such a report in violation of section 232.70 is civilly liable for the damages proximately caused by such failure or interference.

232.76  Publicity and educational programs.

The department, within the limits of available funds, shall conduct a continuing publicity and educational program for the personnel of the department, persons required encouraged to report, and any other appropriate persons to encourage the fullest most accurate and thorough possible degree of reporting possible of suspected cases of child abuse. Educational programs shall include but not be limited to the diagnosis and cause of child abuse, interviewing techniques which avoid leading questions and other devices which inadvertently plant false testimony in the imaginations of impressionable children, the responsibilities, obligations, duties and powers of persons and agencies under this chapter and the procedures of the department and the juvenile court with respect to suspected cases of child abuse and disposition of actual cases.

Parental Notification

232.71B(2).  Notification of parents.  The department, within five working days of commencing the assessment, shall provide written notification of the assessment to the child's parents. However, if the department shows the court to the court's satisfaction that notification is likely to endanger the child or other persons, the court shall orally direct the department to withhold notification. Within one working day of issuing an oral directive, the court shall issue a written order restraining the notification. The department shall not reveal in the written notification to the parents or otherwise the identity of the reporter of child abuse to a subject of a child abuse report listed in section 235A.15, subsection 2, paragraph "a".

Explanation: Judges are too easily "satisfied" that not deceiving parents will have terrible consequences. There may have been a time in American history when abusive parents were motivated to threaten their children for reporting abuse to the mild mannered local elected county sheriff who was not inclined to pursue leads without repeated cries for help. But I just can't imagine any parent today thinking further abuse of his child will gain anything, with the Fire Breathing Abuse Bureaucracy Dragon breathing down his neck. The far more likely danger to the child, in my observation, is that innocent parents will be thrown off guard so much by abuse investigations proceeding full steam without their knowledge, thus depriving them of access to records to which they would otherwise respond, that the child will be deprived of his most loving, most familiar advocate.

The deleted "not" would reverse the practice of not allowing parents to know who accused them. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution gives the accused the right to face their accusers. That right was taken away by moving child abuse trials into civil courts where, for reasons I can barely grasp, constitutional protections don't apply. Nevertheless I think the Fifth Amendment is a good concept. Being deprived of that right deprives accused parents of the ability to "impeach the credibility of the witness". In other words, to say, "Oh, that explains this whole mess! Jake is just sore because his apple tree hangs over my fence so I picked some apples on my side. Ol' Jake's turned in half the neighborhood. A quarter to the Weed Commissioner, a quarter to the Beautification Police, and the other quarter to you guys. Watch out he doesn't get your kids' names or you'll be next.".

Surprise Inspections

232.71B(5).  Home visit.  The assessment may, with the consent of the parent or guardian, include a visit to the home of the child named in the report and an interview or observation of the child may be conducted. The interview with the child shall be videotaped pursuant to 232.68(3). The inspector shall inform the parent that the parent has the right to have witnesses present, and additional time may be granted to allow them to come. If the parent requests time to arrange for witnesses to be present, the investigator shall reschedule the interview at any time of the parent's choosing within 24 hours. If permission to enter the home to interview or observe the child is refused, the juvenile court or district court upon a showing of probable cause may authorize the person making the assessment to enter the home and interview or observe the child.

Explanation: There are a few options possible with this language.

The law doesn't say it, but in current practice these visits are unscheduled. They are surprise inspections. Neither does the law warn Iowans that the investigator may bring a whole crowd of "professionals" with him, but he just might.

A few very diligent home school networks have an emergency calling tree for such events. The investigator's target says "Sure. You can come now. Just wait a minute and I'll be right back." Then she hurries and makes one phone call. That person then calls several others. Within minutes, several witnesses have come, bearing TV cameras, to record everything.

The problem for a parent with no witnesses is that whatever the investigator tells the court, 6 months later, that he found, will be trusted over the uncorroborated testimony of the parent. A videotape would be a great blessing to a parent accused by an investigator turned malicious by a memory fuzzy from time and prejudice.

The other problem parents currently face is that the surprise inspection with no possibility of witnesses is not enough: the investigator, once inside, will then say to the parent "may I interview the child alone?" Meaning, "if that's not all right with you I'll come back with a court order." The investigator makes no taped record of that interview, either, but only scribbles incomplete notes of a few of the most damning statements of the child when taken in their worst light, to be filled inn later with a prejudiced imagination.

The language above ends that practice by announcing the right of the parent to witnesses. The right to witnesses presumes the right to witness the entire investigation.

Our proposed language does not warn the public that we are ending the practice of an interview of the child unwitnessed even by the parent, but that is appropriate since the law doesn't warn the public, either, that such an event is legal.

The law would be more honest if it said "...may...include an unscheduled visit..." and perhaps we may as well make it clear, because that's what they are. If lawmakers would like to add that we have no objection. But as long as lawmakers are embarrassed to admit that is their actual purpose, let's not add it, and our request will seem more reasonable. In fact some may think we are asking for nothing which surely is not already routinely granted.

We are open to making this extension of time as little as 2 hours. That is enough time to get witnesses over, for people who have already planned ahead. Although certainly it is very little time for people who have not planned ahead, and who have never heard of such a thing, and must spend precious time persuading friends or relatives of the importance of leaving work to come.

Of course the extra time we ask could also be used by the parent to tidy up the house. Although that is not our purpose, it is reasonable. No one wants to face company with less than 2 hours to tidy up. Any house which is filthy enough to be "abusive" is not going to get cleaned up very much in two hours.

Notice we propose a later inspection be scheduled at the convenience of the parent, not of the investigator. This is so the inspection may fit the narrow window of availability of the witnesses. Were this left up to the investigator to reschedule at any time of HIS choosing within 24 hours, he would say "fine. I'll be back in 10 minutes."

You say "But the law already gives the parent the right to refuse admittance until the investigator comes back with the court order." Sorry, but (1) the investigator could come back any time in the next week, with a sheriff, and he will barge right in without waiting even 5 minutes; and (2) judges sign blank court orders for investigators to carry around with them and fill out as they have need. May not be legal, but hey, who's watching?

Seizing Children, Storm-Trooper Style

232.78  Temporary custody of a child pursuant to ex parte court order.

1.  The juvenile court may enter an ex parte order directing a peace officer or a juvenile court officer to take custody of a child before or after the filing of a petition under this chapter provided all of the following apply:

232.78(1)(a) New Section. There is evidence of serious physical injury to the child and indications the injury was deliberately caused by the parent.

232.95(2)(a) [In a hearing for temporary removal, the court may:]

a.  Remove the child from home and place the child in a shelter care facility or in the custody of a suitable person or agency pending a final order of disposition if the court finds that substantial evidence exists, including evidence of serious physical injury to the child and indications the injury was deliberately caused by the parent, to believe that removal is necessary to avoid imminent risk to the child's life or health.

232.79  Custody without court order.

1.  A peace officer or juvenile court officer may take a child into custody, a physician treating a child may keep the child in custody, or a juvenile court officer may authorize a peace officer, physician, or medical security personnel to take a child into custody, without a court order as required under section 232.78 and without the consent of a parent, guardian, or custodian provided that both of the following apply:

232.79(1)(a) New Section. There is evidence of serious physical injury to the child and indications the injury was deliberately caused by the parent.

Explanation: Our proposal simply says that without evidence of real abuse, the police cannot storm into your house and seize your children, authorized by a judge's order given at a trial of which you were not notified. There should not only be real evidence of abuse, but evidence of real abuse. In other words, very minor neglect may be sufficient reason to hold hearings to verify it and address it. But serious abuse should be evident, and not merely alleged, before storming in and seizing children, denying the parents' legal rights, and limiting their ability to participate rationally in fact-finding hearings.

"Ex parte order" is where a judge rules against someone without that person being notified there was even a hearing so that he might come and defend himself. It violates the 6th Amendment, but hey, the 6th Amendment doesn't apply in "civil courts", for reasons I can barely juggle in my mind.

The surrounding paragraphs of law show how easy it is for police to storm into your house and remove your children, while you are gone, (your younger children left in the care of your older children), with no prior notice that you were even charged with abuse, leaving you to come home and call authorities for the next day to find out what happened to your children. There need be no evidence of abuse. All it takes is some undefined "reasonable cause to believe" that you might abuse your children if they gave you your legal rights.

Thus these storm trooper tactics are routinely used when the most violence alleged against the parent is that they have a dirty home! Or that there is less than a week's worth of food in your cupboard! Nothing justifying all this secrecy and urgency.

Cutting Legal Corners

232.78(7)(a)  Any order entered under this section authorizing temporary removal of a child must include both of the following:

a.  A determination made by the court that continuation of the child in the child's home would be contrary to the welfare of the child. Such a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. The grounds for the court's determination must be explicitly documented and stated in the order. However, preserving the safety of the child must be the court's paramount consideration. If imminent danger to the child's life or health exists at the time of the court's consideration, the determination shall not be a prerequisite to the removal of the child.

Explanation: This logic is somewhat desperate. Let me translate what you have just read: "Before a judge can order his storm troopers to grab your kids, he has to decide they might get hurt at home. But if your kids are about to get killed at home, then he can go ahead and order in the storm troopers WITHOUT deciding your kids might get hurt at home."

Besides the need to strike this language for the safety of the English Language and the survival of Reason, we need to get judges to stop worrying about "imminent danger" of potential future abuse, and start paying attention to whether, in fact, there has been any ACTUAL abuse to date.

(These same words should be deleted from 232.95(2)(a)(2), 232.96(10)(a), and 232.102(5)(b).

Related issue: Forcible Removal of parent

232.82 Removal of sexual offenders and physical abusers from the residence pursuant to court order

1. Notwithstanding section 561.15, if it is alleged by a person authorized to file a petition under section 232.87, subsection 2, or by the court on its own motion, that a parent, guardian, custodian, or an adult member of the household in which a child resides has committed a sexual offense with or against the child, pursuant to chapter 709 or section 726.2, or a physical abuse as defined by section 232.2, subsection 42, the juvenile court may enter an ex parte order requiring the alleged sexual offender or physical abuser to vacate the child's residence upon a showing that probable cause exists to believe that the sexual offense or physical abuse has occurred and that substantial evidence exists to believe that the presence of the alleged sexual offender or physical abuser in the child's residence presents a danger to the child's life or physical, emotional, or mental health. If the spouse of the accused denies the allegation of abuse, the order requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

...3. The juvenile court may shall order on its own motion, or shall order upon the request of the alleged sexual offender or physical abuser, a hearing to determine whether the order to vacate the residence should be upheld, modified, or vacated. The juvenile court may in any later child in need of assistance proceeding uphold, modify, or vacate the order to vacate the residence. The order shall be vacated if evidence does not confirm the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.

Explanation: One of the sicker dimensions of false child abuse allegations is orders from judges down to CPI's that not only must the parents lose their children, but they must divorce each other! Well, they don't say it just that way. They say to mom, "if you want to get your kids back, you will have to divorce your husband." Of course, after they divorce their husbands, they don't get their kids back either.

Don Burgmaier fielded a call from a woman who was being told that, and she was planning to comply. Don said, "Don't you know they're lying to you? They just want you to lose your husband too. They have no intention of giving you back your kids after you divorce him!"

The woman answered, "Hmmm. Come to think of it, 3 years ago they told me the same thing, and I divorced the husband I was married to then, and I still didn't get back my children."

When a man is accused of sexual abuse, yet his wife protests a removal order and stands up for his innocence, that should tell you something. "Beyond Reasonable doubt", the highest standard of evidence, should be the minimum standard for separating whom God hath joined together, if it is even lawful in that case! Not mere "probable cause", the very weakest standard of evidence!

Hearsay

232.96(4) Adjudicatory hearing (The "Child In Need of Assistance" hearing)

4. A report made to the department of human services pursuant to chapter 235A shall be admissible in evidence subject to objections to its various components, but such a report shall not alone be sufficient to support a finding that the child is a child in need of assistance unless the attorneys for the child and the parents consent to such a finding.

Explanation: The way courts obey the law now, the entire inches-thick bundle of hearsay social worker notes, consisting of biased characterizations of conversations unsubstantiated by tape recordings or even word-for-word quotes, is slapped into the court record without any opportunity for the defense to object to it line by line, as they would in a real court. (Doesn't this violate 232.96(3), the paragraph just before this one?)

Open records

232.97 Social Investigation and Report

3. The social report [which includes "any evidence provided by an individual providing foster care for the child" and "any founded reports of child abuse" (232.97(1)) and "232.2(52) ...information relevant to the court's fashioning of an appropriate disposition of a child in need of assistance case"] shall not be disclosed except as provided in this section and except as otherwise provided in this chapter. Prior to the hearing at which the disposition is determined, the court shall permit counsel for the child, counsel for the child's parent, the child's parent, guardian or custodian, any alleged perpetrator, and the guardian ad litem to inspect any social report to be considered by the court. The court may in its discretion order counsel not to disclose parts of the report to the child, or to the parent, guardian or custodian if disclosure would seriously harm the treatment or rehabilitation of the child or would violate a promise of confidentiality given to a source of information.

Explanation: Notice the double talk: there is a concern about revealing a confidentiality to parents, but no concern about revealing it to the court! Isn't the parent supposed to be in the court room? This is supposed to be America, where the accused has the right to face his accuser. What's this about promising a source that their information will only be given to the court to help it rule against the parents, but the parents will never be allowed to know what the charge was that hit them?!

Notice that according to the definition of "social investigation" in 232.2(52), we are talking about a document for the court's consideration. How can a court in America refuse, for any reason, to allow any party to a case to see and hear all the evidence that is presented during the case? They should not only have the opportunity to inspect the social report, but they should have copies of it well in advance of the hearing, as a part of the "discovery" process.

You are surely interested in correcting every error in the record, aren't you? So won't you want all parties to see the whole record so they have the chance to point out any errors they see? It's not enough to merely allow the parent's attorney to see it! Most attorneys have very limited opportunity to get to know the clients they represent, and therefore they are too unlikely to recognize an error of fact when they see it, if they can't rely on their client to point it out.

But even if it were adequate to let the parent's attorney see it, what of the pro se parent (who has no attorney)? Which is most parents, since only a few parents own their own homes so that they are able to sell them for the price of a moderately hard working attorney. The effect of the current law is that parents may see all the evidence against them, but not in time to read it all, and prepare to address it, before the hearings.

Confidentiality is a "red herring", a bundle of fish dragged across the trail to throw off the dogs following you. It's not a genuine issue. The parents are parties to the case. They see the evidence, despite what this strange paragraph says. The real issue is whether parents will be allowed time to prepare their defense.

Continuances

232.42  Continuances. (Postponements of scheduled hearings)

2. Continuances in Child in Need of Assistance Proceedings may be granted to the parent, to enable the parent to acquire copies of all records prior to the hearing, but not to the DHS Attorney or a guardian ad litem.

Explanation: We would like to write "Continuances may not be granted to the DHS Attorney, who began preparing since before he picked the time of bringing this case to the court." Unfortunately it isn't the official writing style of laws, to make them comprehensible by including in them, the reasons for them.

In practice, not only do they spring these charges on a parent who has never even been in traffic court before, and make parents show up at hearings on very short notice while denyng parents access to records against them contrary to law, but then they love to ask for continuances, themselves, without notifying the parents, leaving parents to take off work and drive across the state for hearings only to find empty courtrooms.

This language adds weight to the right of parents to records, and it stops the continuance game. If there are legislatures who insist county attorneys should still get all the continuances they want, this bill should at least force them to give one week's notice to parents before canceling.

TPR - Termination of Parental Rights

232.116  Grounds for termination.

1.  Except as provided in subsection 3, the court may order the termination of both the parental rights with respect to a child and the relationship between the parent and the child on any of the following grounds, but only if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the parent has inflicted, upon the child, life threatening, or serious, or permanent physical injury, or sexual abuse:

Explanation: It may make a tiny bit of sense to initiate a "Child In Need of Assistance" proceeding because mom doesn't clean the house, but it makes NO sense to cut off all rights and contact between the child and her mother, ship her off to another community, change her name and social security number, and not even let mom know where they are after they turn 18, just because of poor housekeeping!

That is not "appropriate"! Or, "the punishment doesn't fit the crime". Yes, I know, it's civil court, not criminal. At least that's its name. How can any rational person say termination of parental rights is appropriate for mere neglect? OK, DHS bureaucrats, I hear you, but I said "how can any RATIONAL person think TPR, for mere neglect, is in the best interests of any child? I didn't ask "how can anyone RATIONALIZE it."

Isn't it safe enough for a child whose parents committed neglect, to take the child into another home and limit contact to visits? Aren't the harmful effects of most "neglect" limited to occupants of the parental home? CINA powers are sufficient to protect children, without adding the unnecessary devastation, to parent and child, of TPR.

Only if there has been serious physical abuse, or sexual abuse, can TPR be appropriate.

232.116(3)(b) (Termination of Parental Rights won't occur if:)

The child is over ten years of age and objects to the termination, or is less than ten years of age and objects now to the termination, objected during the initial involuntary removal from the home, and objected during the first seven hours of interviews.

Child Abuse Registry

232.71D  Founded child abuse--central registry.

1.  The requirements of this section shall apply to child abuse information relating to a report final court ruling of child abuse and to an assessment performed in accordance with section 232.71B.

3.  Except as otherwise provided in section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "d", regarding parents legitimately practicing religious beliefs, the names of the child and the alleged perpetrator and the report data and disposition data shall be placed in the central registry as a case of founded child abuse under any of the following circumstances accompanied by a final court ruling of child abuse:

Explanation: If you have a job involving children, you lose it as soon as a social worker decides to charge you. (When abuse is "founded", that means the CPI decides to charge you and to begin the process of proving your guilt through the legal process.) They don't wait until you've had your day in court -- your chance to defend yourself -- to take it away. As soon as your case is "founded", the charge enters the Child Abuse Registry, where your employer checks to see who to hire and fire. In fact if your employer DOESN'T fire you he could be sued. This is much different than in criminal court, where you do not get a criminal record until you are not only prosecuted, but actually convicted; and even after you are convicted in lower court, you have a right to appeal, and your criminal record won't be entered until your appeals are exhausted. However, the advantage of entering your name into the record as soon as you are charged for child abuse, is that it is much easier for your prosecutor to defeat you, after you have no job and you can't afford an attorney. Not only that, but without a job, the prosecutor can say "this parent cannot provide a stable home life, being unemployed."

The language above would not permit a finding of child abuse to go into the public record until a "final court ruling", meaning until after all appeals have been exhausted.

Psychiatry is Junk Science,

says Supreme Court

(Reprinted from November/B/1993 Prayer & Action Weekly News. Revised and posted on web 7/29/01)

Replacing Junk Science with Hard Evidence is the goal of a U.S. Supreme Court decision June 28, 1993. It said "science" can't be presented in court as "expert testimony" unless it is "falsifiable".

"Falsifiability" is defined in two ways:

(1) If research has shown a particular body of allegedly "scientific" knowledge is unverifiable, then it doesn't matter what its "prevailing" acceptance is in the scientific community: out it goes.

For example, if research shows that psychotherapy is unable to make anybody any better, or to understand anybody any better than anybody else, a psychotherapist could not be called as an "expert witness" in court.

A Psychiatrist, reviewing the case, concludes, "Although Freudian concepts may serve a purpose in psychotherapy, its lack of falsifiability means that psychiatric testimony based on Freudian psychoanalytic concepts should now be inadmissable as scientific evidence. It would hardly be possible for a judge -- who must follow this Supreme Court decision - - to rule otherwise when the Daubert decision specifically quotes Popper and holds that falsifiability is the determinant of what is scientific, and when that same judge is also confronted with Popper's assessment of Freudian dynamic thought as a premier example of failure to meet the criterion of falsification." (Ralph Underwager and Hollida Wakefield, "A Paradigm Shift for Expert Witnesses", Issues in Child Abuse Accusations, Volume 5, Number 3, 156-167)

Psychiatric testimony based on Freudian psychoanalytic concepts should now be inadmissable as scientific evidence.

(2) If a factfinding approach is so arbitrary that the factfinder can manipulate which result will be found "false", then the approach is not "falsifiable" and may not be introduced in court as expert testimony.

In other words, if the method of determining the fitness, of a parent accused of abuse, is so arbitrary, so imprecise, that two psychiatrists are able to reach opposite conclusions, depending on which side is paying them, then that method of finding the facts is not scientific enough to be admissible in court.

Psychiatrists Underwager and Wakefield give a real life example of the kind of manipulation of analysis psychiatrists are capable of in court. When ruining a calm, in-control parent, they might say the evidence of "...abuse is supported when: The accused shows little or no emotion when being confronted or questioned about the abuse. [That "proves"] The accused is thus either in denial, is sociopathic or is a master manipulator and has little concern for society's mores and values."

But if the same psychiatrist is confronted with an eggregarious, passionate parent, he might ruin her by saying the evidence of "...abuse is supported when: The accused becomes emotional or tearful when confronted or questioned about the abuse. The accused is overwhelmed by guilt and disgust over his behavior...."

The two psyhiatrists conclude that in court testimony they have seen, "...almost any circumstance, behavior or observation can be rationalized as supporting the conclusion that sexual abuse occurred. ...there is no circumstance, behavior, or observation which could be used to conclude that abuse did not occur.

"As this sampling of typical testimony illustrates, almost any circumstance, behavior or observation can be rationalized as supporting the conclusion that sexual abuse occurred. What makes such testimony, and its underlying theory, not falsifiable is the fact that there is no circumstance, behavior, or observation which could be used to conclude that abuse did not occur. Consequently, there are no circumstances under which one could endeavor to prove the underlying theory false." (Ibid, page 161.)

Next: "The Junk Science Case"; then, "The Junk Science Case analyzed by Psychologists"; then, "Psychotherapists Affirm Failure of Psychotherapy"

The Junk Science case

William Daubert, et ux., etc., et al., Petitioners v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 92-102, 61 LW 4805.

Remember that name.

This case has the power to dethrone that which Freud called "science" but Jung classified as "religion": Freudian psychotherapy. (Most psychology is Freudian. Most of the rest fails, just as miserably, the Supreme Court's new criteria.)

This case made K. Popper's definition of junk science the basis for excluding "expert witnesses" whose "expertise" is entirely subjective; and it just so happens that K. Popper holds up Freudian psychotherapy as the premier example of junk science.

Popper's word for junk science was science that is not "falsifiable".

The case itself never mentions any form of psychology. It is about two children with birth defects, for which the parents tried to sue the manufacturer of a drug they took, Bendectin.

The drug company, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, had an expert witness who reviewed extensive published scientific literature about the drug to show that the prevailing view in the scientific community is that the drug is harmless.

Since the previous standard for expert testimony was whether it was "generally accepted" in the "relevant scientific community", the lower courts ruled against the parents.

The parents, for their part, had EIGHT expert witnesses, who based their conclusion that Bendectin can cause birth defects on animal studies, chemical structure analysis, and unpublished "reanalysis" of published human statistical studies.

But the lower courts had not allowed their evidence to be admitted, because it was not published, nor "generally accepted" by fellow scientists. One court had rejected it as "unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review process and generated solely for use in litigation."

The U.S. Supreme Court "vacated" or nullified the lower court decisions, and ordered the lower courts to try the case all over again, and this time to let those 8 experts testify.

In so doing the Court ended the "generally accepted" standard and replaced it with "falsifiability".

The court ruled that "Many considerations will bear on the inquiry [whether the "science" in question is valid], including whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community."

There is only a single paragraph in the case that establishes "falsifiability" as a standard:

"Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested.

"Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry." Green, at 645. See also C. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science 49 (1966)

("[T]he statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test"); K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989) ("[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability")"

By now you may be wondering why, if this is an 8-year-old case, you haven't heard anything about it, and you certainly haven't heard of any reduction in the god-like respect given the wildest flights of fancy by psychiatrists in courtrooms. In answering this question for you, we can kill two birds with one stone. We can not only answer what has become of this case, but we can give you an I.Q. test, to see if you have the intelligence required to serve as a Supreme Court Judge.

First let's go over this term "falsifiability" once more. The method which we call The Scientific Method consists of developing theories, and then testing them to see if they can be proved false. (This method was developed by a Christian, by the way.) Can you follow this concept?

For example, a scientist might theorize that gravity can bend light. So then a test is developed: during an eclipse of the sun, telescopes are pointed to the edge of the eclipse to see if stars are visible which are actually behind the sun. If they are, that proves the gravity of the sun has actually bent the light coming from those stars to the extent that it bends around the sun and reaches our telescopes. If they aren't, that proves the theory is false; gravity cannot bend light. (By the way, this experiment proved that gravity bends light.)

By contrast, an astrologer might tell you, "Bad luck will happen tomorrow." That is so general, that it cannot be proved false.

(That is the point, of course, for astrologers; they are very careful to make their promises vague enough that no matter what happens, no one will be able to quite prove them liars.)

There is no specific definition of "bad luck" upon which all may agree, and every day contains such a mixture of challenges and opportunities that it is impossible to prove that "bad luck" happens, or doesn't happen, on any day. The theory is, thus, not "falsifiable"; and for that reason, no statement made by such a fact-finding method can be called "scientific."

In the same way, a psychiatrist in a child abuse hearing, if indeed he has no science to support his findings, must be very careful to make his analysis general enough that no matter what evidence turns up about the character of the parents he has analyzed, no one will be able to prove he doesn't know what he is talking about. He therefore presents his "analysis" in a way that it is not "falsifiable". That is, it is not based on any facts which the defense might be able to challenge. It makes no predictions which the defense might be able to test. It is based purely on godlike superhuman mind-reading talent, and who can challenge godlike superhuman mind-reading talent? It is given in a way that cannot be proved false. It is not "falsifiable".

Are you following this? Do you understand why a theory has to be "falsifiable" in order to be scientific? Do you understand that means a theory, for example a psychiatrist's evaluation of a parent as "unfit", has to be specific enough, or based on specific enough alleged facts, that the defense can either see those facts and see they support the evaluation, or question whether those facts do not? Can you comprehend this meaning of "falsifiable"?

If you can, than you are more than qualified to serve as a Supreme Court Justice. Because two Supreme Court Justices, after studying far more explanation than I have just given you, wrote in their dissent to the Daubert case, "I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability,' and I suspect some of them will be, too."

Indeed, "Judges will neither readily understand this principle nor consistently apply it without training and education [which doesn't mean] a few hours at a conference seminar... [but] a major educational and training effort for all the players involved--scientists, attorneys, and judges." (Ibid, p. 158)

The Junk Science case analyzed by psychologists

"Falsifiability" defined

The Supreme Court gave a rough context definition of "falsifiability" by listing it with synonyms: "falsifiability, or refutability, or testability".

Still, the word deserves more precise definition.

Such an attempt is made by Ralph Underwager and Hollida Wakefield in their article, "A Paradigm Shift for Expert Witnesses", reprinted in our Documentation Section.

The article foresees a role for testimony of scientists about whether another scientist's testimony is supported by sufficient "credible scientific data". (p. 158)

To be "falsifiable", "the theory or concept in question must be capable of being [proved false] -- that is, be precise and specific enough [that it is possible for evidence] to count against it."

The second sense of "falsifiable" "includes a persuasive practical demonstration using scientific procedures to produce a proof" whether or not the theory, or evidence, or fact-finding method, etc, is false. (page 158)

The article gives sex abuse charges as especially vulnerable to the tests of falsification. "In case after case, this testimony presents, as science, conjecture and speculation ...[every situation] "proves", "supports", or is "consistent with" abuse". Such reasoning is not "falsifiable". (p. 160. 17 examples are given from actual court cases of how abuse bureaucrats rationalize the whole range of possible scenarios to make ANYTHING THAT HAPPENS "prove" abuse.

ERROR RATE. Even if a judge allows junk testimony, the Supreme Court has now made error rates of a theory, process, etc. relevant for the jury to examine; and "every scientist who has analyzed the error rate of the decision making process [of those dealing with child abuse] has concluded that the error is always in the direction of an unacceptable [ratio of parents falsely accused] false positives [to parents accurately accused, or true positives]. The lowest ratio is 3 false positives to every true positive while the highest is an astonishing 2000 to 1." (P. 164)

"Positive" is the medical term meaning you are sick. You "tested positive", meaning the cancer test proves you have it. In the preceding paragraph a "false positive" means a parent who was falsely found to be abusive. Thus this paragraph says for every actual abusive parent, scientific studies have proved that at least 3 other nonabusive parents are falsely "proved" to be abusive, and in some cases as many as 200 innocent parents are falsely "proved" abusive (and presumably lose their children) for every actually abusive parent!

The following article is the one quoted by the U.S. Supreme Court, (Daubert, 113 Sup. Ct. 2786), from "Conjectures and Refutations/the Growth of Scientific Knowledge", by Sir Karl R. Popper, published Routledge, ISBN 0 415 04318 2.

In this article, Popper explains why psychiatry is not "refutable, testable, and falsifiable", and why, therefore, it is not science, but a pseudo science.

 (To read the article, see "As Scientific as the KKK")

The Juvenile Code

With proposed additions the next size larger in red, and proposed deletions the next size smaller in blue.

232.1  Rules of construction.

This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that each child under the jurisdiction of the court shall receive, preferably in the child's own home, the care, guidance and control that will best serve the child's welfare best interests of the child and the best interest of the state. When a child is removed from the control of the child's parents, the court shall secure for the child care as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by the parents.

(See "'Best Interests of the Child' Defined")

232.2  Definitions.

As used in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:

1.  "Abandonment of a child" means the relinquishment or surrender, without reference to any particular person, of the parental rights, duties, or privileges inherent in the parent-child relationship. Proof of abandonment must include both the intention to abandon and the acts by which the intention is evidenced. The term does not require that the relinquishment or surrender be over any particular period of time.

2.  "Adjudicatory hearing" means a hearing to determine if the allegations of a petition are true.

3.  "Adult" means a person other than a child.

232.2(4) New Subsection

4. "Appropriate"" means proportionate to the abuse alleged, before trial, and proven, after trial. Appropriate services are the minimum mandated services proportionate to the abuse alleged, before trial, and proven, after trial. Appropriate treatment is the minimum mandated treatment proportionate to the abuse alleged, before trial, and proven, after trial. Appropriate supervision is the minimum infringement of the family's privacy, proportionate to the abuse alleged, before trial, and proven, after trial. Appropriate removal of the child from his parents is the minimum separation proportionate to the abuse alleged, before trial, and proven, after trial.

For example, it would be inappropriate to order a parent charged with an unsanitary home to see a psychiatrist. The appropriate order would be to see a hygienist. It would be inappropriate to remove a child from a home and limit contact between parent and child to a supervised hour a month, if no violence or sexual abuse has been alleged, but only a diaper rash. The appropriate order would be spot checks over the next two months by someone with medical qualifications.

Inappropriate removal, supervision, treatment, or services are grounds for reversal in District Court.

(For explanation, see "Appropriate")

4.  "Case permanency plan" means the plan, mandated by Pub. L. No. 96-272 and Pub. L. No. 105-89, as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10), 671(a)(16), and 675(1),(5), which is designed to achieve placement in the most appropriate, least restrictive, and most family-like setting available and in close proximity to the parent's home, consistent with the best interests and special needs of the child, and which considers the placement's proximity to the school in which the child is enrolled at the time of placement. The plan shall be developed by the department or agency involved and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. The plan shall specifically include all of the following:

a.  Plans for carrying out the voluntary placement agreement or judicial determination pursuant to which the child entered care.

b.  The type and appropriateness of the placement and services to be provided to the child.

c.  The care and services that will be provided to the child, biological parents, and foster parents.

d.  How the care and services will meet the needs of the child while in care and will facilitate the child's return home or other permanent placement.

e.  To the extent the records are available and accessible, a summary of the child's health and education records, including the date the records were supplied to the agency or individual who is the child's foster care provider.

f.  When a child is sixteen years of age or older, a written plan of appropriate services which, based upon an assessment of the child's needs, would assist the child in preparing for the transition from foster care to independent living. If the child is interested in pursuing higher education, the plan shall provide for the child's participation in the college student aid commission's program of assistance in applying for federal and state aid under section 261.2.

232.2(4)g.  The actions expected of the parent, guardian, or custodian in order for the department or agency to recommend that the court terminate a dispositional order for the child's out-of-home placement and for the department or agency to end its involvement with the child and the child's family. g. A Parental Contract with the biological parent(s) stating what parental actions must be taken, in return for which the Department [of human services] will physically return the child(ren) to the home of the biological parent(s), and those parental actions in return for which the Court will terminate all mandatory DHS involvement with the family.

(For explanation, see "Parental Contract")

h.  If reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or with a guardian are made concurrently with reasonable efforts as defined in section 232.102, the concurrent goals and timelines may be identified. Concurrent case permanency plan goals for reunification, and for adoption or for other permanent out-of-home placement of a child shall not be considered inconsistent in that the goals reflect divergent possible outcomes for a child in an out-of-home placement.

i.  A provision that a designee of the department or other person responsible for placement of a child out-of-state shall visit the child at least once every twelve months.

j.  If it has been determined that the child cannot return to the child's home, documentation of the steps taken to make and finalize an adoption or other permanent placement.

5.  "Child" means a person under eighteen years of age.

6.  "Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child:

a.  Whose parent, guardian or other custodian has abandoned or deserted the child.

232.2(6)b. Whose parent, guardian, other custodian, or other member of the household in which the child resides has repeatedly physically abused or neglected the child, or is imminently likely to abuse or neglect the child.

c. Who has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects as a result of either of the following:

...

d. Who has been, or is imminently likely to be, sexually abused by the child's parent, guardian, custodian or other member of the household in which the child resides.

(For explanation, see "Imminently Likely to Abuse")

(c.  Who has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects as a result of either of the following: )

(1)  Mental injury caused by the acts of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

(2)  The failure of the child's parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of the household in which the child resides to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child.

232.2(6)c(2)

["Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child (c.) Who has suffered...either of the following:] (2) The A pattern of failure of the child's parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of the household in which the child resides to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child. meet the objective criteria of a Chart of Uniform Standards, defining "neglect", "denial of critical care", and "minimum care in supervising the child", which the DHS shall make publicly available, and which shall describe violations of minimum care standards in sufficient detail that any parent can determine with precision whether or not a social worker will find them in compliance.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Supervision, shall take into account the age and intelligence of the children in need of supervision, the amount of time they are left unsupervised, the frequency with which they are left unsupervised for a given length of time, and the ages of any older children into whose care the younger children are left.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Food, shall be specific enough that any parent can inventory their kitchen and know whether it would pass a DHS inspection.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Shelter, shall define minimum shelter ratings with enough specificity that landlords and real estate agents can rate their properties in their advertising.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Clothing, shall define minimum wardrobe criteria objectively enough that any parent, grandparent, teacher, or social worker can inspect a wardrobe and agree whether it meets standards.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Hygiene, shall specify unacceptable levels of unwashed dishes, clothes, diapers, animal waste, and air pollutants. The specified levels shall be objective and measurable.

The published standards defining "Neglect" and "Denial of Critical Care" may also mean any lack of provision for the child whose minimum measurable levels are published by the Department. No instance of neglect whose limits are not clearly published and made freely available to the public shall be permitted as part of any child abuse report.

The Chart of Uniform Standards shall be written in simple language, and approved as Administrative Rules, as well as published and made freely available to the general public.

(For explanation, see "Child Abuse Defined")

[232.2(6)e "Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child]

e.  Who is in need of medical treatment to cure, or alleviate, or prevent serious physical injury or illness and whose parent, guardian or custodian is unwilling or unable to provide such treatment, unless the family's doctor deems the proposed treatment unnecessary. The family's doctor shall incur no additional liability for recommending less treatment than DHS-contracted doctors. In any review of the family's doctor's recommendation, testimony against him by a doctor under contract with the DHS shall not be permitted, but shall be considered a conflict of interest

(For explanation, see "Difference of Medical Opinion")

[232.2(6)f "Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child]

f.  Who is in need of treatment to cure or alleviate serious mental illness or disorder, or emotional damage as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others and whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unwilling or unable to provide such treatment.

(For explanation, see "Psychiatric Treatment")

g.  Whose parent, guardian, or custodian fails to exercise a minimal degree of care pursuant to 232.2(42) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing or shelter and refuses other means made available to provide such essentials.

(For explanation, see "Child Abuse Defined")

h.  Who has committed a delinquent act as a result of pressure, guidance, or approval from a parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of the household in which the child resides.

i.  Who has been the subject of or a party to sexual activities for hire or who poses for live display or for photographic or other means of pictorial reproduction or display which is designed to appeal to the prurient interest and is patently offensive; and taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, scientific, political or artistic value.

j.  Who is without a parent, guardian or other custodian.

k.  Whose parent, guardian, or other custodian for good cause desires to be relieved of the child's care and custody.

[232.2(6)l. "Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child]

l.  Who for good cause desires to have the child's parents relieved of the child's care and custody.

(For explanation, see "Children Divorcing their Parents")

232.2(6)m

["Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child] m. Who is in need of treatment to cure or alleviate chemical dependency and whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unwilling or unable to provide such treatment, provided that treatment is available, at least 50% of whose clients remain chemically free one year after treatment.

(For explanation, see "Mandatory Ineffective Treatment"

232.2(6n.  Whose parent's or guardian's mental capacity or condition, imprisonment, or drug or alcohol abuse results in the child not receiving adequate care.

232.2(6)n

["Child in need of assistance" means an unmarried child:] n. Whose parent's or guardian's mental capacity or condition, imprisonment, or drug or alcohol abuse results in the child not receiving adequate care.

(For explanation, see "'Retarded' Parents")

o.  In whose body there is an illegal drug present as a direct and foreseeable consequence of the acts or omissions of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. The presence of the drug shall be determined in accordance with a medically relevant test as defined in section 232.73.

p.  Whose parent, guardian, or custodian does any of the following:  unlawfully manufactures a dangerous substance in the presence of a child, knowingly allows such manufacture by another person in the presence of a child, or in the presence of a child possesses a product containing ephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, salts of optical isomers, or pseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, salts of optical isomers, with the intent to use the product as a precursor or an intermediary to a dangerous substance.

(1)  For the purposes of this paragraph, "in the presence of a child" means the physical presence of a child during the manufacture or possession, the manufacture or possession occurred in a child's home, on the premises, or in a motor vehicle located on the premises, or the manufacture or possession occurred under other circumstances in which a reasonably prudent person would know that the manufacture or possession may be seen, smelled, or heard by a child.

(2)  For the purposes of this paragraph, "dangerous substance" means any of the following:

(a)  Amphetamine, its salts, isomers, or salts of its isomers.

(b)  Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, or salts of its isomers.

(c)  A chemical or combination of chemicals that poses a reasonable risk of causing an explosion, fire, or other danger to the life or health of persons who are in the vicinity while the chemical or combination of chemicals is used or is intended to be used in any of the following:

(i)  The process of manufacturing an illegal or controlled substance.

(ii)  As a precursor in the manufacturing of an illegal or controlled substance.

(iii)  As an intermediary in the manufacturing of an illegal or controlled substance.

q.  Who is a newborn infant whose parent has voluntarily released custody of the child in accordance with chapter 233.

6A.  "Chronic runaway" means a child who is reported to law enforcement as a runaway more than once in any thirty-day period or three or more times in any year.

7.  "Complaint" means an oral or written report which is made to the juvenile court by any person and alleges that a child is within the jurisdiction of the court.

8.  "Court" means the juvenile court established under section 602.7101.

9.  "Court appointed special advocate" means a person duly certified by the judicial branch for participation in the court appointed special advocate program and appointed by the court to represent the interests of a child in any judicial proceeding to which the child is a party or is called as a witness or relating to any dispositional order involving the child resulting from such proceeding.

10.  "Criminal or juvenile justice agency" means any agency which has as its primary responsibility the enforcement of the state's criminal laws or of local ordinances made pursuant to state law.

11.  "Custodian" means a stepparent or a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity to a child who has assumed responsibility for that child, a person who has accepted a release of custody pursuant to division IV, or a person appointed by a court or juvenile court having jurisdiction over a child. The rights and duties of a custodian with respect to a child are as follows:

a.  To maintain or transfer to another the physical possession of that child.

b.  To protect, train, and discipline that child.

c.  To provide food, clothing, housing, and medical care for that child.

d.  To consent to emergency medical care, including surgery.

e.  To sign a release of medical information to a health professional.

All rights and duties of a custodian shall be subject to any residual rights and duties remaining in a parent or guardian.

12.  "Delinquent act" means:

a.  The violation of any state law or local ordinance which would constitute a public offense if committed by an adult except any offense which by law is exempted from the jurisdiction of this chapter.

b.  The violation of a federal law or a law of another state which violation constitutes a criminal offense if the case involving that act has been referred to the juvenile court.

c.  The violation of section 123.47 which is committed by a child.

13.  "Department" means the department of human services and includes the local, county and regional officers of the department.

14.  "Desertion" means the relinquishment or surrender for a period in excess of six months of the parental rights, duties, or privileges inherent in the parent-child relationship. Proof of desertion need not include the intention to desert, but is evidenced by the lack of attempted contact with the child or by only incidental contact with the child.

15.  "Detention" means the temporary care of a child in a physically restricting facility designed to ensure the continued custody of the child at any point between the child's initial contact with the juvenile authorities and the final disposition of the child's case.

16.  "Detention hearing" means a hearing at which the court determines whether it is necessary to place or retain a child in detention.

17.  "Director" means the director of the department of human services or that person's designee.

18.  "Dismissal of complaint" means the termination of all proceedings against a child.

19.  "Dispositional hearing" means a hearing held after an adjudication to determine what dispositional order should be made.

232.2(20)

20.  "Family in need of assistance" means a family in which there has been a breakdown in the relationship between a child and the child's. a judge has ruled that a child has been abused by his parent, guardian or custodian

(For explanation, see "'Family in Need of Assistance' defined objectively")

21.  "Guardian" means a person who is not the parent of a child, but who has been appointed by a court or juvenile court having jurisdiction over the child, to have a permanent self-sustaining relationship with the child and to make important decisions which have a permanent effect on the life and development of that child and to promote the general welfare of that child. A guardian may be a court or a juvenile court. Guardian does not mean conservator, as defined in section 633.3, although a person who is appointed to be a guardian may also be appointed to be a conservator.

Unless otherwise enlarged or circumscribed by a court or juvenile court having jurisdiction over the child or by operation of law, the rights and duties of a guardian with respect to a child shall be as follows:

a.  To consent to marriage, enlistment in the armed forces of the United States, or medical, psychiatric, or surgical treatment.

b.  To serve as guardian ad litem, unless the interests of the guardian conflict with the interests of the child or unless another person has been appointed guardian ad litem.

c.  To serve as custodian, unless another person has been appointed custodian.

d.  To make periodic visitations if the guardian does not have physical possession or custody of the child.

e.  To consent to adoption and to make any other decision that the parents could have made when the parent-child relationship existed.

f.  To make other decisions involving protection, education, and care and control of the child.

232.2(22)a.  "Guardian ad litem" means a person appointed by the court to represent the interests of a child who has asked a judge for representation, and who is mature enough to participate in any judicial proceeding to which the child is a party, and includes a court appointed special advocate, except that a court appointed special advocate shall not file motions or petitions pursuant to section 232.54, subsections 1 and 4, section 232.103, subsection 2, paragraph "c", and section 232.111. Before appointing a guardian ad litem, the judge shall be certain the child fully understands four options:

(1) court-appointed counsel in which an attorney representing the child is paid by the court and selected by the court, although the court will approve any attorney selected by child and will not approve any attorney which the child rejects;

(2) parent-retained counsel in which an attorney representing the child is paid for and selected by the parents;

(3) Pro-se defense, in which the child is permitted at the counsel table and may participate directly in the trial without legal representation, with or without the whispered assistance of an attorney, paralegal, or friend; or

(4) no separate counsel, where the child is a passive party to the case, the only active parties to the case being the parents and the state. But the parents may choose court-appointed counsel which the parents select but for which the court pays, so that the parents will have like opportunity with the DHS to present evidence on behalf of the child.

b. The budget provided court-appointed counsel, for either the child or parents, shall provide up to the number of hours used by the attorney for the DHS. The funds necessary, which are not available from other sources, shall come from the DHS budget.

(For explanation of this and the next two paragraphs, see "Attorney for a Baby?")

b.  Unless otherwise enlarged or circumscribed by a court or juvenile court having jurisdiction over the child or by operation of law, the duties of a guardian ad litem with respect to a child shall include the following:

(1)  Conducting in-person interviews with the child, if the child's age is appropriate for the interview, and interviewing each parent, guardian, or other person having custody of the child, if authorized by counsel

(2)  Conducting interviews with the child, if the child's age is appropriate for the interview, prior to any court-ordered hearing.

(3)  Visiting the home, residence, or both home and residence of the child and any prospective home or residence of the child, including each time placement is changed.

(4)  Interviewing any person providing medical, mental health, social, educational, or other appropriate services to the child, before any hearing referred to in subparagraph (2).

(5)  Obtaining firsthand knowledge, if possible, of the facts, circumstances, and parties involved in the matter in which the person is appointed guardian ad litem.

(6)  Attending any hearings in the matter in which the person is appointed as the guardian ad litem.

c.  The order appointing the guardian ad litem shall grant authorization to the guardian ad litem to interview any relevant person and inspect and copy any records relevant to the proceedings, if not prohibited by federal law. The order shall specify that the guardian ad litem may interview any person providing medical, mental health, social, educational, or other appropriate services to the child, may attend any departmental staff meeting, case conference, or meeting with medical or mental health providers, service providers, organizations, or educational institutions regarding the child, if deemed necessary by the guardian ad litem, and may inspect and copy any records relevant to the proceedings.

23.  "Health practitioner" means a licensed physician or surgeon, osteopath, osteopathic physician or surgeon, dentist, optometrist, podiatric physician, or chiropractor, a resident or intern of any such profession, and any registered nurse or licensed practical nurse.

24.  "Informal adjustment" means the disposition of a complaint without the filing of a petition and may include but is not limited to the following:

a.  Placement of the child on nonjudicial probation.

b.  Provision of appropriate intake services.

c.  Referral of the child to a public or private agency other than the court for appropriate services.

232.2(25).  "Informal adjustment agreement" means an agreement between an intake officer, a child who is the subject of a complaint, and the child's parent, guardian or custodian providing for the informal adjustment of the complaint. The agreement shall include a Parental Contract with the biological parent(s) stating what parental actions must be taken, in return for which the Department [of human services] will physically return the child(ren) to the home of the biological parent(s), and those parental actions in return for which the Court will terminate all mandatory DHS involvement with the family.

(For explanation, see "Parental Contract")

26.  "Intake" means the preliminary screening of complaints by an intake officer to determine whether the court should take some action and if so, what action.

27.  "Intake officer" means a juvenile court officer or other officer appointed by the court to perform the intake function.

28.  "Judge" means the judge of a juvenile court.

29.  "Juvenile" means the same as "child". However, in the interstate compact on juveniles, sections 232.171 and 232.172, "juvenile" means a person defined as a juvenile in the law of a state which is a party to the compact.

30.  "Juvenile court officer" means a person appointed as a juvenile court officer under section 602.7202 and a chief juvenile court officer appointed under section 602.1217.

31.  "Juvenile court social records" or "social records" means all records made with respect to a child in connection with proceedings over which the court has jurisdiction under this chapter other than official records and includes but is not limited to the records made and compiled by intake officers, predisposition reports, and reports of physical and mental examinations.

32.  "Juvenile detention home" means a physically restricting facility used only for the detention of children.

33.  "Juvenile parole officer" means a person representing an agency which retains jurisdiction over the case of a child adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act, placed in a secure facility and subsequently released, who supervises the activities of the child until the case is dismissed.

34.  "Juvenile shelter care home" means a physically unrestricting facility used only for the shelter care of children.

232.2(35)

Our first choice: "35. 'Mental injury' means a nonorganic injury to a child's intellectual or psychological capacity as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment in the child's ability to function within the child's normal range of performance and behavior, considering the child's cultural origin."

Our second choice: "35. 'Mental injury' means a nonorganic injury to a child's intellectual or psychological capacity as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment, whose existence has been verified by a scientifically testable, refutable, and falsifiable fact-finding process, in the child's ability to function within the child's normal range of performance and behavior, considering the child's cultural origin."

(For explanation, see "Psychiatry part 2")

36.  "Nonjudicial probation" means the informal adjustment of a complaint which involves the supervision of the child who is the subject of the complaint by an intake officer or juvenile court officer for a period during which the child may be required to comply with specified conditions concerning the child's conduct and activities.

37.  "Nonsecure facility" means a physically unrestricting facility in which children may be placed pursuant to a dispositional order of the court made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

38.  "Official juvenile court records" or "official records" means official records of the court of proceedings over which the court has jurisdiction under this chapter which includes but is not limited to the following:

a.  The docket of the court and entries therein.

b.  Complaints, petitions, other pleadings, motions, and applications filed with a court.

c.  Any summons, notice, subpoena, or other process and proofs of publication.

d.  Transcripts of proceedings before the court.

e.  Findings, judgments, decrees and orders of the court.

39.  "Parent" means a biological or adoptive mother or father of a child but does not include a mother or father whose parental rights have been terminated.

40.  "Peace officer" means a law enforcement officer or a person designated as a peace officer by a provision of the Code.

41.  "Petition" means a pleading the filing of which initiates formal judicial proceedings in the juvenile court.

232.2(42)

42. "Physical abuse or neglect" or "abuse or neglect" means any nonaccidental physical injury suffered by a child as the result of the acts or omissions of the child's parent, guardian or custodian or other person legally responsible for the child.

Injury to the gluteal maximus (buttocks) that neither requires medical treatment nor causes permanent injury shall not be considered child abuse under any circumstances, nor made part of any child abuse report. Any other injury shall not be considered child abuse unless it was inflicted by the parent willfully (deliberately), wantonly (without regard for consequences), and maliciously (contrary to the best interests of the child).

"Neglect", also called "Denial of Critical Care", also means a pattern of violations of the objective criteria of a Chart of Uniform Standards, defining "neglect", "denial of critical care", and "minimum care in supervising the child", which the DHS shall make publicly available, and which shall describe violations of minimum care standards in sufficient detail that any parent can determine with precision whether or not a social worker will find them in compliance.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Supervision, shall take into account the age and intelligence of the children in need of supervision, the amount of time they are left unsupervised, the frequency with which they are left unsupervised for a given length of time, and the ages of any older children into whose care the younger children are left.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Food, shall be specific enough that any parent can inventory their kitchen and know whether it would pass a DHS inspection.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Shelter, shall define minimum shelter ratings with enough specificity that landlords and real estate agents can rate their properties in their advertising.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Clothing, shall define minimum wardrobe criteria objectively enough that any parent, grandparent, teacher, or social worker can inspect a wardrobe and agree whether it meets standards.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Hygiene, shall specify unacceptable levels of unwashed dishes, clothes, diapers, animal waste, and air pollutants. The specified levels shall be objective and measurable.

The published standards defining "Neglect" and "Denial of Critical Care" may also mean any lack of provision for the child whose minimum measurable levels are published by the Department. No instance of neglect whose limits are not clearly published and made freely available to the public shall be permitted as part of any child abuse report.

The Chart of Uniform Standards shall be written in simple language, and approved as Administrative Rules, as well as published and made freely available to the general public.

(For explanation, see "Child Abuse Defined")

42A.  "Preadoptive care" means the provision of parental nurturing on a full-time basis to a child in foster care by a person who has signed a preadoptive placement agreement with the department for the purposes of proceeding with a legal adoption of the child. Parental nurturing includes but is not limited to furnishing of food, lodging, training, education, treatment, and other care.

43.  "Predisposition investigation" means an investigation conducted for the purpose of collecting information relevant to the court's fashioning of an appropriate disposition of a delinquency case over which the court has jurisdiction.

44.  "Predisposition report" is a report furnished to the court which contains the information collected during a predisposition investigation.

45.  "Probation" means a legal status which is created by a dispositional order of the court in a case where a child has been adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act, which exists for a specified period of time, and which places the child under the supervision of a juvenile court officer or other person or agency designated by the court. The probation order may require a child to comply with specified conditions imposed by the court concerning conduct and activities, subject to being returned to the court for violation of those conditions.

46.  "Registry" means the central registry for child abuse information as established under chapter 235A.

47.  "Residual parental rights and responsibilities" means those rights and responsibilities remaining with the parent after transfer of legal custody or guardianship of the person of the child. These include but are not limited to the right of visitation, the right to consent to adoption, and the responsibility for support.

48.  "Secure facility" means a physically restricting facility in which children adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act may be placed pursuant to a dispositional order of the court.

49.  "Sexual abuse" means the commission of a sex offense as defined by the penal law.

50.  "Shelter care" means the temporary care of a child in a physically unrestricting facility at any time between a child's initial contact with juvenile authorities and the final judicial disposition of the child's case.

51.  "Shelter care hearing" means a hearing at which the court determines whether it is necessary to place or retain a child in shelter care.

52.  "Social investigation" means an investigation conducted for the purpose of collecting information relevant to the court's fashioning of an appropriate disposition of a child in need of assistance case over which the court has jurisdiction.

53.  "Social report" means a report furnished to the court which contains the information collected during a social investigation.

54.  "Taking into custody" means an act which would be governed by the laws of arrest under the criminal code if the subject of the act were an adult. The taking into custody of a child is subject to all constitutional and statutory protections which are afforded an adult upon arrest.

55.  "Termination hearing" means a hearing held to determine whether the court should terminate a parent-child relationship.

56.  "Termination of the parent-child relationship" means the divestment by the court of the parent's and child's privileges, duties and powers with respect to each other.

57.  "Voluntary placement" means a foster care placement in which the department provides appropriate foster care services to a child according to a signed placement agreement between the department and the child's parent or guardian.

58.  "Waiver hearing" means a hearing at which the court determines whether it shall waive its jurisdiction over a child alleged to have committed a delinquent act so that the state may prosecute the child as if the child were an adult.

232.3  Concurrent court proceedings.

1.  During the pendency of an action under this chapter, a party to the action is estopped from litigating concurrently the custody, guardianship, or placement of a child who is the subject of the action, in a court other than the juvenile court. A district judge, district associate judge, magistrate, or judicial hospitalization referee, upon notice of the pendency of an action under this chapter, shall not issue an order, finding, or decision relating to the custody, guardianship, or placement of the child who is the subject of the action, under any law, including but not limited to chapter 598, 598B, or 633.

2.  The juvenile court with jurisdiction of the pending action under this chapter, however, may, upon the request of a party to the action or on its own motion, authorize the party to litigate concurrently in another court a specific issue relating to the custody, guardianship, or placement of the child who is the subject of the action. Before authorizing a party to litigate a specific issue in another court, the juvenile court shall give all parties to the action an opportunity to be heard on the proposed authorization. The juvenile court may request but shall not require another court to exercise jurisdiction and adjudicate a specific issue relating to the custody, guardianship, or placement of the child.

232.4  Jurisdiction--support obligation.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, and for the purposes of establishing a parental liability obligation for a child under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, a support obligation shall be established pursuant to section 234.39.

232.5  Abortion performed on a minor--waiver of notification proceedings.

The court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings for the granting of an order for waiver of the notification requirements relating to the performance of an abortion on a minor pursuant to section 135L.3.

232.6  Jurisdiction--adoptions and terminations of parental rights.

The court may exercise jurisdiction over adoption and termination of parental rights proceedings under chapters 600 and 600A.

232.8  Jurisdiction.

1. a.  The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act unless otherwise provided by law, and has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning an adult who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act prior to having become an adult, and who has been transferred to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to an order under section 803.5.

b.  Violations by a child of provisions of chapter 321, 321G, 453A, 461A, 461B, 462A, 481A, 481B, 483A, 484A, or 484B, which would be simple misdemeanors if committed by an adult, and violations by a child of county or municipal curfew or traffic ordinances, are excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and shall be prosecuted as simple misdemeanors as provided by law. A child convicted of a violation excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under this paragraph shall be sentenced pursuant to section 805.8, where applicable, and pursuant to section 903.1, subsection 3, for all other violations.

c.  Violations by a child, aged sixteen or older, which subject the child to the provisions of section 124.401, subsection 1, paragraph "e" or "f", or violations of section 723A.2 which involve a violation of chapter 724, or violation of chapter 724 which constitutes a felony, or violations which constitute a forcible felony are excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and shall be prosecuted as otherwise provided by law unless the court transfers jurisdiction of the child to the juvenile court upon motion and for good cause. A child over whom jurisdiction has not been transferred to the juvenile court, and who is convicted of a violation excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under this paragraph, shall be sentenced pursuant to section 124.401B, 902.9, or 903.1. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Code to the contrary, the court may accept from a child a plea of guilty, or may instruct the jury on a lesser included offense to the offense excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under this section, in the same manner as regarding an adult. However, the juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in a proceeding concerning an offense of animal torture as provided in section 717B.3A alleged to have been committed by a child under the age of seventeen.

d.  The juvenile court shall have jurisdiction in proceedings commenced against a child pursuant to section 236.3 over which the district court has waived its jurisdiction. The juvenile court shall hear the action in the manner of an adjudicatory hearing under section 232.47, subject to the following:

(1)  The juvenile court shall abide by the provisions of sections 236.4 and 236.6 in holding hearings and making a disposition.

(2)  The plaintiff is entitled to proceed pro se under sections 236.3A and 236.3B.

2.  A case involving a person charged in a court other than the juvenile court with the commission of a public offense not exempted by law from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and who is within the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall immediately be transferred to the juvenile court. The transferring court shall order a transfer and shall forward the transfer order together with all papers, documents and a transcript of all testimony filed or admitted into evidence in connection with the case to the clerk of the juvenile court. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall attach immediately upon the signing of an order of transfer. From the time of transfer, the custody, shelter care and detention of the person alleged to have committed a delinquent act shall be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and the case shall be processed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

3.  The juvenile court, after a hearing and in accordance with the provisions of section 232.45, may waive jurisdiction of a child alleged to have committed a public offense so that the child may be prosecuted as an adult or youthful offender for such offense in another court. If the child, except a child being prosecuted as a youthful offender, pleads guilty or is found guilty of a public offense other than a class "A" felony in another court of this state, that court may suspend the sentence or, with the consent of the child, defer judgment and without regard to restrictions placed upon deferred judgments for adults, place the child on probation for a period of not less than one year upon such conditions as it may require. Upon fulfillment of the conditions of probation, a child who receives a deferred judgment shall be discharged without entry of judgment.

This subsection does not apply in a proceeding concerning an offense of animal torture as provided in section 717B.3A alleged to have been committed by a child under the age of seventeen.

4.  In a proceeding concerning a child who is alleged to have committed a second delinquent act or a second violation excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the court or the juvenile court shall determine whether there is reason to believe that the child regularly abuses alcohol or other controlled substance and may be in need of treatment. If the court so determines, the court shall advise appropriate juvenile authorities and refer such offenders to the juvenile court for disposition pursuant to section 232.52A.

5.  Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted as affecting the statutory limitations on prosecutions for murder in the first or second degree.

6.  The supreme court shall prescribe rules under section 602.4202 to resolve jurisdictional and venue issues when juveniles who are placed in another court's jurisdiction are alleged to have committed subsequent delinquent acts.

232.9  Motion for change of judge.

Prior to a hearing pursuant to sections 232.44 to 232.47, 232.50 or 232.54, the child may file a motion with the district court for the appointment of a new judge. The chief judge of the district court for cause shown shall appoint a new judge.

232.10  Venue.

1.  Venue for delinquency proceedings shall be in the judicial district where the child is found, where the child resides or where the alleged delinquent act occurred.

2.  The court may transfer delinquency proceedings to the court of any county having venue at any stage in the proceeding as follows:

a.  When it appears that the best interests of the child or society or the convenience of the parties will be served by a transfer, the court may transfer the case to the court of the county of the child's residence.

b.  With the consent of the receiving court, the court may transfer the case to the court of the county where the child is found.

c.  The court may transfer the case to the county where the alleged delinquent act occurred.

3.  The court shall transfer the case by ordering the transfer and a continuance and by forwarding to the clerk of the receiving court a certified copy of all papers filed together with an order of transfer. The judge of the receiving court may accept the filings of the transferring court or may direct the filing of a new petition and hear the case anew.

232.11  Right to assistance of counsel.

1.  A child shall have the right to be represented by counsel at the following stages of the proceedings within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under division II:

a.  From the time the child is taken into custody for any alleged delinquent act that constitutes a serious or aggravated misdemeanor or felony under the Iowa criminal code, and during any questioning thereafter by a peace officer or probation officer.

b.  A detention or shelter care hearing as required by section 232.44.

c.  A waiver hearing as required by section 232.45.

d.  An adjudicatory hearing required by section 232.47.

e.  A dispositional hearing as required by section 232.50.

f.  Hearings to review and modify a dispositional order as required by section 232.54.

232.11 Right to Assistance of Counsel

2.  The child's right to be represented by counsel under subsection 1, paragraphs "b" to "f" of this section shall not be waived by a child of any age. The child's right to be represented by counsel under subsection 1, paragraph "a" shall not be waived by a child less than sixteen years of age without the written consent of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. The waiver by a child who is at least sixteen years of age is valid only if a good faith effort has been made to notify the child's parent, guardian, or custodian that the child has been taken into custody and of the alleged delinquent act for which the child has been taken into custody, the location of the child, and the right of the parent, guardian, or custodian to visit and confer with the child.

(For Explanation, see "Attorney for a Baby?" part 2)

b.  A detention or shelter care hearing as required by section 232.44.

c.  A waiver hearing as required by section 232.45.

d.  An adjudicatory hearing required by section 232.47.

e.  A dispositional hearing as required by section 232.50.

f.  Hearings to review and modify a dispositional order as required

3.  If the child is not represented by counsel as required under subsection 1, counsel shall be provided as follows:

a.  If the court determines, after giving the child's parent, guardian or custodian an opportunity to be heard, that such person has the ability in whole or in part to pay for the employment of counsel, it shall either order that person to retain an attorney to represent the child or shall appoint counsel for the child and order the parent, guardian or custodian to pay for that counsel as provided in subsection 5.

b.  If the court determines that the parent, guardian, or custodian cannot pay any part of the expenses of counsel to represent the child, it shall appoint counsel, who shall be reimbursed according to section 232.141, subsection 2, paragraph "b".

c.  The court may appoint counsel to represent the child and reserve the determination of payment until the parent, guardian or custodian has an opportunity to be heard.

4.  If the child is represented by counsel and the court determines that there is a conflict of interest between the child and the child's parent, guardian or custodian and that the retained counsel could not properly represent the child as a result of the conflict, the court shall appoint other counsel to represent the child and order the parent, guardian or custodian to pay for such counsel as provided in subsection 5.

5.  If the court determines, after an inquiry which includes notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard that the parent, guardian or custodian has the ability to pay in whole or in part for the attorney appointed for the child, the court may order that person to pay such sums as the court finds appropriate in the manner and to whom the court directs. If the person so ordered fails to comply with the order without good reason, the court shall enter judgment against the person.

6.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the child or the child's parent, guardian or custodian from retaining counsel to represent the child in proceedings under this division II of this chapter in which the alleged delinquent act constitutes a simple misdemeanor under the Iowa Code.

232.12  Duties of county attorney.

Upon the filing of a petition the county attorney shall represent the state in all adversary proceedings arising under this division and shall present evidence in support of the petition.

232.13  State liability.

1.  For purposes of chapter 669, the following persons shall be considered state employees:

a.  A child given a work assignment of value to the state or the public or a community work assignment under this chapter.

b.  A court appointed special advocate.

2.  The state of Iowa is exclusively liable for and shall pay any compensation becoming due a person under section 85.59.

Part Two

232.19  Taking a child into custody.

1.  A child may be taken into custody:

a.  By order of the court.

b.  For a delinquent act pursuant to the laws relating to arrest.

c.  By a peace officer, when the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or custodian, for the purposes of determining whether the child shall be reunited with the child's parents, guardian, or custodian, placed in shelter care, or, if the child is a chronic runaway and the county has an approved county runaway treatment plan, placed in a runaway assessment center under section 232.196.

d.  By a peace officer, juvenile court officer, or juvenile parole officer when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the child has committed a material violation of a dispositional order.

2.  When a child is taken into custody as provided in subsection 1 the person taking the child into custody shall notify the child's parent, guardian, or custodian as soon as possible. The person may place bodily restraints, such as handcuffs, on the child if the child physically resists; threatens physical violence when being taken into custody; is being taken into custody for an alleged delinquent act of violence against a person; or when, in the reasonable judgment of the officer, the child presents a risk of injury to the child or others. The child may also be restrained by handcuffs or other restraints at any time after the child is taken into custody if the child has a known history of physical violence to others. Unless the child is placed in shelter care or detention in accordance with the provisions of section 232.21 or 232.22, the child shall be released to the child's parent, guardian, custodian, responsible adult relative, or other adult approved by the court upon the promise of such person to produce the child in court at such time as the court may direct.

3.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a child shall not be placed in detention as a result of a violation by that child of section 123.47.

4.  Information pertaining to a child who is at least ten years of age and who is taken into custody for a delinquent act which would be a public offense is a public record and is not confidential under section 232.147.

232.20  Admission of child to shelter care or detention.

1.  If a child is taken into custody and not released as provided in section 232.19, subsection 2, the child shall immediately be taken to a detention or shelter care facility as specified in sections 232.21 or 232.22.

2.  When a child is admitted to a detention or shelter care facility the person in charge of the facility or the person's designated representative shall notify the court, the child's attorney, and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian as soon as possible of the admission and the reasons for that admission.

232.21  Placement in shelter care.

1.  No child shall be placed in shelter care unless one of the following circumstances applies:

a.  The child has no parent, guardian, custodian, responsible adult relative or other adult approved by the court who will provide proper shelter, care and supervision.

b.  The child desires to be placed in shelter care.

c.  It is necessary to hold the child until the child's parent, guardian, or custodian has been contacted and has taken custody of the child.

d.  It is necessary to hold the child for transfer to another jurisdiction.

e.  The child is being placed pursuant to an order of the court.

2.  A child may be placed in shelter care as provided in this section only in one of the following facilities:

a.  A juvenile shelter care home.

b.  A licensed foster home.

c.  An institution or other facility operated by the department of human services, or one which is licensed or otherwise authorized by law to receive and provide care for the child.

d.  Any other suitable place designated by the court provided that no place used for the detention of a child may be so designated.

Placement shall be made in the least restrictive facility available consistent with the best interests and special needs of the child. Foster family care shall be used for a child unless the child has problems requiring specialized service or supervision which cannot be provided in a family living arrangement.

3.  When there is reason to believe that a child placed in shelter care pursuant to section 232.19, subsection 1, paragraph "c" would not voluntarily remain in the shelter care facility, the shelter care facility shall impose reasonable restrictions necessary to ensure the child's continued custody.

4.  A child placed in a shelter care facility under this section shall not be held for a period in excess of forty-eight hours without an oral or written court order authorizing the shelter care. When the action is authorized by an oral court order, the court shall enter a written order before the end of the next day confirming the oral order and indicating the reasons for the order. A child placed in shelter care pursuant to section 232.19, subsection 1, paragraph "c", shall not be held in excess of seventy-two hours in any event. If deemed appropriate by the court, an order authorizing shelter care placement may include a determination that continuation of the child in the child's home is contrary to the child's welfare and that reasonable efforts as defined in section 232.57 have been made. The inclusion of such a determination shall not under any circumstances be deemed a prerequisite for entering an order pursuant to this section. However, the inclusion of such a determination, supported by the record, may assist the department in obtaining federal funding for the child's placement.

5.  If no satisfactory provision is made for uniting a child placed in shelter care pursuant to section 232.19, subsection 1, paragraph "c" with the child's family, a child in need of assistance complaint may be filed pursuant to section 232.81. Nothing in this subsection shall limit the right of a child to file a family in need of assistance petition under section 232.125.

6.  A child twelve years of age or younger shall not be placed in a group shelter care home, unless there have been reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to place the child in an emergency foster family home which is able to meet the needs of the child. The efforts shall be documented at the shelter care hearing.

232.22  Placement in detention.

1.  A child shall not be placed in detention unless one of the following conditions is met:

a.  The child is being held under warrant for another jurisdiction.

b.  The child is an escapee from a juvenile correctional or penal institution.

c.  There is probable cause to believe that the child has violated conditions of release imposed under section 232.44, subsection 5, paragraph "b", or section 232.52 or 232.54, and there is a substantial probability that the child will run away or otherwise be unavailable for subsequent court appearance.

d.  There is probable cause to believe the child has committed a delinquent act, and one of the following conditions is met:

(1)  There is a substantial probability that the child will run away or otherwise be unavailable for subsequent court appearance.

(2)  There is a serious risk that the child if released may commit an act which would inflict serious bodily harm on the child or on another.

(3)  There is a serious risk that the child if released may commit serious damage to the property of others.

e.  There is probable cause to believe that the child has committed a delinquent act involving possession with intent to deliver any of the following controlled substances:

(1)  A mixture or substance containing cocaine base, also known as crack cocaine, and if the act was committed by an adult, it would be a violation of section 124.401, subsection 1, paragraph "a", subparagraph (3), paragraph "b", subparagraph (3), or paragraph "c", subparagraph (3).

(2)  A mixture or substance containing cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers, and if the act was committed by an adult, it would be a violation of section 124.401, subsection 1, paragraph "a", subparagraph (2), subparagraph subdivision (b), paragraph "b", subparagraph (2), subparagraph subdivision (b), or paragraph "c", subparagraph (2), subparagraph subdivision (b).

(3)  A mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, or salts of isomers, or analogs of methamphetamine, and if the act was committed by an adult, it would be a violation of section 124.401, subsection 1.

f.  A dispositional order has been entered under section 232.52 placing the child in secure custody in a facility defined in subsection 3, paragraph "a" or "b".

g.  There is probable cause to believe that the child has committed a delinquent act which would be domestic abuse under chapter 236 or a domestic abuse assault under section 708.2A if committed by an adult.

2.  If deemed appropriate by the court, an order for placement of a child in detention may include a determination that continuation of the child in the child's home is contrary to the child's welfare and that reasonable efforts as defined in section 232.57 have been made. The inclusion of such a determination shall not under any circumstances be deemed a prerequisite for entering an order pursuant to this section. However, the inclusion of such a determination, supported by the record, may assist the department in obtaining federal funding for the child's placement.

3.  Except as provided in subsection 7, a child may be placed in detention as provided in this section in one of the following facilities only:

a.  A juvenile detention home.

b.  Any other suitable place designated by the court other than a facility under paragraph "c".

c.  A room in a facility intended or used for the detention of adults if there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed a delinquent act which if committed by an adult would be a felony, or aggravated misdemeanor under section 708.2 or 709.11, a serious or aggravated misdemeanor under section 321J.2, or a violation of section 123.46, and if all of the following apply:

(1)  The child is at least fourteen years of age.

(2)  The child has shown by the child's conduct, habits, or condition that the child constitutes an immediate and serious danger to another or to the property of another, and a facility or place enumerated in paragraph "a" or "b" is unavailable, or the court determines that the child's conduct or condition endangers the safety of others in the facility.

(3)  The facility has an adequate staff to supervise and monitor the child's activities at all times.

(4)  The child is confined in a room entirely separated from detained adults, is confined in a manner which prohibits communication with detained adults, and is permitted to use common areas of the facility only when no contact with detained adults is possible.

However, if the child is to be detained for a violation of section 123.46 or section 321J.2, placement in a facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be made only after an attempt has been made to notify the parents or legal guardians of the child and request that the parents or legal guardians take custody of the child. If the parents or legal guardians cannot be contacted, or refuse to take custody of the child, an attempt shall be made to place the child in another facility, including but not limited to a local hospital or shelter care facility. Also, a child detained for a violation of section 123.46 or section 321J.2 pursuant to this paragraph shall only be detained in a facility with adequate staff to provide continuous visual supervision of the child.

d.  A place used for the detention of children prior to an adjudicatory hearing may also be used for the detention of a child awaiting disposition to a placement under section 232.52, subsection 2, paragraph "e" while the adjudicated child is awaiting transfer to the disposition placement.

4.  A child shall not be held in a facility under subsection 3, paragraph "a" or "b" for a period in excess of twenty-four hours without an oral or written court order authorizing the detention. When the detention is authorized by an oral court order, the court shall enter a written order before the end of the next day confirming the oral order and indicating the reasons for the order.

5.  A child shall not be detained in a facility under subsection 3, paragraph "c" for a period of time in excess of six hours without the oral or written order of a judge or a magistrate authorizing the detention. A judge or magistrate may authorize detention in a facility under subsection 3, paragraph "c" for a period of time in excess of six hours but less than twenty-four hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays, but only if all of the following occur or exist:

a.  The facility serves a geographic area outside a standard metropolitan statistical area as determined by the United States census bureau.

b.  The court determines that an acceptable alternative placement does not exist pursuant to criteria developed by the department of human services.

c.  The facility has been certified by the department of corrections as being capable of sight and sound separation pursuant to this section and section 356.3.

d.  The child is awaiting an initial hearing before the court pursuant to section 232.44.

The restrictions contained in this subsection relating to the detention of a child in a facility under subsection 3, paragraph "c" do not apply if the court has waived its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of a felony offense pursuant to section 232.45.

6.  An adult within the jurisdiction of the court under section 232.8, subsection 1, who has been placed in detention, is not bailable under chapter 811. If such an adult is detained in a room in a facility intended or used for the detention of adults, the adult shall be confined in a room entirely separated from adults not within the jurisdiction of the court under section 232.8, subsection 1.

7.  If the court has waived its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of a forcible felony offense pursuant to section 232.45 or 232.45A, and there is a serious risk that the child may commit an act which would inflict serious bodily harm on another person, the child may be held in the county jail, notwithstanding section 356.3. However, wherever possible the child shall be held in sight and sound separation from adult offenders. A child held in the county jail under this subsection shall have all the rights of adult postarrest or pretrial detainees.

8.  Notwithstanding any other provision of the Code to the contrary, a child shall not be placed in detention for a violation of section 123.47, or for failure to comply with a dispositional order which provides for performance of community service for a violation of section 123.47.

232.23  Detention--youthful offenders.

1.  After waiver of a child who will be prosecuted as a youthful offender, the child shall be held in a facility under section 232.22, subsection 3, paragraph "a" or "b", unless released in accordance with subsection 2.

2. a.  The court shall determine, at the detention hearing under section 232.44, the amount of bail, appearance bond, or other conditions necessary for a child who has been waived for prosecution as a youthful offender to be released from detention or that the child should not be released from detention.

b.  A child placed in detention or released under this subsection shall be supervised by a juvenile court officer or juvenile court services personnel.

c.  An order under this section may be reviewed by the court upon motion of either party.

Part Three

232.28  Intake.

1.  Any person having knowledge of the facts may file a complaint with the court or its designee alleging that a child has committed a delinquent act. A written record shall be maintained of any oral complaint received.

2.  The court or its designee shall refer the complaint to an intake officer who shall consult with law enforcement authorities having knowledge of the facts and conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine what action should be taken.

3.  In the course of a preliminary inquiry, the intake officer may:

a.  Interview the complainant, victim or witnesses of the alleged delinquent act.

b.  Check existing records of the court, law enforcement agencies and public records of other agencies.

c.  Hold conferences with the child and the child's parent or parents, guardian or custodian for the purpose of interviewing them and discussing the disposition of the complaint in accordance with the requirements set forth in subsection 8.

d.  Examine any physical evidence pertinent to the complaint.

e.  Interview such persons as are necessary to determine whether the filing of a petition would be in the best interests of the child and the community as provided in section 232.35, subsections 2 and 3.

4.  Any additional inquiries may be made only with the consent of the child and the child's parent or parents, guardian or custodian.

5.  Participation of the child and the child's parent or parents, guardian or custodian in a conference with an intake officer shall be voluntary, and they shall have the right to refuse to participate in such conference. At such conference the child shall have the right to the assistance of counsel in accordance with section 232.11 and the right to remain silent when questioned by the intake officer.

6.  The intake officer, after consultation with the county attorney when necessary, shall determine whether the complaint is legally sufficient for the filing of a petition. A complaint shall be deemed legally sufficient for the filing of a petition if the facts as alleged are sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the court and probable cause to believe that the child has committed a delinquent act. If the intake officer determines that the complaint is legally sufficient to support the filing of a petition, the officer shall determine whether the interests of the child and the public will best be served by the dismissal of the complaint, the informal adjustment of the complaint, or the filing of a petition.

7.  If the intake officer determines that the complaint is not legally sufficient for the filing of a petition or that further proceedings are not in the best interests of the child or the public, the intake officer shall dismiss the complaint.

8.  If the intake officer determines that the complaint is legally sufficient for the filing of a petition and that an informal adjustment of the complaint is in the best interests of the child and the community, the officer may make an informal adjustment of the complaint in accordance with section 232.29.

9.  If the intake officer determines that the complaint is legally sufficient for the filing of a petition and that the filing of a petition is in the best interests of the child and the public, the officer shall request the county attorney to file a petition in accordance with section 232.35.

232.29  Informal adjustment.

1.  The informal adjustment of a complaint is a permissible disposition of a complaint at intake subject to the following conditions:

a.  The child has admitted the child's involvement in a delinquent act.

b.  The intake officer shall advise the child and the child's parent, guardian or custodian that they have the right to refuse an informal adjustment of the complaint and demand the filing of a petition and a formal adjudication.

c.  Any informal adjustment agreement shall be entered into voluntarily and intelligently by the child with the advice of the child's attorney, or by the child with the consent of a parent, guardian, or custodian if the child is not represented by counsel.

d.  The terms of such agreement shall be clearly stated in writing and signed by all parties to the agreement and a copy of this agreement shall be given to the child; the counsel for the child; the parent, guardian or custodian; and the intake officer, who shall retain the copy in the case file.

e.  An agreement providing for the supervision of a child by a juvenile court officer or the provision of appropriate intake services shall not exceed six months.

f.  An agreement providing for the referral of a child to a public or private agency for appropriate services shall not exceed six months.

g.  The child and the child's parent, guardian or custodian shall have the right to terminate such agreement at any time and to request the filing of a petition and a formal adjudication.

h.  If an informal adjustment of a complaint has been made, a petition based upon the events out of which the original complaint arose may be filed only during the period of six months from the date the informal adjustment agreement was entered into. If a petition is filed within this period the child's compliance with all proper and reasonable terms of the agreement shall be grounds for dismissal of the petition by the court.

i.  The person performing the duties of intake officer shall file a report at least annually with the court listing the number of informal adjustments made during the reporting time, the conditions imposed in each case, the number of informal adjustments resulting in dismissal without the filing of a petition, and the number of informal adjustments resulting in the filing of a petition upon the original complaint.

2.  An informal adjustment agreement may prohibit a child from driving a motor vehicle for a specified period of time or under specific circumstances, require the child to perform a work assignment of value to the state or to the public, or require the child to make restitution consisting of a monetary payment to the victim or a work assignment directly of value to the victim. The juvenile court officer shall notify the state department of transportation of the informal adjustment prohibiting the child from driving.

3.  The person performing the duties of intake officer shall notify the superintendent of the school district or the superintendent's designee, or the authorities in charge of the nonpublic school which the child attends, of any informal adjustment regarding the child, fourteen years of age or older, for an act which would be an aggravated misdemeanor or felony if committed by an adult.

4.  An informal adjustment agreement regarding a child who has been placed in detention under section 232.22, subsection 1, paragraph "g", may include a provision that the child voluntarily participate in a batterers' treatment program under section 708.2B.

Part Four Judicial Proceedings

232.35  Filing of petition.

1.  A formal judicial proceeding to determine whether a child has committed a delinquent act shall be initiated by the filing by the county attorney of a petition alleging that a child has committed a delinquent act.

2.  If the intake officer determines that a complaint is legally sufficient for the filing of a petition alleging that a child has committed a delinquent act and that the filing of a petition would be in the best interests of the child and the community, the officer shall submit a written request for the filing of a petition to the county attorney. The county attorney may grant or deny the request of the intake officer for the filing of a petition. A determination by the county attorney that a petition should not be filed shall be final.

3.  If the intake officer determines that a complaint is not legally sufficient for the filing of a petition or that the filing of a petition would not be in the best interests of the child and the community, the officer shall notify the complainant of the officer's determination and the reasons for such determination, and shall advise the complainant that the complainant may submit the complaint to the county attorney for review. Upon receiving a request for review, the county attorney shall consider the facts presented by the complainant, consult with the intake officer and make the final determination as to whether a petition should be filed. In the absence of a request by the complainant for a review of the intake officer's determination that a petition should not be filed, the officer's determination shall be final, and the intake officer shall inform the county attorney of this decision concerning complaints involving allegations of acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute an aggravated misdemeanor or a felony.

232.36  Contents of petition.

1.  The petition and subsequent court documents shall be entitled "In the interests of . . . . . , a child."

2.  The petition shall be verified and any statements in the petition may be made upon information and belief.

3.  The petition shall set forth plainly:

a.  The name, age, and residence of the child who is the subject of the petition.

b.  The names and residences of any:

(1)  Living parent of the child.

(2)  Guardian of the child.

(3)  Legal custodian of the child.

(4)  Guardian ad litem.

c.  With reasonable particularity, the time, place and manner of the delinquent act alleged and the penal law allegedly violated by such act.

4.  If any of the facts required under subsection 3, paragraphs "a" and "b" are not known by the petitioner, the petition shall so state.

5.  The petition shall set forth plainly the nearest known relative of the child if no parent or guardian can be found.

232.37  Summons, notice, subpoenas and service--order for removal.

1.  After a petition has been filed the court shall set a time for an adjudicatory hearing and unless the parties named in subsection 2 voluntarily appear, shall issue a summons requiring the child to appear before the court at a time and place stated and requiring the person who has custody or control of the child to appear before the court and to bring the child with the person at that time. The summons shall attach a copy of the petition and shall give notification of the right to counsel provided for in section 232.11.

2.  Notice of the pendency of the case shall be served upon the known parents, guardians or legal custodians of a child if these persons are not summoned to appear as provided in subsection 1. Notice shall also be served upon the child and upon the child's guardian ad litem, if any. The notice shall attach a copy of the petition and shall give notification of the right to counsel provided for in section 232.11.

3.  Upon request of the child who is identified in the petition as a party to the proceeding, the child's parent, guardian or custodian, a county attorney or on the court's own motion, the court or the clerk of the court shall issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and production of papers at any hearing under this division.

4.  Service of summons or notice shall be made personally by the delivery of a copy of the summons or notice to the person being served. If the court determines that personal service of a summons or notice is impracticable, the court may order service by certified mail addressed to the last known address. Service of summons or notice shall be made not less than five days before the time fixed for hearing. Service of summons, notice, subpoenas or other process, after an initial valid summons or notice, shall be made in accordance with the rules of the court governing such service in civil actions.

5.  If a person personally served with a summons or subpoena fails without reasonable cause to appear or to bring the child, the person may be proceeded against for contempt of court or the court may issue an order for the arrest of such person or both the arrest of the person and the taking into custody of the child.

6.  The court may issue an order for the removal of the child from the custody of the child's parent, guardian or custodian when there exists an immediate threat that the parent, guardian or custodian will flee the state with the child, or when it appears that the child's immediate removal is necessary to avoid imminent danger to the child's life or health.

232.38  Presence of parents at hearings.

1.  Any hearings or proceedings under this division subsequent to the filing of a petition shall not take place without the presence of one or both of the child's parents, guardian or custodian except that a hearing or proceeding may take place without such presence if the parent, guardian or custodian fails to appear after reasonable notification, or if the court finds that a reasonably diligent effort has been made to notify the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, and the effort was unavailing.

2.  In any such hearings or proceedings the court may temporarily excuse the presence of the parent, guardian or custodian when the court deems it in the best interests of the child. Counsel for the parent, guardian or custodian shall have the right to participate in a hearing or proceeding during the absence of the parent, guardian or custodian.

232.39  Exclusion of public from hearings.

At any time during the proceedings, the court, on the motion of any of the parties or upon the court's own motion, may exclude the public from hearings under this division if the court determines that the possibility of damage or harm to the child outweighs the public's interest in having an open hearing, and if there is no objection from the child, or from the child's attorney, or from the child's parents if the child has no attorney and if the child is not participating in the trial. Upon closing the hearing to the public, the court may admit those persons who have direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.

(For explanation, see "Closed Courtrooms")

232.40  Other issues adjudicated.

When it appears during the course of any hearing or proceeding that some action or remedy other than those indicated by the application or pleading is appropriate, the court, with the consent of all necessary parties, may proceed to hear and determine the additional or other issues as though originally properly sought and pleaded.

232.41  Reporter required.

Stenographic notes or mechanical or electronic recordings shall be taken of all court hearings held pursuant to this division unless waived by the parties. The child shall not be competent to waive the reporting requirement, but waiver may be made for the child by the child's counsel or guardian ad litem. Matters which must be reported under the provisions of this section shall be reported in the same manner as required in section 624.9. The child and parent shall be allowed to audio or video record the hearings.

(For explanation, see "Tape Recordings")

232.42  Continuances.

1.  Continuances in juvenile delinquency proceedings may be granted by the court only for good cause shown on the record if the child is being held in detention.

232.42  Continuances. (Postponements of scheduled hearings)

2. Continuances in Child in Need of Assistance Proceedings may be granted to the parent, to enable the parent to acquire copies of all records prior to the hearing, but not to the DHS Attorney or a guardian ad litem.

(For explanation, see "Continuances")

2.  Where the child requests a continuance of proceedings, the court, in an order granting the continuance, may suspend the time limitations imposed on the state by this division for a period of time not to exceed the length of the continuance.

3.  Proceedings may be continued for up to one year upon the request of the county attorney and the child to permit the making of probation arrangements prior to the adjudicatory hearing. If either the child or the county attorney requests that the adjudicatory hearing be held at any time during the period of the continuance, the court shall set the matter for hearing.

232.43  Answer--plea agreement--acceptance of plea admitting allegations of petition.

1.  A written answer to a delinquency petition need not be filed by the child, but any matters which might be set forth in an answer or other pleading may be filed in writing or pleaded orally before the court.

2.  The county attorney and the child's counsel may mutually consider a plea agreement which contemplates entry of a plea admitting the allegations of the petition in the expectation that other charges will be dismissed or not filed or that a specific disposition will be recommended by the county attorney and granted by the court. Any plea discussion shall be open to the child and the child's parent, guardian or custodian.

3.  The court shall not accept a plea admitting the allegations of the petition without first addressing the child personally in court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of any force or threats or promises other than promises made in connection with a plea agreement and informing the child of and determining that the child understands the following:

a.  The nature of the allegations of the petition to which the plea is offered.

b.  The severest possible disposition and the maximum length of such disposition which the court may order if the court accepts the plea.

c.  The child has the right to deny the allegations of the petition.

d.  If the child admits the allegations of the petition the child waives the right to a further adjudicatory hearing.

4.  The court shall not accept a plea admitting the allegations of the petition without first addressing the county attorney and the child's counsel in court and making an inquiry into whether such a plea is the result of a plea agreement. The court shall require the disclosure of the terms of any such agreement in court. If a plea agreement has been reached which contemplates entry of the plea in the expectation that the court will order a specific disposition or dismiss other charges against the child before the court, the court shall state to the parties whether the court will concur in the proposed disposition or dismissal of charges. If the court will not concur in such disposition or dismissal, the court should advise the child personally of this fact, advise the child that the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the child than that contemplated by the plea agreement, and afford the child the opportunity to withdraw the plea. If the court defers decision as to whether the court will concur with the proposed disposition or dismissal until there has been an opportunity to consider the predisposition report, the court shall advise the child that the court is not bound by the plea agreement and afford the child the opportunity to withdraw the plea.

5.  The court shall not accept a plea admitting the allegations of the petition without:

a.  Determining that there is a factual basis for the plea.

b.  Determining that the child was given effective assistance of counsel prior to tender of the plea.

c.  Inquiring of the parent or parents who are present in court whether they agree as to the course of action that their child has chosen. If either parent expresses disagreement with the plea, the court may refuse to accept that plea.

6.  If the court determines that a plea is not in the child's best interest it may refuse to accept that plea regardless of the agreement of the parties.

232.44  Detention or shelter care hearing--release from detention upon change of circumstance.

1.  A hearing shall be held within forty-eight hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, of the time of the child's admission to a shelter care facility, and within twenty-four hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, of the time of a child's admission to a detention facility. If the hearing is not held within the time specified, the child shall be released from shelter care or detention. Prior to the hearing a petition shall be filed, except where the child is already under the supervision of a juvenile court under a prior judgment.

If the child is placed in a detention facility in a county other than the county in which the child resides or in which the delinquent act allegedly occurred but which is within the same judicial district, the hearing may take place in the county in which the detention facility is located. The child shall appear in person at the hearing required by this subsection.

2.  The county attorney or a juvenile court officer may apply for a hearing at any time after the petition is filed to determine whether the child who is the subject of the petition should be placed in detention or shelter care. The court may upon the application or upon its own motion order such hearing. The court shall order a detention hearing for a child waived under section 232.45, subsection 7, at the time of waiver.

3.  A notice shall be served upon the child, the child's attorney, the child's guardian ad litem if any, and the child's known parent, guardian, or custodian not less than twelve hours before the time the hearing is scheduled to begin and in a manner calculated fairly to apprise the parties of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing. In the case of a hearing for a child waived for prosecution as a youthful offender, this notice may accompany the waiver order. If the court finds that there has been reasonably diligent effort to give notice to a parent, guardian, or custodian and that the effort has been unavailing, the hearing may proceed without the notice having been served.

4.  At the hearing to determine whether detention or shelter care is authorized under section 232.21 or 232.22 the court shall admit only testimony and other evidence relevant to the determination of whether there is probable cause to believe the child has committed the act as alleged in the petition and to the determination of whether the placement of the child in detention or shelter care is authorized under section 232.21 or 232.22. At the hearing to determine whether a child who has been waived for prosecution as a youthful offender should be released from detention the court shall also admit evidence of the kind admissible to determine bond or bail under chapter 811, notwithstanding section 811.1. Any written reports or records made available to the court at the hearing shall be made available to the parties. A copy of the petition or waiver order shall be given to each of the parties at or before the hearing.

5.  The court shall find release to be proper under the following circumstances:

a.  If the court finds that there is not probable cause to believe that the child is a child within the jurisdiction of the court under this chapter, it shall release the child and dismiss the petition.

b.  If the court finds that detention or shelter care is not authorized under section 232.21 or 232.22, or is authorized but not warranted in a particular case, the court shall order the child's release, and in so doing, may impose one or more of the following conditions:

(1)  Place the child in the custody of a parent, guardian or custodian under that person's supervision, or under the supervision of an organization which agrees to supervise the child.

(2)  Place restrictions on the child's travel, association, or place of residence during the period of release.

(3)  Impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary and consistent with the grounds for detaining children specified in section 232.21 or 232.22, including a condition requiring that the child return to custody as required.

(4)  In the case of a child waived for prosecution as a youthful offender, require bail, an appearance bond, or set other conditions consistent with this section or section 811.2.

c.  An order releasing a child on conditions specified in this section may be amended at any time to impose equally or less restrictive conditions. The order may be amended to impose additional or more restrictive conditions, or to revoke the release, if the child has failed to conform to the conditions originally imposed.

6.  If the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the child is within the jurisdiction of the court under this chapter and that full-time detention or shelter care is authorized under section 232.21 or 232.22 or that detention is authorized under section 232.23, it may issue an order authorizing either shelter care or detention until the adjudicatory hearing or trial is held or for a period not exceeding seven days, whichever is shorter. However, in the case of a child placed in detention under section 232.23, this period may be extended by agreement of the parties and the court.

7.  If a child held in shelter care or detention by court order has not been released after a detention hearing or has not appeared at an adjudicatory hearing before the expiration of the order of detention, an additional hearing shall automatically be scheduled for the next court day following the expiration of the order. The child, the child's counsel, the child's guardian ad litem, and the child's parent, guardian or custodian shall be notified of this hearing not less than twenty-four hours before the hearing is scheduled to take place. The hearing required by this subsection may be held by telephone conference call.

8.  A child held in a detention or shelter care facility pursuant to section 232.21 or 232.22 under order of court after a hearing may be released upon a showing that a change of circumstances makes continued detention unnecessary.

9.  A written request for the release of the child, setting forth the changed circumstances, may be filed by the child, by a responsible adult on the child's behalf, by the child's custodian, or by the juvenile court officer.

10.  Based upon the facts stated in the request for release the court may grant or deny the request without a hearing, or may order that a hearing be held at a date, time and place determined by the court. Notice of the hearing shall be given to the child and the child's custodian or counsel. Upon receiving evidence at the hearing, the court may release the child to the child's custodian or other suitable person, or may deny the request and remand the child to the detention or shelter care facility.

11.  This section does not apply to a child placed in accordance with section 232.78, 232.79, or 232.95.

232.45  Waiver hearing and waiver of jurisdiction.

1.  After the filing of a petition which alleges that a child has committed a delinquent act on the basis of an alleged commission of a public offense and before an adjudicatory hearing on the merits of the petition is held, the county attorney or the child may file a motion requesting the court to waive its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of the public offense or for the purpose of prosecution of the child as an adult or a youthful offender. If the county attorney and the child agree, a motion for waiver for the purpose of being prosecuted as a youthful offender may be heard by the district court as part of the proceedings under section 907.3A, or by the juvenile court as provided in this section. If the motion for waiver for the purpose of being prosecuted as a youthful offender is made as a result of a conditional agreement between the county attorney and the child, the conditions of the agreement shall be disclosed to the court in the same manner as provided in rules 8 and 9 of the Iowa rules of criminal procedure.

2.  The court shall hold a waiver hearing on all such motions.

3.  Reasonable notice that states the time, place, and purpose of the waiver hearing shall be provided to the persons required to be provided notice for adjudicatory hearings under section 232.37. Summons, subpoenas, and other process may be issued and served in the same manner as for adjudicatory hearings as provided in section 232.37.

4.  Prior to the waiver hearing, the juvenile probation officer or other person or agency designated by the court shall conduct an investigation for the purpose of collecting information relevant to the court's decision to waive its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of the public offense and shall submit a report concerning the investigation to the court. The report shall include any recommendations made concerning waiver. Prior to the hearing the court shall provide the child's counsel and the county attorney with access to the report and to all written material to be considered by the court.

5.  At the waiver hearing all relevant and material evidence shall be admitted.

6.  At the conclusion of the waiver hearing the court may waive its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of the public offense if all of the following apply:

a.  The child is fourteen years of age or older.

b.  The court determines, or has previously determined in a detention hearing under section 232.44, that there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed a delinquent act which would constitute the public offense.

c.  The court determines that the state has established that there are not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child if the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the child and the child is adjudicated to have committed the delinquent act, and that waiver of the court's jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of the public offense would be in the best interests of the child and the community.

7.  At the conclusion of the waiver hearing and after considering the best interests of the child and the best interests of the community the court may, in order that the child may be prosecuted as a youthful offender, waive its jurisdiction over the child if all of the following apply:

a.  The child is fifteen years of age or younger.

b.  The court determines, or has previously determined in a detention hearing under section 232.44, that there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed a delinquent act which would constitute a public offense under section 232.8, subsection 1, paragraph "c", notwithstanding the application of that paragraph to children aged sixteen or older.

c.  The court determines that the state has established that there are not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child, prior to the child's eighteenth birthday, if the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the child and the child enters into a plea agreement, is a party to a consent decree, or is adjudicated to have committed the delinquent act.

The court shall retain jurisdiction over the child for the purpose of determining whether the child should be released from detention under section 232.23. If the court has been apprised of conditions of an agreement between the county attorney and the child which resulted in a motion for waiver for purposes of the child being prosecuted as a youthful offender, and the court finds that the conditions are in the best interests of the child, the conditions of the agreement shall constitute conditions of the waiver order.

8.  In making the determination required by subsection 6, paragraph "c", the factors which the court shall consider include but are not limited to the following:

a.  The nature of the alleged delinquent act and the circumstances under which it was committed.

b.  The nature and extent of the child's prior contacts with juvenile authorities, including past efforts of such authorities to treat and rehabilitate the child and the response to such efforts.

c.  The programs, facilities and personnel available to the juvenile court for rehabilitation and treatment of the child, and the programs, facilities and personnel which would be available to the court that would have jurisdiction in the event the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction so that the child can be prosecuted as an adult.

9.  In making the determination required by subsection 7, paragraph "c", the factors which the court shall consider include but are not limited to the following:

a.  The nature of the alleged delinquent act and the circumstances under which it was committed.

b.  The nature and extent of the child's prior contacts with juvenile authorities, including past efforts of such authorities to treat and rehabilitate the child and the response to such efforts.

c.  The age of the child, the programs, facilities, and personnel available to the juvenile court for rehabilitation and treatment of the child, and the programs, facilities, and personnel which would be available to the district court after the child reaches the age of eighteen in the event the child is given youthful offender status.

10.  If at the conclusion of the hearing the court waives its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of the public offense, the court shall make and file written findings as to its reasons for waiving its jurisdiction.

11.  If the court waives jurisdiction, statements made by the child after being taken into custody and prior to intake are admissible as evidence in chief against the child in subsequent criminal proceedings provided that the statements were made with the advice of the child's counsel or after waiver of the child's right to counsel and provided that the court finds the child had voluntarily waived the right to remain silent. Other statements made by a child are admissible as evidence in chief provided that the court finds the statements were voluntary. In making its determination, the court may consider any factors it finds relevant and shall consider the following factors:

a.  Opportunity for the child to consult with a parent, guardian, custodian, lawyer or other adult.

b.  The age of the child.

c.  The child's level of education.

d.  The child's level of intelligence.

e.  Whether the child was advised of the child's constitutional rights.

f.  Length of time the child was held in shelter care or detention before making the statement in question.

g.  The nature of the questioning which elicited the statement.

h.  Whether physical punishment such as deprivation of food or sleep was used upon the child during the shelter care, detention, or questioning.

Statements made by the child during intake or at a waiver hearing held pursuant to this section are not admissible as evidence in chief against the child in subsequent criminal proceedings over the child's objection in any event.

12.  If the court waives its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of the public offense so that the child may be prosecuted as an adult or a youthful offender, the judge who made the waiver decision shall not preside at any subsequent proceedings in connection with that prosecution if the child objects.

13.  The waiver does not apply to other delinquent acts which are not alleged in the delinquency petition presented at the waiver hearing.

14.  If a child who is alleged to have delivered, manufactured, or possessed with intent to deliver or manufacture, a controlled substance except marijuana, as defined in chapter 124, is waived to district court for prosecution, the mandatory minimum sentence provided in section 124.413 shall not be imposed if a conviction is had; however, each child convicted of such an offense shall be confined for not less than thirty days in a secure facility.

a.  Five years have elapsed since the final discharge of that person; and

b.  The person has not been convicted of a felony or an aggravated or serious misdemeanor, or adjudicated a delinquent for an act which if committed by an adult would be a felony, or an aggravated or serious misdemeanor since the final discharge of that person.

Upon application of a person charged or convicted under the authority of this subsection, the district court shall order the records in the case sealed if:

232.45A  Waiver to and conviction by district court--processing.

1.  Once jurisdiction over a child has been waived by the juvenile court as provided in section 232.45, for the alleged commission of a felony, and once a conviction is entered by the district court, for all other offenses, the clerk of the juvenile court shall immediately send a certified copy of the findings required by section 232.45, subsection 10, and the judgment of conviction, as applicable, to the department of public safety. The department shall maintain a file on each child who has previously been waived to or waived to and convicted by the district court in a prosecution as an adult. The file shall be accessible by law enforcement officers on a twenty-four hour per day basis.

2.  Once a child sixteen years of age or older has been waived to and convicted of an aggravated misdemeanor or a felony in the district court, all criminal proceedings against the child for any aggravated misdemeanor or felony occurring subsequent to the date of the conviction of the child shall begin in district court, notwithstanding sections 232.8 and 232.45. A copy of the findings required by section 232.45, subsection 10, shall be made a part of the record in the district court proceedings.

3.  If proceedings against a child for an aggravated misdemeanor or a felony who has previously been waived to and convicted of an aggravated misdemeanor or a felony in the district court are mistakenly begun in the juvenile court, the matter shall be transferred to district court upon the discovery of the prior waiver and conviction, notwithstanding sections 232.8 and 232.45.

4.  This section shall not apply to a child who was waived to the district court for the purpose of being prosecuted as a youthful offender.

232.46  Consent decree.

1.  At any time after the filing of a petition and prior to entry of an order of adjudication pursuant to section 232.47, the court may suspend the proceedings on motion of the county attorney or the child's counsel, enter a consent decree, and continue the case under terms and conditions established by the court. These terms and conditions may include prohibiting a child from driving a motor vehicle for a specified period of time or under specific circumstances, or the supervision of the child by a juvenile court officer or other agency or person designated by the court, and may include the requirement that the child perform a work assignment of value to the state or to the public or make restitution consisting of a monetary payment to the victim or a work assignment directly of value to the victim. The court shall notify the state department of transportation of an order prohibiting the child from driving.

2.  A consent decree entered regarding a child placed in detention under section 232.22, subsection 1, paragraph "g", shall require the child to attend a batterers' treatment program under section 708.2B. The second time the child fails to attend the batterers' treatment as required by the consent decree shall result in the decree being vacated and proceedings commenced under section 232.47.

3.  A consent decree shall not be entered unless the child and the child's parent, guardian or custodian is informed of the consequences of the decree by the court and the court determines that the child has voluntarily and intelligently agreed to the terms and conditions of the decree. If the county attorney objects to the entry of a consent decree, the court shall proceed to determine the appropriateness of entering a consent decree after consideration of any objections or reasons for entering such a decree.

4.  A consent decree shall remain in force for six months unless the child is sooner discharged by the court or by the juvenile court officer or other agency or person supervising the child. Upon application of a juvenile court officer or other agency or person supervising the child made prior to the expiration of the decree and after notice and hearing, or upon agreement by the parties, a consent decree may be extended for an additional six months by order of the court.

5.  When a child has complied with the express terms and conditions of the consent decree for the required amount of time or until earlier dismissed as provided in subsection 4, the original petition may not be reinstated. However, failure to so comply may result in the child's being thereafter held accountable as if the consent decree had never been entered.

6.  A child who is discharged or who completes a period of continuance without the reinstatement of the original petition shall not be proceeded against in any court for a delinquent act alleged in the petition.

232.47  Adjudicatory hearing--findings--adjudication.

1.  If a child denies the allegations of the petition, that child may be found to be delinquent only after an adjudicatory hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of this section.

2.  The court shall hear and adjudicate all cases involving a petition alleging a child to have committed a delinquent act.

3.  The child shall have the right to adjudication by an impartial finder of fact. A judge of the juvenile court may not serve as the finder of fact over objection of the child based upon a showing of prejudice on the part of the judge. In the event that a judge is disqualified from serving as a finder of fact under this provision, a substitute judge shall serve as the finder of fact.

4.  At an adjudicatory hearing the state shall have the burden of proving the allegations of the petition.

5.  Only evidence which is admissible under the rules of evidence applicable to the trial of criminal cases shall be admitted at the hearing except as otherwise provided by this section.

6.  Statements or other evidence derived directly or indirectly from statements which a child makes to a law enforcement officer while in custody without presence of counsel may be admitted into evidence at an adjudicatory hearing over the child's objection only after the court determines whether the child has voluntarily waived the right to remain silent. In making its determination the court may consider any factors it finds relevant and shall consider the following factors:

a.  Opportunity for the child to consult with a parent, guardian, custodian, lawyer or other adult.

b.  The age of the child.

c.  The child's level of education.

d.  The child's level of intelligence.

e.  Whether the child was advised of the child's constitutional rights.

f.  Length of time the child was held in shelter care or detention before making the statement in question.

g.  The nature of the questioning which elicited the statement.

h.  Whether physical punishment such as deprivation of food or sleep was used upon the child during the shelter care, detention, or questioning.

7.  The following statements or other evidence shall not be admitted as evidence in chief at an adjudicatory hearing:

a.  Statements or other evidence derived directly or indirectly from statements which a child makes to a juvenile intake officer without the presence of counsel subsequent to the filing of a complaint and prior to adjudication unless the child and the child's attorney consent to the admission of such statements or evidence.

b.  Statements which the child makes to a juvenile probation officer or other person conducting a predisposition investigation during such an investigation.

8.  At the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing, the court shall make a finding as to whether the child has committed a delinquent act. The court shall make and file written findings as to the truth of the specific allegations of the petition and as to whether the child has engaged in delinquent conduct.

9.  If the court finds that the child did not engage in delinquent conduct, the court shall enter an order dismissing the petition.

10.  If the court finds that the child did engage in delinquent conduct, the court may enter an order adjudicating the child to have committed a delinquent act. The child shall be presumed to be innocent of the charges and no finding that a child has engaged in delinquent conduct may be made unless the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the child engaged in such behavior.

11.  If the court enters an order adjudicating the child to have committed a delinquent act, the court may issue an order authorizing either shelter care or detention until the dispositional hearing is held.

12.  A juvenile court officer shall notify the superintendent of the school district or the superintendent's designee, or the authorities in charge of the nonpublic school which the child attends of the child's adjudication for a delinquent act which would be an indictable offense if committed by an adult.

232.48  Predisposition investigation and report.

1.  The court shall not make a disposition of the matter following the entry of an order of adjudication pursuant to section 232.47 until a predisposition report has been submitted to and considered by the court.

2.  After a petition is filed, the court shall direct a juvenile court officer or any other agency or individual to conduct a predisposition investigation and to prepare a predisposition report. The investigation and report shall cover all of the following:

a.  The social history, environment and present condition of the child and the child's family.

b.  The performance of the child in school.

c.  The presence of child abuse and neglect histories, learning disabilities, physical impairments and past acts of violence.

d.  Other matters relevant to the child's status as a delinquent, treatment of the child or proper disposition of the case.

3.   No predisposition report shall be submitted to or considered by the court prior to the completion of the adjudicatory hearing without the consent of the child and the child's counsel.

4.  A predisposition report shall not be disclosed except as provided in this section and in division VIII of this chapter. The court shall permit the child's attorney to inspect the predisposition report prior to consideration by the court. The court may order counsel not to disclose parts of the report to the child, or to the child's parent, guardian, guardian ad litem, or custodian if the court finds that disclosure would seriously harm the treatment or rehabilitation of the child.

232.49  Physical and mental examinations.

1.  Following the entry of an order of adjudication under section 232.47 the court may, after a hearing which may be simultaneous with the adjudicatory hearing, order a physical or mental examination of the child if it finds that an examination is necessary to determine the child's physical or mental condition. The court may consider chemical dependency as either a physical or mental condition and may consider a chemical dependency evaluation as either a physical or mental examination.

2.  When possible an examination shall be conducted on an out-patient basis, but the court may, if it deems necessary, commit the child to a suitable hospital, facility or institution for the purpose of examination. Commitment for examination shall not exceed thirty days and the civil commitment provisions of chapter 229 shall not apply.

3.  At any time after the filing of a delinquency petition the court may order a physical or mental examination of the child if the following circumstances apply:

a.  The court finds such examination to be in the best interest of the child; and

b.  The parent, guardian or custodian and the child's counsel agree.

An examination shall be conducted on an out-patient basis unless the court, the child's counsel and the parent, guardian or custodian agree that it is necessary the child be committed to a suitable hospital, facility or institution for the purpose of examination. Commitment for examination shall not exceed thirty days and the civil commitment provisions of chapter 229 shall not apply.

New definition: 232.2

50. "Services" means any assistance offered or ordered to the child or the family whose anticipated benefits are scientifically testable, refutable and falsifiable.

(For explanation, see "Mandatory Ineffective Treatment")

232.50  Dispositional hearing.

1.  As soon as practicable following the entry of an order of adjudication pursuant to section 232.47 or notification that the child has received a youthful offender deferred sentence pursuant to section 907.3A, the court shall hold a dispositional hearing in order to determine what disposition should be made of the matter.

2.  The court shall hold a periodic dispositional review hearing for each child in placement pursuant to section 232.52, subsection 2, paragraph "d" or "e", to determine the future disposition status of the child. The hearings shall not be waived or continued beyond twelve months after the last dispositional hearing or dispositional review hearing.

3.  At dispositional hearings under this section all relevant and material evidence shall be admitted.

4.  When a dispositional hearing under this section is concluded the court shall enter an order to make any one or more of the dispositions authorized under section 232.52.

232.51  Disposition of child with mental illness or mental retardation.

If the evidence received at an adjudicatory or a dispositional hearing indicates that the child is mentally ill, the court may direct the juvenile court officer or the department to initiate proceedings or to assist the child's parent or guardian to initiate civil commitment proceedings in the juvenile court. These proceedings in the juvenile court shall adhere to the requirements of chapter 229. If the evidence received at an adjudicatory or a dispositional hearing indicates that the child is mentally retarded, the court may direct the juvenile court officer or the department to initiate proceedings or to assist the child's parent or guardian to initiate civil commitment proceedings in the juvenile court. These proceedings shall adhere to the requirements of chapter 222. If the child is committed as a child with mental illness or mental retardation, any order adjudicating the child to have committed a delinquent act shall be set aside and the petition shall be dismissed.

232.52  Disposition of child found to have committed a delinquent act.

1.  Pursuant to a hearing as provided in section 232.50, the court shall enter the least restrictive dispositional order appropriate in view of the seriousness of the delinquent act, the child's culpability as indicated by the circumstances of the particular case, the age of the child, the child's prior record, or the fact that the child has received a youthful offender deferred sentence under section 907.3A. The order shall specify the duration and the nature of the disposition, including the type of residence or confinement ordered and the individual, agency, department or facility in whom custody is vested. In the case of a child who has received a youthful offender deferred sentence, the initial duration of the dispositional order shall be until the child reaches the age of eighteen.

2.  The dispositional orders which the court may enter subject to its continuing jurisdiction are as follows:

a.  An order prescribing one or more of the following:

(1)  A work assignment of value to the state or to the public.

(2)  Restitution consisting of monetary payment or a work assignment of value to the victim.

(3)  If the child is fourteen years of age or older, restitution consisting of monetary payment or a work assignment of value to the county or to the public for fees of attorneys appointed to represent the child at public expense pursuant to section 232.11.

(4)  The suspension or revocation of the driver's license or operating privilege of the child, for a period of one year, for the commission of delinquent acts which are a violation of any of the following:

(a)  Section 123.46.

(b)  Section 123.47 regarding the purchase or attempt to purchase of alcoholic beverages.

(c)  Chapter 124.

(d)  Section 126.3.

(e)  Chapter 453B.

(f)  Two or more violations of section 123.47 regarding the possession of alcoholic beverages.

(g)  Section 708.1, if the assault is committed upon an employee of the school at which the child is enrolled, and the child intended to inflict serious injury upon the school employee or caused bodily injury or mental illness.

(h)  Section 724.4, if the child carried the dangerous weapon on school grounds.

(i)  Section 724.4B.

The child may be issued a temporary restricted license or school license if the child is otherwise eligible.

(5)  The suspension of the driver's license or operating privilege of the child for a period not to exceed one year. The order shall state whether a work permit may or shall not be issued to the child.

An order under paragraph "a" may be the sole disposition or may be included as an element in other dispositional orders.

b.  An order placing the child on probation and releasing the child to the child's parent, guardian or custodian.

c.  An order providing special care and appropriate treatment required for the physical, emotional or mental health of the child, and

(1)  Placing the child on probation or other supervision; and

232.52 Disposition of child found to have committed a delinquent act

2(c)(2) ¶2: A parent or guardian may be required by the juvenile court to participate in educational or appropriate treatment programs whose benefits are scientifically testable, refutable, and falsifiable as part of a probation plan if the court determines it to be in the best interest of the child. A parent or guardian who does not participate in the probation plan when required to do so by the court may be held in contempt.

(For explanation, see "Mandatory Ineffective Treatment")

d.  An order transferring the legal custody of the child, subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court for purposes of section 232.54, to one of the following:

(1)  An adult relative or other suitable adult and placing the child on probation.

(2)  A child placing agency or other suitable private agency or facility which is licensed or otherwise authorized by law to receive and provide care for children and placing the child on probation or other supervision.

(3)  The department of human services for purposes of foster care and prescribing the type of placement which will serve the best interests of the child and the means by which the placement shall be monitored by the court. The court shall consider ordering placement in family foster care as an alternative to group foster care.

(4)  The chief juvenile court officer or the officer's designee for placement in a program under section 232.191, subsection 4. The chief juvenile court officer or the officer's designee may place a child in group foster care for failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the supervised community treatment program for up to seventy-two hours without notice to the court or for more than seventy-two hours if the court is notified of the placement within seventy-two hours of placement, subject to a hearing before the court on the placement within ten days.

e.  An order transferring the guardianship of the child, subject to the continuing jurisdiction and custody of the court for the purposes of section 232.54, to the director of the department of human services for purposes of placement in the state training school or other facility, provided that the child is at least twelve years of age and the court finds the placement to be in the best interests of the child or necessary for the protection of the public, and that the child has been found to have committed an act which is a forcible felony, as defined in section 702.11, or a felony violation of section 124.401 or chapter 707, or the court finds any three of the following conditions exist:

(1)  The child is at least fifteen years of age and the court finds the placement to be in the best interests of the child or necessary to the protection of the public.

(2)  The child has committed an act which is a crime against a person and which would be an aggravated misdemeanor or a felony if the act were committed by an adult.

(3)  The child has previously been found to have committed a delinquent act.

(4)  The child has previously been placed in a treatment facility outside the child's home or in a supervised community treatment program established pursuant to section 232.191, subsection 4, as a result of a prior delinquency adjudication.

f.  An order committing the child to a mental health institute or other appropriate facility for the purpose of treatment of a mental or emotional condition after making findings pursuant to the standards set out for involuntary commitment in chapter 229.

g.  An order placing a child, other than a child who has committed a violation of section 123.47, in secure custody for not more than two days in a facility under section 232.22, subsection 3, paragraph "a" or "b".

h.  In the case of a child adjudicated delinquent for an act which would be a violation of chapter 236 or section 708.2A if committed by an adult, an order requiring the child to attend a batterers' treatment program under section 708.2B.

2A.  Notwithstanding subsection 2, the court shall not order group foster care placement of the child which is a charge upon the state if that placement is not in accordance with the regional plan for group foster care established pursuant to section 232.143 for the departmental region in which the court is located.

3.  When the court enters an order placing a child on probation pursuant to this section, the court may in cases of change of residency transfer jurisdiction of the child to the juvenile court of the county where the child's residence is established. The court to which the jurisdiction of the child is transferred shall have the same powers with respect to the child as if the petition had originally been filed in that court.

4.  When the court enters an order transferring the legal and physical custody of a child to an agency, facility, department or institution, the court shall transmit its order, its finding, and a summary of its information concerning the child to such agency, facility, department or institution.

5.  If the court orders the transfer of custody of the child to the department of human services or other agency for placement, the department or agency responsible for the placement of the child shall submit a case permanency plan to the court and shall make every effort to return the child to the child's home as quickly as possible.

6.  When the court orders the transfer of legal custody of a child pursuant to subsection 2, paragraph "d", "e", or "f", the order shall state that reasonable efforts as defined in section 232.57 have been made. If deemed appropriate by the court, the order may include a determination that continuation of the child in the child's home is contrary to the child's welfare. The inclusion of such a determination shall not under any circumstances be deemed a prerequisite for entering an order pursuant to this section. However, the inclusion of such a determination, supported by the record, may be used to assist the department in obtaining federal funding for the child's placement.

When the court orders the transfer of legal custody of a child pursuant to subsection 2, paragraph "d", and the child is sixteen years of age or older, the order shall specify the appropriate services needed to assist the child in preparing for the transition from foster care to independent living. If the child is interested in pursuing higher education, the plan shall provide for the child's participation in the college student aid commission's program of assistance in applying for federal and state aid under section 261.2.

7.  If the court orders the transfer of the custody of the child to the department of human services or to another agency for placement in group foster care, the department or agency shall make every reasonable effort to place the child within the state, in the least restrictive, most family-like, and most appropriate setting available and in close proximity to the parents' home, consistent with the child's best interests and special needs, and shall consider the placement's proximity to the school in which the child is enrolled at the time of placement.

8.  If a child has previously been adjudicated as a child in need of assistance, and a social worker or other caseworker from the department of human services has been assigned to work on the child's case, the court may order the department of human services to assign the same social worker or caseworker to work on any matters related to the child arising under this division.

9. a.  Upon receipt of an application from the director of the department of human services, the court shall enter an order to temporarily transfer a child who has been placed in the state training school pursuant to subsection 2, paragraph "e", to a facility which has been designated to be an alternative placement site for the state training school, provided the court finds that all of the following conditions exist:

b.  If the court finds the conditions in paragraph "a" exist and there is insufficient time to provide notice as required under rule of juvenile procedure 4.6, the court may enter an ex parte order temporarily transferring the child to the alternative placement site.

c.  Within three days of the child's transfer, the director shall file a motion for a substitute dispositional order under section 232.54 and the court shall hold a hearing concerning the motion within fourteen days of the child's transfer.

(1)  There is insufficient time to file a motion and hold a hearing for a substitute dispositional order under section 232.54.

(2)  Immediate removal of the child from the state training school is necessary to safeguard the child's physical or emotional health.

(3)  That reasonable attempts to notify the parents, guardian ad litem, and attorney for the child have been made.

232.52A  Disposition of certain juvenile offenders.

In addition to any other order of the juvenile court, a person under age eighteen, who may be in need of treatment as determined under section 232.8, may be ordered to participate in an alcohol or controlled substance education or evaluation program approved by the juvenile court. If recommended after evaluation, the court may also order the person to participate in a treatment program approved by the court. The juvenile court may also require the custodial parent or parents or other legal guardian to participate in an educational program with the person under age eighteen if the court determines that such participation is in the best interests of the person under age eighteen.

232.53  Duration of dispositional orders.

1.  Any dispositional order entered by the court pursuant to section 232.52 shall remain in force for an indeterminate period or until the child becomes eighteen years of age unless otherwise specified by the court or unless sooner terminated pursuant to the provisions of section 232.54. No dispositional order made under section 232.52, subsection 2, paragraph "e" shall remain in force longer than the maximum possible duration of the sentence which may be imposed on an adult for the commission of the act which the child has been found by the court to have committed.

2.  All dispositional orders entered prior to the child attaining the age of seventeen years shall automatically terminate when the child becomes eighteen years of age. Dispositional orders entered subsequent to the child attaining the age of seventeen years and prior to the child's eighteenth birthday shall automatically terminate one year and six months after the date of disposition. In the case of an adult within the jurisdiction of the court under the provisions of section 232.8, subsection 1, the dispositional order shall automatically terminate one year and six months after the last date upon which jurisdiction could attach.

3.  Notwithstanding section 233A.13, a child committed to the training school subsequent to the child attaining the age of seventeen years and prior to the child's eighteenth birthday may be held at the school beyond the child's eighteenth birthday pursuant to subsection 2, provided that the training school makes application to and receives permission from the committing court. This extension shall be for the purpose of completion by the child of a course of instruction established for the child pursuant to section 233A.4 and cannot extend for more than one year and six months beyond the date of disposition.

4. a.  Any person supervising but not having custody of the child pursuant to such an order shall file a written report with the court at least every six months concerning the status and progress of the child.

b.  Any agency, facility, institution, or person to whom custody of the child has been transferred pursuant to such order shall file a written report with the court at least every six months concerning the status and progress of the child.

c.  Any report prepared pursuant to this subsection shall be included in the record considered by the court in a permanency hearing conducted pursuant to section 232.58.

232.54  Termination, modification, or vacation and substitution of dispositional order.

At any time prior to its expiration, a dispositional order may be terminated, modified, or vacated and another dispositional order substituted therefor only in accordance with the following provisions:

1.  With respect to a dispositional order made pursuant to section 232.52, subsection 2, paragraph "a", "b" or "c" and upon the motion of a child, a child's parent or guardian, a child's guardian ad litem, a person supervising the child under a dispositional order, a county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may terminate the order and discharge the child, modify the order, or vacate the order and substitute another order pursuant to the provisions of section 232.52. Notice shall be afforded all parties, and a hearing shall be held at the request of any party.

2.  With respect to a dispositional order made pursuant to section 232.52, subsection 2, paragraphs "d", and "e", the court shall grant a motion of the person to whom custody has been transferred for termination of the order and discharge of the child, for modification of the order by imposition of less restrictive conditions, or for vacation of the order and substitution of a less restrictive order unless there is clear and convincing evidence that there has not been a change of circumstance sufficient to grant the motion. Notice shall be afforded all parties, and a hearing shall be held at the request of any party or upon the court's own motion.

3.  With respect to a dispositional order made pursuant to section 232.52, subsection 2, paragraphs "d", or "e" or "f", the court shall grant a motion of a person or agency to whom custody has been transferred for modification of the order by transfer to an equally restrictive placement, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that there has not been a change of circumstance sufficient to grant the motion. Notice shall be afforded all parties, and a hearing shall be held at the request of any party or upon the court's own motion.

4.  With respect to a dispositional order made pursuant to section 232.52, subsection 2, paragraphs "d", "e" or "f", the court may, after notice and hearing, either grant or deny a motion of the child, the child's parent or guardian, or the child's guardian ad litem, to terminate the order and discharge the child, to modify the order either by imposing less restrictive conditions or by transfer to an equally or less restrictive placement, or to vacate the order and substitute a less restrictive order. A motion may be made pursuant to this paragraph no more than once every six months.

5.  With respect to a dispositional order made pursuant to section 232.52, subsection 2, paragraphs "d" and "e", the court may, after notice and a hearing at which there is presented clear and convincing evidence to support such an action, either grant or deny a motion by a county attorney or by a person or agency to whom custody has been transferred, to modify an order by imposing more restrictive conditions or to vacate the order and substitute a more restrictive order.

6.  With respect to a temporary transfer order made pursuant to section 232.52, subsection 9, if the court finds that removal of a child from the state training school is necessary to safeguard the child's physical or emotional health and is in the best interests of the child, the court shall grant the director's motion for a substitute dispositional order to place the child in a facility which has been designated to be an alternative placement site for the state training school.

7.  With respect to a juvenile court dispositional order entered regarding a child who has received a youthful offender deferred sentence under section 907.3A, the dispositional order may be terminated prior to the child reaching the age of eighteen upon motion of the child, the person or agency to whom custody of the child has been transferred, or the county attorney following a hearing before the juvenile court if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of the child and the community to terminate the order. The hearing may be waived if all parties to the proceeding agree. The dispositional order regarding a child who has received a youthful offender deferred sentence may also be terminated prior to the child reaching the age of eighteen upon motion of the county attorney, if the waiver of the child to district court was conditioned upon the terms of an agreement between the county attorney and the child, and the child violates the terms of the agreement after the waiver order has been entered. The district court shall discharge the child's youthful offender status upon receiving a termination order under this section.

8.  With respect to a dispositional order entered regarding a child who has received a youthful offender deferred sentence under section 907.3A, the juvenile court may, in the case of a child who violates the terms of the order, modify or terminate the order in accordance with the following:

a.  After notice and hearing at which the facts of the child's violation of the terms of the order are found, the juvenile court may refuse to modify the order, modify the order and impose a more restrictive order, or, after an assessment of the child by a juvenile court officer in consultation with the judicial district department of correctional services and if the child is age fourteen or over, terminate the order and return the child to the supervision of the district court under chapter 907.

b.  The juvenile court shall only terminate an order under this subsection if after considering the best interests of the child and the best interests of the community the court finds that the child should be returned to the supervision of the district court.

c.  A youthful offender over whom the juvenile court has terminated the dispositional order under this subsection shall be treated in the manner of an adult who has been arrested for a violation of probation under section 908.11 for sentencing purposes only.

Notice requirements of this section shall be satisfied by providing reasonable notice to the persons required to be provided notice for adjudicatory hearings under section 232.37, except that notice shall be waived regarding a person who was notified of the adjudicatory hearing and who failed to appear. At a hearing under this section all relevant and material evidence shall be admitted.

232.55  Effect of adjudication and disposition.

1.  An adjudication or disposition in a proceeding under this division shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime and shall not impose any civil disabilities or operate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment.

2.  Adjudication and disposition proceedings under this division are not admissible as evidence against a person in a subsequent proceeding in any other court before or after the person reaches majority except in a sentencing proceeding after conviction of the person for an offense other than a simple or serious misdemeanor. Adjudication and disposition proceedings may properly be included in a presentence investigation report prepared pursuant to chapter 901 and section 906.5.

However, the use of adjudication and disposition proceedings pursuant to this subsection shall be subject to the restrictions contained in section 232.150.

This section does not apply to dispositional orders entered regarding a child who has received a youthful offender deferred sentence under section 907.3A who is not discharged from probation before or upon the child's eighteenth birthday.

232.56  Youthful offenders--transfer to district court supervision.

The juvenile court shall deliver a report, which includes an assessment of the child by a juvenile court officer after consulting with the judicial district department of correctional services, to the district court prior to the eighteenth birthday of a child who has received a youthful offender deferred sentence under section 907.3A. A hearing shall be held in the district court in accordance with section 907.3A to determine whether the child should be discharged from youthful offender status or whether the child shall continue under the supervision of the district court after the child's eighteenth birthday.

CHILD IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE PROCEEDINGS

PART 1

DIVISION III

GENERAL PROVISIONS

232.61  Jurisdiction.

1.  The juvenile court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings under this chapter alleging that a child is a child in need of assistance.

2.  In determining such jurisdiction the age and marital status of the child at the time the proceedings are initiated is controlling.

232.62  Venue.

1.  Venue for child in need of assistance proceedings shall be in the judicial district where the child is found or in the judicial district of the child's residence.

2.  The court may transfer any child in need of assistance proceedings brought under this chapter to the juvenile court of any county having venue at any stage in the proceedings as follows:

a.  When it appears that the best interests of the child or the convenience of the proceedings shall be served by a transfer, the court may transfer the case to the court of the county of the child's residence.

b.  With the consent of the receiving court, the court may transfer the case to the court of the county where the child is found.

3.  The court shall transfer the case by ordering the transfer and a continuance and by forwarding to the clerk of the receiving court a certified copy of all papers filed together with an order of transfer. The judge of the receiving court may accept the filings of the transferring court or may direct the filing of a new petition and hear the case anew.

PART 2

CHILD ABUSE REPORTING, ASSESSMENT, AND REHABILITATION

232.67  Legislative findings--purpose and policy.

Children in this state are in urgent need of protection from abuse, while nonabusive, loving families are in urgent need of protection from false abuse charges. It is the purpose and policy of this part 2 of division III to provide the greatest possible protection to victims or potential victims of abuse through encouraging the increased conscientious, accurate reporting of suspected cases of abuse, ensuring the thorough and prompt assessment of these reports, and providing falsifiable, testable, refutable, and appropriate rehabilitative services, where appropriate and whenever possible to abused children and their families which will stabilize the home environment so that the family can remain intact without further danger to the child.

(For explanation, see "Overview")

232.68  Definitions.

The definitions in section 235A.13 are applicable to this part 2 of division III. As used in sections 232.67 through 232.77 and 235A.12 through 235A.23, unless the context otherwise requires:

1.  "Child" means any person under the age of eighteen years.

2.  "Child abuse" or "abuse" means:

232.68(2)(a).  Any nonaccidental physical injury, or injury which is at variance with the history given of it, suffered by a child as the result of the acts or omissions of a person responsible for the care of the child. Injury to the gluteal maximus (buttocks) that neither requires medical treatment nor causes permanent injury shall not be considered child abuse under any circumstances, nor made part of any child abuse report. Any other injury shall not be considered child abuse unless it was inflicted by the parent willfully (deliberately), wantonly (without regard for consequences), and maliciously (contrary to the best interests of the child).

"Neglect", also called "Denial of Critical Care", also means a pattern of violations of the objective criteria of a Chart of Uniform Standards, defining "neglect", "denial of critical care", and "minimum care in supervising the child", which the DHS shall make publicly available, and which shall describe violations of minimum care standards in sufficient detail that any parent can determine with precision whether or not a social worker will find them in compliance.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Supervision, shall take into account the age and intelligence of the children in need of supervision, the amount of time they are left unsupervised, the frequency with which they are left unsupervised for a given length of time, and the ages of any older children into whose care the younger children are left.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Food, shall be specific enough that any parent can inventory their kitchen and know whether it would pass a DHS inspection.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Shelter, shall define minimum shelter ratings with enough specificity that landlords and real estate agents can rate their properties in their advertising.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Clothing, shall define minimum wardrobe criteria objectively enough that any parent, grandparent, teacher, or social worker can inspect a wardrobe and agree whether it meets standards.

The Chart of Uniform Standards, in defining Abusive Lack of Hygiene, shall specify unacceptable levels of unwashed dishes, clothes, diapers, animal waste, and air pollutants. The specified levels shall be objective and measurable.

The published standards defining "Neglect" and "Denial of Critical Care" may also mean any lack of provision for the child whose minimum measurable levels are published by the Department. No instance of neglect whose limits are not clearly published and made freely available to the public shall be permitted as part of any child abuse report.

The Chart of Uniform Standards shall be written in simple language, and approved as Administrative Rules, as well as published and made freely available to the general public.

(For explanation, see "Child Abuse Defined")

232.68(2)(b) Definitions. "Child abuse" or "abuse" means:

b. Any mental injury to a child's intellectual or psychological capacity as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment, whose existence has been verified by a scientifically testable, refutable, and falsifiable fact-finding process, in the child's ability to function within the child's normal range of performance and behavior as the result of the acts or omissions of a person responsible for the care of the child, if the impairment is diagnosed and confirmed by a licensed physician or qualified mental health professional as defined in section 622.10

(For explanation, see "Psychiatric Treatment, part 2")

c.  The commission of a sexual offense with or to a child pursuant to chapter 709, section 726.2, or section 728.12, subsection 1, as a result of the acts or omissions of the person responsible for the care of the child. Notwithstanding section 702.5, the commission of a sexual offense under this paragraph includes any sexual offense referred to in this paragraph with or to a person under the age of eighteen years.

232.68(2)(d) The failure on the part of a person responsible for the care of a child to provide for the adequate food, shelter, clothing or other care necessary, whose minimum levels are published by the Department pursuant to 232.2(42), for the child's health and welfare when financially able to do so or when offered financial or other reasonable means to do so. A parent or guardian legitimately practicing religious beliefs who does not provide specified medical treatment for a child for that reason alone shall not be considered abusing the child, however this provision shall not preclude a court from ordering that medical service be provided to the child where the child's health requires it.

(For explanation, see "Child Abuse Defined")

e.  The acts or omissions of a person responsible for the care of a child which allow, permit, or encourage the child to engage in acts prohibited pursuant to section 725.1. Notwithstanding section 702.5, acts or omissions under this paragraph include an act or omission referred to in this paragraph with or to a person under the age of eighteen years.

f.  An illegal drug is present in a child's body as a direct and foreseeable consequence of the acts or omissions of the person responsible for the care of the child.

g.  The person responsible for the care of a child has, in the presence of the child, as defined in section 232.2, subsection 6, paragraph "p", manufactured a dangerous substance, as defined in section 232.2, subsection 6, paragraph "p", or in the presence of the child possesses a product containing ephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, salts of optical isomers, or pseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, salts of optical isomers, with the intent to use the product as a precursor or an intermediary to a dangerous substance.

h.  The commission of bestiality in the presence of a minor under section 717C.1 by a person who resides in a home with a child, as a result of the acts or omissions of a person responsible for the care of the child.

2A.  "Child protection worker" means an individual designated by the department to perform an assessment in response to a report of child abuse.

3.  "Confidential access to a child" means access to a child, during an assessment of an alleged act of child abuse, who is alleged to be the victim of the child abuse. The access may be accomplished by interview, observation, or examination of the child. As used in this subsection and this part:

232.68(3)(a)

a. "Interview" means the verbal exchange between the child and the department investigator, and the child or any attorney or mental health professional cooperating with the department investigator, or with the guardian ad litem, for the purpose of developing information necessary to protect the child which may be used in court. A department investigator is not precluded from recording visible evidence of abuse. The first 7 hours of interviews must be recorded on video tape, and copies immediately made available without cost, to the child's parent, custodian and guardian, and any alleged perpetrator.

(For explanation, see "Interview!")

b.  "Observation" means direct physical viewing of a child under the age of four by the child protection worker where the viewing is limited to the child's body other than the genitalia and pubes. "Observation" also means direct physical viewing of a child aged four or older by the child protection worker without touching the child or removing an article of the child's clothing, and doing so without the consent of the child's parent, custodian, or guardian. A child protection worker is not precluded from recording evidence of abuse obtained as a result of a child's voluntary removal of an article of clothing without inducement by the child protection worker. However, if prior consent of the child's parent or guardian, or an ex parte court order, is obtained, "observation" may include viewing the child's unclothed body other than the genitalia and pubes.

c.  "Physical examination" means direct physical viewing, touching, and medically necessary manipulation of any area of the child's body by a physician licensed under chapter 148 or 150A.

4.  "Department" means the state department of human services and includes the local, county and regional offices of the department.

5.  "Health practitioner" includes a licensed physician and surgeon, osteopath, osteopathic physician and surgeon, dentist, optometrist, podiatric physician, or chiropractor; a resident or intern in any of such professions; a licensed dental hygienist, a registered nurse or licensed practical nurse; a physician assistant; and an emergency medical care provider certified under section 147A.6.

232.68(6).  "Mental health professional" means a person practitioner of a discipline which is falsifiable, testable, and refutable and who meets the following requirements:

(For explanation, see "Psychiatry")

a.  Holds at least a master's degree in a mental health field, including, but not limited to, psychology, counseling, nursing, or social work; or is licensed to practice medicine pursuant to chapter 148, 150, or 150A.

b.  Holds a license to practice in the appropriate profession.

c.  Has at least two years of postdegree experience, supervised by a mental health professional, in assessing mental health problems and needs of individuals used in providing appropriate mental health services for those individuals.

7.  "Person responsible for the care of a child" means:

a.  A parent, guardian, or foster parent.

b.  A relative or any other person with whom the child resides and who assumes care or supervision of the child, without reference to the length of time or continuity of such residence.

c.  An employee or agent of any public or private facility providing care for a child, including an institution, hospital, health care facility, group home, mental health center, residential treatment center, shelter care facility, detention center, or child care facility.

d.  Any person providing care for a child, but with whom the child does not reside, without reference to the duration of the care.

8.  "Registry" means the central registry for child abuse information established in section 235A.14.

232.69  Mandatory and permissive reporters--training required.

(For explanation, see "Mandatory Reporters")

1.  The classes of persons enumerated in this subsection shall may make a report within twenty-four hours and as provided in section 232.70, of cases of child abuse. In addition, the classes of persons enumerated in this subsection shall make a report of abuse of a child who is under twelve years of age and may make a report of abuse of a child who is twelve years of age or older, which would be defined as child abuse under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "c" or "e", except that the abuse resulted from the acts or omissions of a person other than a person responsible for the care of the child.

(For explanation, see "Mandatory Reporters")

a.  Every health practitioner who in the scope of professional practice, examines, attends, or treats a child and who reasonably believes the child has been abused. Notwithstanding section 139A.30, this provision applies to a health practitioner who receives information confirming that a child is infected with a sexually transmitted disease.

b.  Any of the following persons who, in the scope of professional practice or in their employment responsibilities, examines, attends, counsels, or treats a child and reasonably believes a child has suffered abuse:

(1)  A social worker.

(2)  An employee or operator of a public or private health care facility as defined in section 135C.1.

(3)  A certified psychologist.

(4)  A licensed school employee, certified para-educator, or holder of a coaching authorization issued under section 272.31.

(5)  An employee or operator of a licensed child care center, registered child care home, head start program, family development and self-sufficiency grant program under section 217.12, or healthy opportunities for parents to experience success-healthy families Iowa program under section 135.106.

(6)  An employee or operator of a substance abuse program or facility licensed under chapter 125.

(7)  An employee of a department of human services institution listed in section 218.1.

(8)  An employee or operator of a juvenile detention or juvenile shelter care facility approved under section 232.142.

(9)  An employee or operator of a foster care facility licensed or approved under chapter 237.

(10)  An employee or operator of a mental health center.

(11)  A peace officer.

(12)  A counselor or mental health professional.

2.  Any other person who believes that a child has been abused may make a report as provided in section 232.70.

3. a.  For the purposes of this subsection, "licensing board" means an examining board designated in section 147.13, the board of educational examiners created in section 272.2, or a licensing board as defined in section 272C.1.

232.69(3)(b)  

b.  A person required to make a report under subsection 1, other than a physician whose professional practice does not regularly involve providing primary health care to children, shall complete two hours of training which shall consist of a video prepared by the DHS explaining the Chart of Uniform Standards described in 232.2(42), objective ways of measuring abuse, cautions about how to interview children without using leading questions which draw out fanciful stories out of impressionable young imaginations, and procedures relating to the identification and reporting of child abuse, within six months of initial employment or self-employment involving the examination, attending, counseling, or treatment of children on a regular basis. Within one month of initial employment or self-employment, the person shall obtain a statement of the abuse reporting requirements from the person's employer or, if self-employed, from the department. The person shall complete at least two hours of additional child abuse identification and reporting training every five years.

(For explanation, see "Mandatory Reporters")

c.  If the person is an employee of a hospital or similar institution, or of a public or private institution, agency, or facility, the employer shall be responsible for providing the child abuse identification and reporting training. If the person is self-employed, employed in a licensed or certified profession, or employed by a facility or program that is subject to licensure, regulation, or approval by a state agency, the person shall obtain the child abuse identification and reporting training as provided in paragraph "d".

d.  The person may complete the initial or additional training requirements as part of any of the following that are applicable to the person:

(1)  A continuing education program required under chapter 272C and approved by the appropriate licensing or examining board.

(2)  A training program using a curriculum approved by the abuse education review panel established by the director of public health pursuant to section 135.11.

(3)  A training program using such an approved curriculum offered by the department of human services, the department of education, an area education agency, a school district, the Iowa law enforcement academy, or a similar public agency.

(For explanation, see "Mandatory Reporters")

e.  A licensing board with authority over the license of a person required to make a report under subsection 1 shall require as a condition of licensure that the person is in compliance with the requirements for abuse training under this subsection. The licensing board shall require the person upon licensure renewal to accurately document for the licensing board the person's completion of the training requirements. However, the licensing board may adopt rules providing for waiver or suspension of the compliance requirements, if the waiver or suspension is in the public interest, applicable to a person who is engaged in active duty in the military service of this state or of the United States, to a person for whom compliance with the training requirements would impose a significant hardship, or to a person who is practicing a licensed profession outside this state or is otherwise subject to circumstances that would preclude the person from encountering child abuse in this state.

f.  For persons required to make a report under subsection 1 who are not engaged in a licensed profession that is subject to the authority of a licensing board but are employed by a facility or program subject to licensure, registration, or approval by a state agency, the agency shall require as a condition of renewal of the facility's or program's licensure, registration, or approval, that such persons employed by the facility or program are in compliance with the training requirements of this subsection.

g.  For peace officers, the elected or appointed official designated as the head of the agency employing the peace officer shall ensure compliance with the training requirements of this subsection.

h.  For persons required to make a report under subsection 1 who are employees of state departments and political subdivisions of the state, the department director or the chief administrator of the political subdivision shall ensure the persons' compliance with the training requirements of this subsection.

232.70  Reporting procedure.

1.  Each report made by a mandatory reporter, as defined in section 232.69, subsection 1, shall be made both orally and in writing. Each report made by a permissive reporter, as defined in section 232.69, subsection 2, may be oral, written, or both.

2.  The employer or supervisor of a person who is a mandatory or permissive reporter shall not apply a policy, work rule, or other requirement that interferes with the person making a report of child abuse.

(For explanation, see "Mandatory Reporters")

2.  The employer or supervisor of a person who is a mandatory or permissive reporter shall not apply a policy, work rule, or other requirement that interferes with the person making a report of child abuse.

3.  The oral report shall be made by telephone or otherwise to the department of human services. If the person making the report has reason to believe that immediate protection for the child is advisable, that person shall also make an oral report to an appropriate law enforcement agency.

4.  The written report shall be made to the department of human services within forty-eight hours after such oral report.

5.  Upon receipt of a report the department shall do all of the following:

a.  Immediately, upon receipt of an oral report, make a determination as to whether the report constitutes an allegation of child abuse as defined in section 232.68.

b.  Notify the appropriate county attorney of the receipt of the report.

6.  The oral and written reports shall contain the following information, or as much thereof as the person making the report is able to furnish:

a.  The names and home address of the child and the child's parents or other persons believed to be responsible for the child's care;

b.  The child's present whereabouts if not the same as the parent's or other person's home address;

c.  The child's age;

d.  The nature and extent of the child's injuries, including any evidence of previous injuries;

e.  The name, age and condition of other children in the same home;

f.  Any other information which the person making the report believes might be helpful in establishing the cause of the injury to the child, the identity of the person or persons responsible for the injury, or in providing assistance to the child; and

g.  The name and address of the person making the report.

7.  A report made by a permissive reporter, as defined in section 232.69, subsection 2, shall be regarded as a report pursuant to this chapter whether or not the report contains all of the information required by this section and may be made to the department of human services, county attorney, or law enforcement agency. If the report is made to any agency other than the department of human services, such agency shall promptly refer the report to the department of human services.

232.70(8)  

8.  If a report would be determined to constitute an allegation of child abuse as defined under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "c" or "e", except that the suspected abuse resulted from the acts or omissions of a person other than a person responsible for the care of the child, the department shall refer the report to the appropriate law enforcement agency having jurisdiction to investigate the allegation. The department shall refer the report orally as soon as practicable and in writing within seventy-two hours of receiving the report.

(For explanation, see "Mandatory Reporters")

9.  Within twenty-four hours of receiving a report from a mandatory or permissive reporter, the department shall inform the reporter, orally or by other appropriate means, whether or not the department has commenced an assessment of the allegation in the report.

232.71  Duties of the department upon receipt of report.

 Repealed by 97 Acts, ch 35, §24, 25.  See §232.71B.

232.71B  Duties of the department upon receipt of report.

1.  Commencement of assessment--purpose.

a.  If the department determines a report constitutes a child abuse allegation, the department shall promptly commence an appropriate assessment within twenty-four hours of receiving the report.

b.  The primary purpose of the assessment shall be the protection of the child named in the report. The secondary purpose of the assessment shall be to engage the child's family in appropriate services to enhance family strengths and to address needs.

232.71B(2).  Notification of parents.  The department, within five working days of commencing the assessment, shall provide written notification of the assessment to the child's parents. However, if the department shows the court to the court's satisfaction that notification is likely to endanger the child or other persons, the court shall orally direct the department to withhold notification. Within one working day of issuing an oral directive, the court shall issue a written order restraining the notification. The department shall not reveal in the written notification to the parents or otherwise the identity of the reporter of child abuse to a subject of a child abuse report listed in section 235A.15, subsection 2, paragraph "a".

(For explanation, see "Parental Notification")

3.  Involvement of law enforcement.  The department shall apply a protocol, developed with representatives of law enforcement agencies at the local level, to work jointly with law enforcement agencies in performing assessment and investigative processes for child abuse reports in which a criminal act harming a child is alleged. The county attorney and appropriate law enforcement agencies shall also take any other lawful action which may be necessary or advisable for the protection of the child. If a report is determined not to constitute a child abuse allegation, but a criminal act harming a child is alleged, the department shall immediately refer the matter to the appropriate law enforcement agency.

4.  Assessment process.  The assessment is subject to all of the following:

a.  Identification of the nature, extent, and cause of the injuries, if any, to the child named in the report.

b.  Identification of the person or persons responsible for the alleged child abuse.

c.  A description of the name, age, and condition of other children in the same home as the child named in the report.

d.  An evaluation of the home environment. If concerns regarding protection of children are identified by the child protection worker, the child protection worker shall evaluate the child named in the report and any other children in the same home as the parents or other persons responsible for their care.

e.  An interview of the person alleged to have committed the child abuse, if the person's identity and location are known, to afford the person the opportunity to address the allegations of the child abuse report. The interview shall be conducted, or an opportunity for an interview shall be provided, prior to a determination of child abuse being made. The court may waive the requirement of the interview for good cause.

232.71B(4)(f).  Unless otherwise prohibited under section 234.40 or 280.21, the use of corporal punishment by the person responsible for the care of a child which does not result in a physical injury to the child shall not be considered child abuse. Nor shall it be made part of any child abuse report.

(For explanation, see "Child Abuse Defined")

232.71B(5).  Home visit.  The assessment may, with the consent of the parent or guardian, include a visit to the home of the child named in the report and an interview or observation of the child may be conducted. The interview with the child shall be videotaped pursuant to 232.68(3). The inspector shall inform the parent that the parent has the right to have witnesses present, and additional time may be granted to allow them to come. If the parent requests time to arrange for witnesses to be present, the investigator shall reschedule the interview at any time of the parent's choosing within 24 hours. If permission to enter the home to interview or observe the child is refused, the juvenile court or district court upon a showing of probable cause may authorize the person making the assessment to enter the home and interview or observe the child.

(For explanation, see "Surprise Inspections")

232.71B(6).  Facility or school visit.  The assessment may include a visit to a facility providing care to the child named in the report or to any public or private school subject to the authority of the department of education where the child named in the report is located. The administrator of a facility, or a public or private school shall cooperate with the child protection worker by providing confidential access to the child named in the report for the purpose of interviewing the child, and shall allow the child protection worker confidential access to other children for the purpose of conducting interviews in order to obtain relevant information. The child protection worker may observe a child named in a report in accordance with the provisions of section 232.68, subsection 3, paragraph "b". A witness shall be present during an observation of a child. The interview shall be videotaped pursuant to232.68(3). Any child aged ten years of age or older can terminate contact with the child protection worker by stating or indicating the child's wish to discontinue the contact. The immunity granted by section 232.73 applies to acts or omissions in good faith of administrators and their facilities or school districts for cooperating in an assessment and allowing confidential access to a child.

(For explanation, see "Interview!")

7.  Information requests.

a.  The department may request information from any person believed to have knowledge of a child abuse case. The county attorney, any law enforcement or social services agency in the state, and any mandatory reporter, whether or not the reporter made the specific child abuse report, shall cooperate and assist in the assessment upon the request of the department.

b.  In performing an assessment, the department may request criminal history data from the department of public safety on any person believed to be responsible for an injury to a child which, if confirmed, would constitute child abuse. The department shall establish procedures for determining when a criminal history records check is necessary.

8.  Physical examination.  If the department refers a child to a physician for a physical examination, the department shall contact the physician regarding the examination within twenty-four hours of making the referral. If the physician who performs the examination upon referral by the department reasonably believes the child has been abused, the physician shall report to the department within twenty-four hours of performing the examination.

9.  Multidisciplinary team.  In each county or multicounty area in which more than fifty child abuse reports are made per year, the department shall establish a multidisciplinary team, as defined in section 235A.13, subsection 8. Upon the department's request, a multidisciplinary team shall assist the department in the assessment, diagnosis, and disposition of a child abuse report.

10.  Facility protocol.  The department shall apply a protocol, developed in consultation with facilities providing care to children, for conducting an assessment of reports of abuse of children allegedly caused by employees of facilities providing care to children. As part of such an assessment, the department shall notify the licensing authority for the facility, the governing body of the facility, and the administrator in charge of the facility of any of the following:

a.  A violation of facility policy noted in the assessment.

b.  An instance in which facility policy or lack of facility policy may have contributed to the reported incident of alleged child abuse.

c.  An instance in which general practice in the facility appears to differ from the facility's written policy.

The licensing authority, the governing body, and the administrator in charge of the facility shall take any lawful action which may be necessary or advisable to protect children receiving care.

11.  Assessment report.  The department, upon completion of the assessment, shall make a written report of the assessment, in accordance with all of the following:

a.  The written assessment shall incorporate the information required by subsection 4.

b.  The written assessment shall be completed within twenty business days of the receipt of the report.

c.  The written assessment shall include a description of the child's condition, identification of the injury or risk to which the child was exposed, the circumstances which led to the injury or risk to the child, and the identity of any person alleged to be responsible for the injury or risk to the child.

d.  The written assessment shall identify the strengths and needs of the child, and of the child's parent, home, and family.

e.  The written assessment shall identify appropriate services available from the department and informal and formal services and other support available in the community to address the strengths and needs identified in the assessment.

f.  Upon completion of the assessment, the department shall consult with the child's family in offering services to the child and the child's family to address strengths and needs identified in the assessment.

g.  The department shall notify each subject of the child abuse report, as identified in section 235A.15, subsection 2, paragraph "a", of the results of the assessment, of the subject's right, pursuant to section 235A.19, to correct the report data or disposition data which refers to the subject, and of the procedures to correct the data.

12.  Court-ordered and voluntary services.  The department shall provide or arrange for and monitor appropriate services for abused children and their families on a voluntary basis or under a final or intermediate order of the juvenile court.

13.  County attorney--juvenile court.  The department shall provide the juvenile court and the county attorney with a copy of the portion of the written assessment pertaining to the child abuse report. The juvenile court and the county attorney shall notify the department of any action taken concerning an assessment provided by the department.

14.  False reports.  If a fourth report is received from the same person who made three earlier reports which identified the same child as a victim of child abuse and the same person responsible for the care of the child as the alleged abuser and which were determined by the department to be entirely false or without merit, the department may determine that the report is again false or without merit due to the report's spurious or frivolous nature and may in its discretion terminate its assessment of the report. If the department receives more than three reports which identify the same child as a victim of child abuse or the same person as the alleged abuser of a child, or which were made by the same person, and the department determined the reports to be entirely false or without merit, the department shall provide information concerning the reports to the county attorney for consideration of criminal charges under section 232.75, subsection 3.

232.71C  Court action following child abuse assessment--guardian ad litem.

1.  If, upon completion of an assessment performed under section 232.71B, the department determines that the best interests of the child require juvenile court action, the department shall act appropriately to initiate the action. If at any time during the assessment process the department believes court action is necessary to safeguard a child, the department shall act appropriately to initiate the action. The county attorney shall assist the department as provided under section 232.90, subsection 2.

2.  The department shall assist the juvenile court or district court during all stages of court proceedings involving an alleged child abuse case in accordance with the purposes of this chapter.

232.71C (3).  In every case involving child abuse which results in a child protective judicial proceeding, whether or not the proceeding arises under this chapter, a guardian ad litem shall be appointed by the court pursuant to 232.2(22)a  to represent the child in the proceedings. Before a guardian ad litem is appointed pursuant to this section, the court shall require the person responsible for the care of the child to complete under oath a detailed financial statement. If, on the basis of that financial statement, the court determines that the person responsible for the care of the child is able to bear the cost of the guardian ad litem, the court shall so order. In cases where the person responsible for the care of the child is unable to bear the cost of the guardian ad litem, the expense shall be paid out of the county treasury.

(For explanation, see "Attorney for a Baby")

232.71D  Founded child abuse--central registry.

1.  The requirements of this section shall apply to child abuse information relating to a report final court ruling of child abuse and to an assessment performed in accordance with section 232.71B.

2.  If the alleged child abuse meets the definition of child abuse under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "a" or "d", and the department determines the injury or risk of harm to the child was minor and isolated and is unlikely to reoccur, the names of the child and the alleged perpetrator of the child abuse and any other child abuse information shall not be placed in the central registry as a case of founded child abuse.

3.  Except as otherwise provided in section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "d", regarding parents legitimately practicing religious beliefs, the names of the child and the alleged perpetrator and the report data and disposition data shall be placed in the central registry as a case of founded child abuse under any of the following circumstances accompanied by a final court ruling of child abuse:

(For explanation, see "Child Abuse Registry")

a.  The case was referred for juvenile or criminal court action as a result of the acts or omissions of the alleged perpetrator or a criminal or juvenile court action was initiated by the county attorney or juvenile court within twelve months of the date of the department's report concerning the case, in which the alleged perpetrator was convicted of a crime involving the child or there was a delinquency or child in need of assistance adjudication.

b.  The department determines the acts or omissions of the alleged perpetrator meet the definition of child abuse under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "a", involving nonaccidental physical injury suffered by the child and the injury was not minor or was not isolated or is likely to reoccur.

c.  The department determines the acts or omissions of the alleged perpetrator meet the definition of child abuse and the department has previously determined within the eighteen-month period preceding the issuance of the department's report that the acts or omissions of the alleged perpetrator in a prior case met the definition of child abuse.

d.  The department determines the acts or omissions of the alleged perpetrator meet the definition of child abuse under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "b", involving mental injury.

e.  The department determines the acts or omissions meet the definition of child abuse under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "c", and the alleged perpetrator of the acts or omissions is age fourteen or older. However, the juvenile court may order the removal from the central registry of the name of an alleged perpetrator placed in the registry pursuant to this paragraph who is age fourteen through seventeen upon a finding of good cause. The name of an alleged perpetrator who is less than age fourteen shall not be placed in the central registry pursuant to this paragraph.

f.  The department determines the acts or omissions of the alleged perpetrator meet the definition of child abuse under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "d", involving failure to provide care necessary for the child's health and welfare, and any injury to the child or risk to the child's health and welfare was not minor or was not isolated or is likely to reoccur, in any of the following ways:

(1)  Failure to provide adequate food and nutrition.

(2)  Failure to provide adequate shelter.

(3)  Failure to provide adequate health care.

232.71D(3)(f)(4)  

(4)  Failure to provide adequate mental health care.

(5)  Gross failure to meet emotional needs.

(For explanation, see "Psychiatry")

(6)  Failure to respond to an infant's life-threatening condition.

g.  The department determines the acts or omissions of the alleged perpetrator meet the definition of child abuse under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "e", involving prostitution.

h.  The department determines the acts or omissions of the alleged perpetrator meet the definition of child abuse under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph "f", involving the presence of an illegal drug.

i.  The alleged abuse took place in any of the following licensed, registered, unregistered, or regulated facilities or services:

(1)  Substance abuse program licensed under chapter 125.

(2)  Hospital licensed under chapter 135B.

(3)  Health care facility or residential care facility licensed under chapter 135C.

(4)  Psychiatric medical institution licensed under chapter 135H.

(5)  Medical assistance home and community-based waiver for persons with mental retardation residential program regulated by the department of human services and the department of inspections and appeals.

(6)  An institution controlled by the department and enumerated in section 218.1.

(7)  Mental health center, juvenile shelter care facility, or juvenile detention facility.

(8)  Child foster care licensee under chapter 237.

(9)  Child care provider under chapter 237A.

(10)  Public or private school which provides overnight care.

(11)  The Iowa braille and sight saving school and the Iowa school for the deaf controlled by the state board of regents.

j.  The department determines the alleged perpetrator of the child abuse will continue to pose a danger to the child who is the subject of the report of child abuse or to another child with whom the alleged perpetrator may come into contact.

4.  If report data and disposition data are placed in the central registry in accordance with this section, the department shall make periodic follow-up reports in a manner prescribed by the registry so that the registry is kept up-to-date and fully informed concerning the case.

5. a.  The confidentiality of all of the following shall be maintained in accordance with section 217.30:

b.  The confidentiality of report data and disposition data pertaining to an allegation of child abuse determined to meet the definition of child abuse which is subject to placement in the central registry, shall be maintained as provided in chapter 235A.

(1)  Assessment data.

(2)  Information pertaining to an allegation of child abuse for which there was no assessment performed.

(3)  Information pertaining to an allegation of child abuse which was determined to not meet the definition of child abuse. Individuals identified in section 235A.15, subsection 4, are authorized to have access to such information under section 217.30.

(4)  Report data and disposition data pertaining to an allegation of child abuse determined to meet the definition of child abuse which is not subject to placement in the central registry. Individuals identified in section 235A.15, subsection 3, are authorized to have access to such data under section 217.30.

232.72  Jurisdiction--transfer.

1.  For the purposes of this division, the terms "department of human services", "department", or "county attorney" ordinarily refer to the regional or local office of the department of human services or of the county attorney's office serving the county in which the child's home is located.

2.  However, if the person making a report of child abuse pursuant to this chapter does not know where the child's home is located, or if the child's home is not located in the service area where the health practitioner examines, attends, or treats the child, the report may be made to the department or to the local office serving the county where the person making the report resides or the county where the health practitioner examines, attends, or treats the child. These agencies shall promptly proceed as provided in section 232.71B, unless the matter is transferred as provided in this section.

3.  If the child's home is located in a county not served by the office receiving the report, the department shall promptly transfer the matter by transmitting a copy of the report of injury and any other pertinent information to the office and the county attorney serving the other county. They shall promptly proceed as provided in section 232.71B.

232.73  Medically relevant tests--immunity from liability.

A person participating in good faith in the making of a report, photographs, or X rays, or in the performance of a medically relevant test pursuant to this chapter, or aiding and assisting in an assessment of a child abuse report pursuant to section 232.71B, shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, which might otherwise be incurred or imposed. The person shall have the same immunity with respect to participation in good faith in any judicial proceeding resulting from the report or relating to the subject matter of the report.

As used in this section and in sections 232.77 and 232.78, "medically relevant test" means a test that produces reliable results of exposure to cocaine, heroin, amphetamine, methamphetamine, or other illegal drugs, or combinations or derivatives of the illegal drugs, including a drug urine screen test.

232.74  Evidence not privileged or excluded.

Sections 622.9 and 622.10 and any other statute or rule of evidence which excludes or makes privileged the testimony of a husband or wife against the other or the testimony of a health practitioner or mental health professional as to confidential communications, do not apply to evidence regarding a child's injuries or the cause of the injuries in any judicial proceeding, civil or criminal, resulting from a report pursuant to this chapter or relating to the subject matter of such a report.

232.75  Sanctions.

1.  Any person, official, agency, or institution required by this chapter to report a suspected case of child abuse who knowingly and willfully fails to do so is guilty of a simple misdemeanor.

2.  Any person, official, agency, or institution required by section 232.69 to report a suspected case of child abuse who knowingly fails to do so or who knowingly interferes with the making of such a report in violation of section 232.70 is civilly liable for the damages proximately caused by such failure or interference.

(For explanation, see "Mandatory Reporters")

3.  A person who reports or causes to be reported to the department of human services false information regarding an alleged act of child abuse, knowing that the information is false or that the act did not occur, commits a simple misdemeanor.

232.76  Publicity and educational programs.

The department, within the limits of available funds, shall conduct a continuing publicity and educational program for the personnel of the department, persons required encouraged to report, and any other appropriate persons to encourage the fullest most accurate and thorough possible degree of reporting possible of suspected cases of child abuse. Educational programs shall include but not be limited to the diagnosis and cause of child abuse, interviewing techniques which avoid leading questions and other devices which inadvertantly plant false testimony in the imaginations of impressionable children, the responsibilities, obligations, duties and powers of persons and agencies under this chapter and the procedures of the department and the juvenile court with respect to suspected cases of child abuse and disposition of actual cases.

(For explanation, see "Mandatory Reporters")

232.77  Photographs, X rays, and medically relevant tests.

1.  A person who is required to report a case of child abuse may take or cause to be taken, at public expense, photographs, X rays, or other physical examinations or tests of a child which would provide medical indication of allegations arising from a child abuse assessment. A health practitioner may, if medically indicated, cause to be performed radiological examination, physical examination, or other medical tests of the child. A person who takes any photographs or X rays or performs physical examinations or other tests pursuant to this section shall notify the department that the photographs or X rays have been taken or the examinations or other tests have been performed. The person who made notification shall retain the photographs or X rays or examination or test findings for a reasonable time following the notification. Whenever the person is required to report under section 232.69, in that person's capacity as a member of the staff of a medical or other private or public institution, agency or facility, that person shall immediately notify the person in charge of the institution, agency, or facility or that person's designated delegate of the need for photographs or X rays or examinations or other tests.

2.  If a health practitioner discovers in a child physical or behavioral symptoms of the effects of exposure to cocaine, heroin, amphetamine, methamphetamine, or other illegal drugs, or combinations or derivatives thereof, which were not prescribed by a health practitioner, or if the health practitioner has determined through examination of the natural mother of the child that the child was exposed in utero, the health practitioner may perform or cause to be performed a medically relevant test, as defined in section 232.73, on the child. The practitioner shall report any positive results of such a test on the child to the department. The department shall begin an assessment pursuant to section 232.71B upon receipt of such a report. A positive test result obtained prior to the birth of a child shall not be used for the criminal prosecution of a parent for acts and omissions resulting in intrauterine exposure of the child to an illegal drug.

PART 3

TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF A CHILD

232.78  Temporary custody of a child pursuant to ex parte court order.

1.  The juvenile court may enter an ex parte order directing a peace officer or a juvenile court officer to take custody of a child before or after the filing of a petition under this chapter provided all of the following apply:

232.78(1)(a) New Section. There is evidence of serious physical injury to the child and indications the injury was deliberately caused by the parent.

(For explanation, see "Seizing Children, Storm Trooper-Style")

a.  The person responsible for the care of the child is absent, or though present, was asked and refused to consent to the removal of the child and was informed of an intent to apply for an order under this section, or there is reasonable cause to believe that a request for consent would further endanger the child, or there is reasonable cause to believe that a request for consent will cause the parent, guardian, or legal custodian to take flight with the child.

b.  It appears that the child's immediate removal is necessary to avoid imminent danger to the child's life or health. The circumstances or conditions indicating the presence of such imminent danger shall include but are not limited to any of the following:

(1)  The refusal or failure of the person responsible for the care of the child to comply with the request of a peace officer, juvenile court officer, or child protection worker for such person to obtain and provide to the requester the results of a physical or mental examination of the child. The request for a physical examination of the child may specify the performance of a medically relevant test.

(2)  The refusal or failure of the person responsible for the care of the child or a person present in the person's home to comply with a request of a peace officer, juvenile court officer, or child protection worker for such a person to submit to and provide to the requester the results of a medically relevant test of the person.

c.  There is not enough time to file a petition and hold a hearing under section 232.95.

d.  The application for the order includes a statement of the facts to support the findings specified in paragraphs "a", "b", and "c".

2.  The person making the application for an order shall assert facts showing there is reasonable cause to believe that the child cannot either be returned to the place where the child was residing or placed with the parent who does not have physical care of the child.

3.  Except for good cause shown or unless the child is sooner returned to the place where the child was residing or permitted to return to the child care facility, a petition shall be filed under this chapter within three days of the issuance of the order.

4.  The juvenile court may enter an order authorizing a physician or hospital to provide emergency medical or surgical procedures before the filing of a petition under this chapter provided:

a.  Such procedures are necessary to safeguard the life and health of the child; and

b.  There is not enough time to file a petition under this chapter and hold a hearing as provided in section 232.95.

5.  The juvenile court, before or after the filing of a petition under this chapter, may enter an ex parte order authorizing a physician or hospital to conduct an outpatient physical examination or authorizing a physician, a psychologist certified under section 154B.7, or a community mental health center accredited pursuant to chapter 230A to conduct an outpatient mental examination of a child if necessary to identify the nature, extent, and cause of injuries to the child as required by section 232.71B, provided all of the following apply:

a.  The parent, guardian, or legal custodian is absent, or though present, was asked and refused to provide written consent to the examination.

b.  The juvenile court has entered an ex parte order directing the removal of the child from the child's home or a child care facility under this section.

c.  There is not enough time to file a petition and to hold a hearing as provided in section 232.98.

6.  Any person who may file a petition under this chapter may apply for, or the court on its own motion may issue, an order for temporary removal under this section. An appropriate person designated by the court shall confer with a person seeking the removal order, shall make every reasonable effort to inform the parent or other person legally responsible for the child's care of the application, and shall make such inquiries as will aid the court in disposing of such application. The person designated by the court shall file with the court a complete written report providing all details of the designee's conference with the person seeking the removal order, the designee's efforts to inform the parents or other person legally responsible for the child's care of the application, any inquiries made by the designee to aid the court in disposing of the application, and all information the designee communicated to the court. The report shall be filed within five days of the date of the removal order. If the court does not designate an appropriate person who performs the required duties, notwithstanding section 234.39 or any other provision of law, the child's parent shall not be responsible for paying the cost of care and services for the duration of the removal order.

232.78(7)a

7.  Any order entered under this section authorizing temporary removal of a child must include both of the following:

a.  A determination made by the court that continuation of the child in the child's home would be contrary to the welfare of the child. Such a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. The grounds for the court's determination must be explicitly documented and stated in the order. However, preserving the safety of the child must be the court's paramount consideration. If imminent danger to the child's life or health exists at the time of the court's consideration, the determination shall not be a prerequisite to the removal of the child.

(For explanation, see "Seizing Children, Storm Trooper-Style")

b.  A statement informing the child's parent that the consequences of a permanent removal may include termination of the parent's rights with respect to the child.

232.79  Custody without court order.

1.  A peace officer or juvenile court officer may take a child into custody, a physician treating a child may keep the child in custody, or a juvenile court officer may authorize a peace officer, physician, or medical security personnel to take a child into custody, without a court order as required under section 232.78 and without the consent of a parent, guardian, or custodian provided that both of the following apply:

232.79(1)(a) New Section. There is evidence of serious physical injury to the child and indications the injury was deliberately caused by the parent.

(For explanation, see "Seizing Children, Storm Trooper-Style")

a.  The child is in a circumstance or condition that presents an imminent danger to the child's life or health.

b.  There is not enough time to apply for an order under section 232.78.

2.  If a person authorized by this section removes or retains custody of a child, the person shall:

a.  Bring the child immediately to a place designated by the rules of the court for this purpose, unless the person is a physician treating the child and the child is or will presently be admitted to a hospital.

b.  Make every reasonable effort to inform the parent, guardian, or custodian of the whereabouts of the child.

c.  In accordance with court-established procedures, immediately orally inform the court of the emergency removal and the circumstances surrounding the removal.

d.  Within twenty-four hours of orally informing the court of the emergency removal in accordance with paragraph "c", inform the court in writing of the emergency removal and the circumstances surrounding the removal.

3.  Any person, agency, or institution acting in good faith in the removal or keeping of a child pursuant to this section, and any employer of or person under the direction of such a person, agency, or institution, shall have immunity from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed as the result of such removal or keeping.

4. a.  When the court is informed that there has been an emergency removal or keeping of a child without a court order, the court shall direct the department of human services or the juvenile probation department to make every reasonable effort to communicate immediately with the child's parent or parents or other person legally responsible for the child's care. Upon locating the child's parent or parents or other person legally responsible for the child's care, the department of human services or the juvenile probation department shall, in accordance with court-established procedures, immediately orally inform the court. After orally informing the court, the department of human services or the juvenile probation department shall provide to the court written documentation of the oral information.

b.  The court shall authorize the department of human services or the juvenile probation department to cause a child thus removed or kept to be returned if it concludes there is not an imminent risk to the child's life and health in so doing. If the department of human services or the juvenile probation department receives information which could affect the court's decision regarding the child's return, the department of human services or the juvenile probation department, in accordance with court established procedures, shall immediately orally provide the information to the court. After orally providing the information to the court, the department of human services or the juvenile probation department shall provide to the court written documentation of the oral information. If the child is not returned, the department of human services or the juvenile probation department shall forthwith cause a petition to be filed within three days after the removal.

c.  If deemed appropriate by the court, upon being informed that there has been an emergency removal or keeping of a child without a court order, the court may enter an order in accordance with section 232.78.

5.  When there has been an emergency removal or keeping of a child without a court order, a physical examination of the child by a licensed medical practitioner shall be performed within twenty-four hours of such removal, unless the child is returned to the child's home within twenty-four hours of the removal.

232.79A  Children without adult supervision.

If a peace officer determines that a child does not have adult supervision because the child's parent, guardian, or other person responsible for the care of the child has been arrested and detained or has been unexpectedly incapacitated, and that no adult who is legally responsible for the care of the child can be located within a reasonable period of time, the peace officer shall attempt to place the child with an adult relative of the child, an adult person who cares for the child, or another adult person who is known to the child. The person with whom the child is placed is authorized to give consent for emergency medical treatment of the child and shall not be held liable for any action arising from giving the consent. Upon the request of the peace officer, the department shall assist in making the placement. The placement shall not exceed a period of twenty-four hours and shall be terminated when a person who is legally responsible for the care of the child is located and takes custody of the child. If a person who is legally responsible for the care of the child cannot be located within the twenty-four hour period or a placement in accordance with this section is unavailable, the provisions of section 232.79 shall apply. If the person with whom the child is placed charges a fee for the care of the child, the fee shall be paid from funds provided in the appropriation to the department for protective child care.

232.80  Homemaker services.

A homemaker-home health aide may be assigned to give care to a child in the child's place of residence. Whenever possible, the services shall be provided in preference to removal of the child from the home. The care may be provided under this Act* on an emergency basis for up to twenty-four hours without court order, and may be ordered by the court for a period of time extending until dismissal or disposition of the case.

232.81  Complaint.

1.  Any person having knowledge of the circumstances may file a complaint with the person or agency designated by the court to perform intake duties alleging that a child is a child in need of assistance.

2.  Upon receipt of a complaint, the court may request the department of human services, juvenile probation office, or other authorized agency or individual to conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaint to determine if further action should be taken.

3.  A petition alleging the child to be a child in need of assistance may be filed pursuant to section 232.87 provided the allegations of the complaint, if proven, are sufficient to establish the court's jurisdiction and the filing is in the best interests of the child.

4.  A person or agency shall not maintain any records with regard to a complaint filed under division III of this chapter which is dismissed without the filing of a petition. This subsection does not apply to records maintained pursuant to chapter 235A.

232.82  Removal of sexual offenders and physical abusers from the residence pursuant to court order.

1.  Notwithstanding section 561.15, if it is alleged by a person authorized to file a petition under section 232.87, subsection 2, or by the court on its own motion, that a parent, guardian, custodian, or an adult member of the household in which a child resides has committed a sexual offense with or against the child, pursuant to chapter 709 or section 726.2, or a physical abuse as defined by section 232.2, subsection 42, the juvenile court may enter an ex parte order requiring the alleged sexual offender or physical abuser to vacate the child's residence upon a showing that probable cause exists to believe that the sexual offense or physical abuse has occurred and that substantial evidence exists to believe that the presence of the alleged sexual offender or physical abuser in the child's residence presents a danger to the child's life or physical, emotional, or mental health.

232.82 Removal of sexual offenders and physical abusers from the residence pursuant to court order

1. Notwithstanding section 561.15, if it is alleged by a person authorized to file a petition under section 232.87, subsection 2, or by the court on its own motion, that a parent, guardian, custodian, or an adult member of the household in which a child resides has committed a sexual offense with or against the child, pursuant to chapter 709 or section 726.2, or a physical abuse as defined by section 232.2, subsection 42, the juvenile court may enter an ex parte order requiring the alleged sexual offender or physical abuser to vacate the child's residence upon a showing that probable cause exists to believe that the sexual offense or physical abuse has occurred and that substantial evidence exists to believe that the presence of the alleged sexual offender or physical abuser in the child's residence presents a danger to the child's life or physical, emotional, or mental health. If the spouse of the accused denies the allegation of abuse, the order requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

(For explanation, see "Seizing Children, Storm Trooper-Style")

2.  If an order is entered under subsection 1 and a petition has not yet been filed under this chapter, the petition shall be filed under section 232.87 by the county attorney, the department of human services, or a juvenile court officer within three days of the entering of the order.

... 232.82(3). The juvenile court may shall order on its own motion, or shall order upon the request of the alleged sexual offender or physical abuser, a hearing to determine whether the order to vacate the residence should be upheld, modified, or vacated. The juvenile court may in any later child in need of assistance proceeding uphold, modify, or vacate the order to vacate the residence. The order shall be vacated if evidence does not confirm the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.

(For explanation, see "Seizing Children, Storm Trooper-Style")

232.83  Child sexual abuse involving a person not responsible for the care of the child.

1.  A complaint related to circumstances involving a child who is alleged to be a victim of an offense defined in chapter 709, 726, or 728 and an alleged offender who is not a person responsible for the care of the child shall be handled pursuant to section 232.81.

2.  Anyone authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation in response to a complaint may apply for, or the court on its own motion may enter an ex parte order authorizing a physician or hospital to conduct an outpatient physical examination or authorizing a physician, a psychologist certified under section 154B.7, or a community mental health center accredited pursuant to chapter 230A to conduct an outpatient mental examination of a child if necessary to identify the nature, extent, and causes of any injuries, emotional damage, or other such needs of a child as specified in section 232.2, subsection 6, paragraph "c", "e", or "f", provided that all of the following apply:

a.  The parent, guardian, or legal custodian is absent, or though present, was asked and refused to authorize the examination.

b.  There is not enough time to file a petition and hold a hearing under this chapter.

c.  The parent, guardian, or legal custodian has not provided care and treatment related to their child's alleged victimization.

(For explanation, see "Psychiatry, part 3")

PART 4

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 

232.87  Filing of a petition--contents of petition.

1.  A formal judicial proceeding to determine whether a child is a child in need of assistance under this chapter shall be initiated by the filing of a petition alleging a child to be a child in need of assistance.

2.  A petition may be filed by the department of human services, juvenile court officer, or county attorney.

3.  The department, juvenile court officer, county attorney or judge may authorize the filing of a petition with the clerk of the court by any competent person having knowledge of the circumstances without the payment of a filing fee.

4.  The petition shall be submitted in the form specified in section 232.36.

5.  The petition shall contain the information specified in section 232.36 and a clear and concise summary of the facts which bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court under this division.

232.88  Summons, notice, subpoenas, and service.

After a petition has been filed, the court shall issue and serve summons, subpoenas, and other process in the same manner as for adjudicatory hearings in cases of juvenile delinquency as provided in section 232.37. Reasonable notice shall be provided to the persons required to be provided notice under section 232.37, except that notice shall be waived regarding a person who was notified of the adjudicatory hearing and who failed to appear. In addition, reasonable notice for any hearing under this division shall be provided to the agency, facility, institution, or person, including a foster parent, relative, or other individual providing preadoptive care, with whom a child has been placed.

232.89  Right to and appointment of counsel.

1.  Upon the filing of a petition the parent, guardian, or custodian identified in the petition shall have the right to counsel in connection with all subsequent hearings and proceedings. If that person desires but is financially unable to employ counsel, the court shall appoint counsel.

2.  Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall appoint counsel and a guardian ad litem for the child identified in the petition as a party to the proceedings pursuant to 232.2(22)a . . If a guardian ad litem has previously been appointed for the child in a proceeding under division II of this chapter or a proceeding in which the court has waived jurisdiction under section 232.45, the court shall appoint the same guardian ad litem upon the filing of the petition under this part. Counsel shall be appointed as follows:

(For explanation, see "Attorney for a Baby?")

a.  If the child is represented by counsel and the court determines there is a conflict of interest between the child and the child's parent, guardian or custodian and that the retained counsel could not properly represent the child as a result of the conflict, the court shall appoint other counsel to represent the child, who shall be compensated pursuant to the provisions of subsection 3.

b.  If the child is not represented by counsel, the court shall either order the parent, guardian or custodian to retain counsel for the child or shall appoint counsel for the child, who shall be compensated pursuant to the provisions of subsection 3.

3.  The court shall determine, after giving the parent, guardian, or custodian an opportunity to be heard, whether the person has the ability to pay in whole or in part for counsel appointed for the child. If the court determines that the person possesses sufficient financial ability, the court shall then consult with the department of human services, the juvenile probation office, or other authorized agency or individual regarding the likelihood of impairment of the relationship between the child and the child's parent, guardian or custodian as a result of ordering the parent, guardian, or custodian to pay for the child's counsel. If impairment is deemed unlikely, the court shall order that person to pay an amount the court finds appropriate in the manner and to whom the court directs. If the person fails to comply with the order without good reason, the court shall enter judgment against the person. If impairment is deemed likely or if the court determines that the parent, guardian, or custodian cannot pay any part of the expenses of counsel appointed to represent the child, counsel shall be reimbursed pursuant to section 232.141, subsection 2, paragraph "b".

4.  The same person may serve both as the child's counsel and as guardian ad litem. However, the court may appoint a separate guardian ad litem, if the same person cannot properly represent the legal interests of the child as legal counsel and also represent the best interest of the child as guardian ad litem, or a separate guardian ad litem is required to fulfill the requirements of subsection 2.

5.  The court may appoint a special advocate, as defined in section 232.2, subsection 9, to act as guardian ad litem. The court appointed special advocate shall receive notice of and may attend all depositions, hearings, and trial proceedings to support the child and advocate for the protection of the child. The court appointed special advocate shall not be allowed to separately introduce evidence or to directly examine or cross-examine witnesses. However, the court appointed special advocate shall file reports to the court as required by the court.

232.90  Duties of county attorney.

1.  The county attorney shall represent the state in proceedings arising from a petition filed under this division and shall present evidence in support of the petition. The county attorney shall be present at proceedings initiated by petition under this division filed by an intake officer or the county attorney, or if a party to the proceedings contests the proceedings, or if there are contested issues before the court, or if the court determines there is a conflict of interest between the guardian ad litem and the county attorney. The court shall presume there is no conflict of interest between the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. or if there are contested issues before the court

(For explanation, see "Attorney for a Baby?")

2.  The county attorney shall represent the department in proceedings arising under this division. However, if there is disagreement between the department and the county attorney regarding the appropriate action to be taken, the department may request to be represented by the attorney general in place of the county attorney.

232.91  Presence of parents, guardian ad litem, and others at hearings--additional parties.

1.  Any hearings or proceedings under this division subsequent to the filing of a petition shall not take place without the presence of the child's parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem in accordance with and subject to section 232.38. A parent without custody may petition the court to be made a party to proceedings under this division.

2.  An agency, facility, institution, or person, including a foster parent or an individual providing preadoptive care, may petition the court to be made a party to proceedings under this division.

3.  Any person who is entitled under section 232.88 to receive notice of a hearing concerning a child shall be given the opportunity to be heard in any other review or hearing involving the child.

232.92  Exclusion of public from hearings.

Hearings held under this division are open to the public unless the court, on the motion of any of the parties or upon the court's own motion, excludes the public. The court shall exclude the public from a hearing if the court determines that the possibility of damage or harm to the child outweighs the public's interest in having an open hearing, and if there is no objection from the child, or from the child's attorney, or from the child's parents if the child has no attorney and if the child is not participating in the trial.. Upon closing the hearing to the public, the court may admit those persons who have direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.

(For explanation, see "Closed Courtrooms")

232.93  Other issues adjudicated.

When it appears during the course of any hearing or proceeding that some action or remedy other than those indicated by the application or pleading appears appropriate, the court may, provided all necessary parties consent, proceed to hear and determine the other issues as though originally properly sought and pleaded.

232.94  Reporter required.

Stenographic notes or electronic or mechanical recordings shall be taken of all court hearings held pursuant to this division unless waived by the parties. The child shall not be competent to waive the reporting requirement, but waiver may be made for the child by the child's counsel or guardian ad litem. Matters which must be reported under the provisions of this section shall be reported in the same manner as required in section 624.9.

232.94A  Records--subsequent hearings.

Juvenile court records, social records, and the material required to be recorded pursuant to section 232.94 shall be maintained and shall be a part of each hearing relating to the child so long as and whenever the child is a child in need of assistance.

232.95  Hearing concerning temporary removal.

1.  At any time after the petition is filed, any person who may file a petition under section 232.87 may apply for, or the court on its own motion may order, a hearing to determine whether the child should be temporarily removed from home. If the child is in the custody of a person other than the child's parent, guardian, or custodian as the result of action taken pursuant to section 232.78 or 232.79, the court shall hold a hearing within ten days of the date of temporary removal to determine whether the temporary removal should be continued.

2.  Upon such hearing, the court may:

232.95(2)(a)

a.  Remove the child from home and place the child in a shelter care facility or in the custody of a suitable person or agency pending a final order of disposition if the court finds that substantial evidence exists, including evidence of serious physical injury to the child and indications the injury was deliberately caused by the parent, to believe that removal is necessary to avoid imminent risk to the child's life or health.

(For explanation, see "Seizing Children, Storm Trooper-Style")

(1)  If removal is ordered, the court must, in addition, make a determination that continuation of the child in the child's home would be contrary to the welfare of the child, and that reasonable efforts, as defined in section 232.102, have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the child's home.

232.95(2)(a)(2)

(2)  The court's determination regarding continuation of the child in the child's home, and regarding reasonable efforts, including those made to prevent removal and those made to finalize any permanency plan in effect, as well as any determination by the court that reasonable efforts are not required, must be made on a case-by-case basis. The grounds for each determination must be explicitly documented and stated in the court order. However, preserving the safety of the child must be the court's paramount consideration. If imminent danger to the child's life or health exists at the time of the court's consideration, the determinations otherwise required under this paragraph shall not be a prerequisite for an order for removal of the child.

(For explanation, see "Seizing Children, Storm Trooper-Style")

(3)  The order shall also include a statement informing the child's parent that the consequences of a permanent removal may include termination of the parent's rights with respect to the child.

3.  The court shall make and file written findings as to the grounds for granting or denying an application under this section.

4.  If the court orders the child removed from the home pursuant to subsection 2, paragraph "a", the court shall hold a hearing to review the removal order within six months unless a dispositional hearing pursuant to section 232.99 has been held.

232.96  Adjudicatory hearing.

1.  The court shall hear and adjudicate cases involving a petition alleging a child to be a child in need of assistance.

2.  The state shall have the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence.

3.  Only evidence which is admissible under the rules of evidence applicable to the trial of civil cases shall be admitted, except as otherwise provided by this section.

232.96(4) Adjudicatory hearing (The "Child In Need of Assistance" hearing)

4. A report made to the department of human services pursuant to chapter 235A shall be admissible in evidence subject to objections to its various components, but such a report shall not alone be sufficient to support a finding that the child is a child in need of assistance unless the attorneys for the child and the parents consent to such a finding.

(For explanation, see "Hearsay")

5.  Neither the privilege attaching to confidential communications between a health practitioner or mental health professional and patient nor the prohibition upon admissibility of communications between husband and wife shall be ground for excluding evidence at an adjudicatory hearing.

6.  A report, study, record, or other writing or an audiotape or videotape recording made by the department of human services, a juvenile court officer, a peace officer or a hospital relating to a child in a proceeding under this division is admissible notwithstanding any objection to hearsay statements contained in it provided it is relevant and material and provided its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. The circumstances of the making of the report, study, record or other writing or an audiotape or videotape recording, including the maker's lack of personal knowledge, may be proved to affect its weight.

7.  After the hearing is concluded, the court shall make and file written findings as to the truth of allegations of the petition and as to whether the child is a child in need of assistance.

8.  If the court concludes facts sufficient to sustain a petition have not been established by clear and convincing evidence or if the court concludes that its aid is not required in the circumstances, the court shall dismiss the petition.

9.  If the court concludes that facts sufficient to sustain the petition have been established by clear and convincing evidence and that its aid is required, the court may enter an order adjudicating the child to be a child in need of assistance.

10.  If the court enters an order adjudicating the child to be a child in need of assistance, the court, if it has not previously done so, may issue an order authorizing temporary removal of the child from the child's home as set forth in section 232.95, subsection 2, paragraph "a", pending a final order of disposition. The order shall include both of the following:

232.96(10)(a)

a.  A determination that continuation of the child in the child's home would be contrary to the welfare of the child, and that reasonable efforts, as defined in section 232.102, have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the child's home. The court's determination regarding continuation of the child in the child's home, and regarding reasonable efforts, including those made to prevent removal and those made to finalize any permanency plan in effect, as well as any determination by the court that reasonable efforts are not required, must be made on a case-by-case basis. The grounds for each determination must be explicitly documented and stated in the court order. However, preserving the safety of the child is the paramount consideration. If imminent danger to the child's life or health exists at the time of the court's consideration, the determinations otherwise required under this paragraph shall not be a prerequisite for an order for temporary removal of the child.

(For explanation, see "Seizing Children, Storm Trooper-Style")

b.  A statement informing the child's parent that the consequences of a permanent removal may include termination of the parent's rights with respect to the child.

232.97  Social investigation and report.

1.  The court shall not make a disposition of the petition until two working days after a social report has been submitted to the court and counsel for the child and has been considered by the court. The court may waive the two-day requirement upon agreement by all the parties. The court may direct either the juvenile court officer or the department of human services or any other agency licensed by the state to conduct a social investigation and to prepare a social report which may include any evidence provided by an individual providing foster care for the child. A report prepared shall include any founded reports of child abuse.

2.  The social investigation may be conducted and the social history may be submitted to the court prior to the adjudication of the child as a child in need of assistance with the consent of the parties.

3.  The social report shall not be disclosed except as provided in this section and except as otherwise provided in this chapter. Prior to the hearing at which the disposition is determined, the court shall permit counsel for the child, counsel for the child's parent, guardian or custodian, and the guardian ad litem to inspect any social report to be considered by the court. The court may in its discretion order counsel not to disclose parts of the report to the child, or to the parent, guardian or custodian if disclosure would seriously harm the treatment or rehabilitation of the child or would violate a promise of confidentiality given to a source of information.

232.97 Social Investigation and Report

3. The social report [which includes "any evidence provided by an individual providing foster care for the child" and "any founded reports of child abuse" (232.97(1)) and "232.2(52) ...information relevant to the court's fashioning of an appropriate disposition of a child in need of assistance case"] shall not be disclosed except as provided in this section and except as otherwise provided in this chapter. Prior to the hearing at which the disposition is determined, the court shall permit counsel for the child, counsel for the child's parent, the child's parent, guardian or custodian, any alleged perpetrator, and the guardian ad litem to inspect any social report to be considered by the court. The court may in its discretion order counsel not to disclose parts of the report to the child, or to the parent, guardian or custodian if disclosure would seriously harm the treatment or rehabilitation of the child or would violate a promise of confidentiality given to a source of information.

(For explanation, see "Open Records")

232.98  Physical and mental examinations.

1.  Except as provided in section 232.78, subsection 5, a physical or mental examination of the child may be ordered only after the filing of a petition pursuant to section 232.87 and after a hearing to determine whether an examination is necessary to determine the child's physical or mental condition. The court may consider chemical dependency as either a physical or mental condition and may consider a chemical dependency evaluation as either a physical or mental examination.

The hearing required by this section may be held simultaneously with the adjudicatory hearing.

An examination ordered prior to the adjudication shall be conducted on an outpatient basis when possible, but if necessary the court may commit the child to a suitable nonsecure hospital, facility, or institution for the purpose of examination for a period not to exceed fifteen days if all of the following are found to be present:

a.  Probable cause exists to believe that the child is a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.2, subsection 6, paragraph "e" or "f".

b.  Commitment is necessary to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is a child in need of assistance.

232.98(1)(c) Physical and mental examinations

["...the court may commit the child to a...[medical or mental] hospital...for the purpose of examination for a period not to exceed fifteen days if all of the following are found to be present:"]

c.  The child's attorney, or if the child has no attorney, the child in an interview with the judge, agrees to the commitment. An examination ordered after adjudication shall be conducted on an outpatient basis when possible, but if necessary the court may commit the child to a suitable nonsecure hospital, facility, or institution for the purpose of examination for a period not to exceed thirty days.

The child's parent, guardian, or custodian shall be included at their option in counseling sessions offered during the child's stay in a hospital, facility, or institution when feasible, and when in the best interests of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. The child's parent, guardian, or custodian may establish a record of the sessions with video or audio recorders, and by bringing witnesses. If separate counseling sessions are conducted for the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, a joint counseling session shall be offered prior to the release of the child from the hospital, facility, or institution. The court shall require that notice be provided to the child's guardian ad litem of the counseling sessions and of the participants and results of the sessions.

(For explanation, see "Psychiatry")

232.98(2)  Following an adjudication that a child is a child in need of assistance, the court may after a hearing order the physical or mental examination of the parent, guardian or custodian if that person's ability to care for the child is at issue.

(For explanation, see "Psychiatry")

232.99  Dispositional hearing--findings.

1.  Following the entry of an order pursuant to section 232.96, the court shall, as soon as practicable, hold a dispositional hearing in order to determine what disposition should be made of the petition.

2.  All relevant and material evidence shall be admitted.

3.  In the initial dispositional hearing, any hearing held under section 232.103, and any dispositional review or permanency hearing, the court shall inquire of the parties as to the sufficiency of the services being provided and whether additional appropriate services are needed to facilitate the safe return of the child to the child's home. If the court determines such services are needed, the court shall order the services to be provided. The court shall advise the parties that failure to identify a deficiency in services or to request additional services may preclude the party from challenging the sufficiency of the services in a termination of parent-child relationship proceeding.

4.  When the dispositional hearing is concluded the court shall make the least restrictive disposition appropriate considering all the circumstances of the case. The dispositions which may be entered under this division are listed in sections 232.100 to 232.102 in order from least to most restrictive.

5.  The court shall make and file written findings as to its reason for the disposition.

232.100  Suspended judgment.

After the dispositional hearing the court may enter an order suspending judgment and continuing the proceedings subject to terms and conditions imposed to assure the proper care and protection of the child. Such terms and conditions may include the supervision of the child and of the parent, guardian or custodian by the department of human services, juvenile court office or other appropriate agency designated by the court. The maximum duration of any term or condition of a suspended judgment shall be twelve months unless the court finds at a hearing held during the last month of that period that exceptional circumstances require an extension of the term or condition for an additional six months.

232.101  Retention of custody by parent.

1.  After the dispositional hearing, the court may enter an order permitting the child's parent, guardian or custodian at the time of the filing of the petition to retain custody of the child subject to terms and conditions which the court prescribes to assure the proper care and protection of the child. Such terms and conditions may include appropriate supervision of the child and the parent, guardian or custodian by the department of human services, juvenile court office or other appropriate agency which the court designates. Such terms and conditions may also include the provision or acceptance by the parent, guardian or custodian of appropriate special treatment or care which the child needs for the child's physical or mental health, unless the family's doctor deems it unnecessary. If the parent, guardian or custodian fails to provide the treatment or care, the court may order the department of human services or some other appropriate state agency to provide such care or treatment.

2.  The duration of any period of supervision or other terms or conditions shall be for an initial period of no more than twelve months and the court, at the expiration of that period, upon a hearing and for good cause shown, may make not more than two successive extensions of such supervision or other terms or conditions of up to twelve months each.

232.102  Transfer of legal custody of child and placement.

1.  After a dispositional hearing the court may enter an order transferring the legal custody of the child to one of the following for purposes of placement:

a.  A parent who does not have physical care of the child, other relative, or other suitable person.

b.  A child placing agency or other suitable private agency, facility, or institution which is licensed or otherwise authorized by law to receive and provide care for the child.

c.  The department of human services.

If the child is sixteen years of age or older, the order shall specify the appropriate services needed to assist the child in preparing for the transition from foster care to independent living.

1A.  The court shall not order group foster care placement of the child which is a charge upon the state if that placement is not in accordance with the regional plan for group foster care established pursuant to section 232.143 for the departmental region in which the court is located.

2.  After a dispositional hearing and upon the request of the department, the court may enter an order appointing the department as the guardian of an unaccompanied refugee child or of a child without parent or guardian.

3.  After a dispositional hearing and upon written findings of fact based upon evidence in the record that an alternative placement set forth in subsection 1, paragraph "b", has previously been made and is not appropriate the court may enter an order transferring the guardianship of the child for the purposes of subsection 8, to the director of human services for the purposes of placement in the Iowa juvenile home at Toledo.

4. a.  Upon receipt of an application from the director of the department of human services, the court shall enter an order to temporarily transfer a child who has been placed in the Iowa juvenile home at Toledo pursuant to subsection 3, to a facility which has been designated to be an alternative placement site for the juvenile home, provided the court finds that all of the following conditions exist:

(1)  There is insufficient time to file a motion and hold a hearing for a new dispositional order under section 232.103.

(2)  Immediate removal of the child from the juvenile home is necessary to safeguard the child's physical or emotional health.

(3)  That reasonable attempts to notify the parents, guardian ad litem, and attorney for the child have been made.

b.  If the court finds the conditions in paragraph "a" exist and there is insufficient time to provide notice as required under rule of juvenile procedure 4.6, the court may enter an ex parte order temporarily transferring the child to the alternative placement site.

c.  Within three days of the child's transfer, the director shall file a motion for a new dispositional order under section 232.103 and the court shall hold a hearing concerning the motion within fourteen days of the child's transfer.

5. a.  Whenever possible the court should permit the child to remain at home with the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. Custody of the child should not be transferred unless the court finds there is clear and convincing evidence that: (1) The child cannot be protected from physical abuse without transfer of custody; or

(2)  The child cannot be protected from some harm which would justify the adjudication of the child as a child in need of assistance and an adequate placement is available.

232.102(5)(b)

b.  In order to transfer custody of the child under this subsection, the court must make a determination that continuation of the child in the child's home would be contrary to the welfare of the child, and shall identify the reasonable efforts that have been made. The court's determination regarding continuation of the child in the child's home, and regarding reasonable efforts, including those made to prevent removal and those made to finalize any permanency plan in effect, as well as any determination by the court that reasonable efforts are not required, must be made on a case-by-case basis. The grounds for each determination must be explicitly documented and stated in the court order. However, preserving the safety of the child is the paramount consideration. If imminent danger to the child's life or health exists at the time of the court's consideration, the determinations otherwise required under this paragraph shall not be a prerequisite for an order for removal of the child.

(For explanation, see "Seizing Children, Storm Trooper-Style")

6.  The child shall not be placed in the state training school.

7.  In any order transferring custody to the department or an agency, or in orders pursuant to a custody order, the court shall specify the nature and category of disposition which will serve the best interests of the child, and shall prescribe the means by which the placement shall be monitored by the court. If the court orders the transfer of the custody of the child to the department of human services or other agency for placement, the department or agency shall submit a case permanency plan to the court and shall make every reasonable effort to return the child to the child's home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests of the child. When the child is not returned to the child's home and if the child has been previously placed in a licensed foster care facility, the department or agency shall consider placing the child in the same licensed foster care facility. If the court orders the transfer of custody to a parent who does not have physical care of the child, other relative, or other suitable person, the court may direct the department or other agency to provide appropriate services to the child's parent, guardian, or custodian in order to enable them to resume custody of the child. If the court orders the transfer of custody to the department of human services or to another agency for placement in group foster care, the department or agency shall make every reasonable effort to place the child within Iowa, in the least restrictive, most family-like, and most appropriate setting available, and in close proximity to the parents' home, consistent with the child's best interests and special needs, and shall consider the placement's proximity to the school in which the child is enrolled at the time of placement.

8.  Any order transferring custody to the department or an agency shall include a statement informing the child's parent that the consequences of a permanent removal may include the termination of the parent's rights with respect to the child.

9.  An agency, facility, institution, or person to whom custody of the child has been transferred pursuant to this section shall file a written report with the court at least every six months concerning the status and progress of the child. The court shall hold a periodic dispositional review hearing for each child in placement pursuant to this section in order to determine whether the child should be returned home, an extension of the placement should be made, a permanency hearing should be held, or a termination of the parent-child relationship proceeding should be instituted. The placement shall be terminated and the child returned to the child's home if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child will not suffer harm in the manner specified in section 232.2, subsection 6. If the placement is extended, the court shall determine whether additional appropriate services are necessary to facilitate the return of the child to the child's home, and if the court determines such services are needed, the court shall order the provision of such services. When the child is not returned to the child's home and if the child has been previously placed in a licensed foster care facility, the department or agency responsible for the placement of the child shall consider placing the child in the same licensed foster care facility.

a.  The initial dispositional review hearing shall not be waived or continued beyond six months after the date of the dispositional hearing.

b.  Subsequent dispositional review hearings shall not be waived or continued beyond twelve months after the date of the most recent dispositional review hearing.

c.  For purposes of this subsection, a hearing held pursuant to section 232.103 satisfies the requirements for initial dispositional review or subsequent permanency hearing.

10. a.  As used in this division, "reasonable efforts" means the efforts made to preserve and unify a family prior to the out-of-home placement of a child in foster care or to eliminate the need for removal of the child or make it possible for the child to safely return to the family's home. If returning the child to the family's home is not appropriate or not possible, reasonable efforts shall include the efforts made in a timely manner to finalize a permanency plan for the child. A child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern in making reasonable efforts. Reasonable efforts may include appropriate intensive family preservation or family-centered services, if the child's safety in the home can be maintained during the time the services are provided. In determining whether reasonable efforts have been made, the court shall consider both of the following:

(1)  The type, duration, and intensity of services or support offered or provided to the child and the child's family. If intensive family preservation services were not provided, the court record shall enumerate the reasons the services were not provided, including but not limited to whether the services were not available, not accepted by the child's family, judged to be unable to protect the child and the child's family during the time the services would have been provided, judged to be unlikely to be successful in resolving the problems which would lead to removal of the child, or other services were found to be more appropriate.

(2)  The relative risk to the child of remaining in the child's home versus removal of the child.

b.  As used in this section:

(1)  "Family-centered services" means services which utilize a comprehensive approach to addressing the problems of individual family members, whether or not the problems are integrally related to the family, within the context of the family. Family-centered services are adapted to the individual needs of a family in the intensity and duration of service delivery and are intended to improve overall family functioning.

(2)  "Intensive family preservation services" means services provided to a family with a child who is at imminent risk of out-of-home placement. The services are designed to address any problem creating the need for out-of-home placement and have the following characteristics:  are persistently offered but provided at the family's option; are provided in the family's home; are available twenty-four hours per day; provide a response within twenty-four hours of the initial contact for assistance; have worker caseloads of not more than two through four families per worker at any one time; are provided for a period of four to six weeks; and provide funding in order to meet the special needs of a family.

11.  The performance of reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or with a guardian may be made concurrently with making reasonable efforts as defined in this section.

12.  If the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that aggravated circumstances exist, with written findings of fact based upon evidence in the record, the court may waive the requirement for making reasonable efforts. The existence of aggravated circumstances is indicated by any of the following:

a.  The parent has abandoned the child.

b.  The court finds the circumstances described in section 232.116, subsection 1, paragraph "i", are applicable to the child.

c.  The parent's parental rights have been terminated under section 232.116 with respect to another child who is a member of the same family, and there is clear and convincing evidence to show that the offer or receipt of services would not be likely within a reasonable period of time to correct the conditions which led to the child's removal.

d.  The parent has been convicted of the murder of another child of the parent.

e.  The parent has been convicted of the voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent.

f.  The parent has been convicted of aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring in, or soliciting the commission of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent.

g.  The parent has been convicted of a felony assault which resulted in serious bodily injury of the child or of another child of the parent.

232.103  Termination, modification, vacation and substitution of dispositional order.

1.  At any time prior to expiration of a dispositional order and upon the motion of an authorized party or upon its own motion as provided in this section, the court may terminate the order and discharge the child, modify the order, or vacate the order and make a new order.

2.  The following persons shall be authorized to file a motion to terminate, modify or vacate and substitute a dispositional order:

a.  The child.

Note: the child, himself, can write to the judge asking him to modify his order and send him back home. As often as he likes! See contrast with the frequency limitation of the next paragraph. This means as soon as parents see trouble coming, they can begin training their small children how to write weekly letters to the judge to modify orders that take the child away from mommy and daddy, and each letter would be a motion initiating a new hearing?

b.  The child's parent, guardian or custodian, except that such motion may be filed by that person not more often than once every six months except with leave of court for good cause shown.

c.  The child's guardian ad litem.

d.  A person supervising the child pursuant to a dispositional order.

e.  An agency, facility, institution or person to whom legal custody has been transferred pursuant to a dispositional order.

f.  The county attorney.

3.  A hearing shall be held on a motion to terminate or modify a dispositional order except that a hearing on a motion to terminate an order may be waived upon agreement by all parties. Reasonable notice of the hearing shall be given to the parties. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 232.50.

4.  The court may terminate an order and release the child if the court finds that the purposes of the order have been accomplished and the child is no longer in need of supervision, care or treatment.

5.  The court may modify or vacate an order for good cause shown provided that where the request to modify or vacate is based on the child's alleged failure to comply with the conditions or terms of the order, the court may modify or vacate the order only if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that the child violated a material and reasonable condition or term of the order.

6.  If the court vacates the order it may make any other order in accordance with and subject to the provisions of sections 232.100 to 232.102.

7.  With respect to a temporary transfer order made pursuant to section 232.102, subsection 4, if the court finds that removal of a child from the Iowa juvenile home is necessary to safeguard the child's physical or emotional health and is in the best interests of the child, the court shall grant the director's motion for a new dispositional order to place the child in a facility which has been designated to be an alternative placement site for the juvenile home.

232.104  Permanency hearing.

1. a.  The time for the initial permanency hearing for a child subject to out-of-home placement shall be the earlier of the following:

(1)  For a temporary removal order entered under section 232.78, 232.95, or 232.96, for a child who was removed without a court order under section 232.79, or for an order entered under section 232.102, for which the court has not waived reasonable efforts requirements, the permanency hearing shall be held within twelve months of the date the child was removed from the home.

(2)  For an order entered under section 232.102, for which the court has waived reasonable efforts requirements under section 232.102, subsection 12, the permanency hearing shall be held within thirty days of the date the requirements were waived.

b.  The permanency hearing may be held concurrently with a hearing under section 232.103 to review, modify, substitute, vacate, or terminate a dispositional order.

c.  Reasonable notice of a permanency hearing shall be provided to the parties. A permanency hearing shall be conducted in substantial conformance with the provisions of section 232.99. During the hearing, the court shall consider the child's need for a secure and permanent placement in light of any permanency plan or evidence submitted to the court. Upon completion of the hearing, the court shall enter written findings and make a determination identifying a primary permanency goal for the child. If a permanency plan is in effect at the time of the hearing, the court shall also make a determination as to whether reasonable progress is being made in achieving the permanency goal and complying with the other provisions of that permanency plan.

2.  After a permanency hearing the court shall do one of the following:

a.  Enter an order pursuant to section 232.102 to return the child to the child's home.

b.  Enter an order pursuant to section 232.102 to continue placement of the child for an additional six months at which time the court shall hold a hearing to consider modification of its permanency order. An order entered under this paragraph shall enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child's home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.

c.  Direct the county attorney or the attorney for the child to institute proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship.

d.  Enter an order, pursuant to findings required by subsection 3, to do one of the following:

(1)  Transfer guardianship and custody of the child to a suitable person.

(2)  Transfer sole custody of the child from one parent to another parent.

(3)  Transfer custody of the child to a suitable person for the purpose of long-term care.

(4)  If the department has documented to the court's satisfaction a compelling reason for determining that an order under the other subparagraphs of this paragraph would not be in the child's best interest, order another planned permanent living arrangement for the child.

3.  Prior to entering a permanency order pursuant to subsection 2, paragraph "d", convincing evidence must exist showing that all of the following apply:

a.  A termination of the parent-child relationship would not be in the best interest of the child.

b.  Services were offered to the child's family to correct the situation which led to the child's removal from the home.

c.  The child cannot be returned to the child's home.

4.  Any permanency order may provide restrictions upon the contact between the child and the child's parent or parents, consistent with the best interest of the child.

5.  Subsequent to the entry of a permanency order pursuant to this section, the child shall not be returned to the care, custody, or control of the child's parent or parents, over a formal objection filed by the child's attorney or guardian ad litem, unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence, that returning the child to such custody would be in the best interest of the child.

6.  Following an initial permanency hearing and the entry of a permanency order which places a child in the custody or guardianship of another person or agency, the court shall retain jurisdiction and annually review the order to ascertain whether the best interest of the child is being served. When the order places the child in the custody of the department for the purpose of long-term foster care placement in a facility, the review shall be in a hearing that shall not be waived or continued beyond twelve months after the initial permanency hearing or the last permanency review hearing. Any modification shall be accomplished through a hearing procedure following reasonable notice. During the hearing, all relevant and material evidence shall be admitted and procedural due process shall be provided to all parties.

232.106  Terms and conditions on child's parent.

If the court enters an order under this chapter which imposes terms and conditions on the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, the purpose of the terms and conditions shall be to assure the protection of the child. The order is subject to the following provisions:

1.  The order shall state the reasons for and purpose of the terms and conditions.

2.  If a parent, guardian, or custodian is required to have a chemical test of blood or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of an illegal drug, the test shall be a medically relevant test as defined in section 232.73.

232.107  Parent visitation.

If a child is removed from the child's home in accordance with an order entered under this division based upon evidence indicating the presence of an illegal drug in the child's body, unless the court finds that substantial evidence exists to believe that reasonable visitation or supervised visitation would cause an imminent risk to the child's life or health, the order shall allow the child's parent reasonable visitation or supervised visitation with the child.

DIVISION IV

TERMINATION OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP PROCEEDING

232.109  Jurisdiction.

The juvenile court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings under this chapter to terminate a parent-child relationship and all parental rights with respect to a child. No such termination shall be ordered except under the provisions of this chapter if the court has made an order concerning the child pursuant to the provisions of division III of this chapter and the order is in force at the time a petition for termination is filed.

232.110  Venue.

1.  Venue for termination proceedings under this chapter shall be in the judicial district where the child is found or the judicial district where the child resides except as otherwise provided in subsection 2.

2.  If a court has made an order concerning the child pursuant to the provisions of this chapter and the order is still in force at the time the termination petition is filed, such court shall hear and adjudicate the case unless the court transfers the case.

3.  The judge may transfer the case to the juvenile court of any county having venue in accordance with the provisions of section 232.62.

232.111  Petition.

1.  A child's guardian, guardian ad litem, or custodian, the department of human services, a juvenile court officer, or the county attorney may file a petition for termination of the parent-child relationship and parental rights with respect to a child.

2. a.  Unless any of the circumstances described in paragraph "b" exist, the county attorney shall file a petition for termination of the parent-child relationship and parental rights with respect to a child or if a petition has been filed, join in the petition, under any of the following circumstances:

(1)  The child has been placed in foster care for fifteen months of the most recent twenty-two-month period. The petition shall be filed by the end of the child's fifteenth month of foster care placement.

(2)  A court has determined aggravated circumstances exist and has waived the requirement for making reasonable efforts under section 232.102 because the court has found the circumstances described in section 232.116, subsection 1, paragraph "i", are applicable to the child.

(3)  The child is less than twelve months of age and has been judicially determined to meet the definition of abandonment of a child or the child is a newborn infant whose parent has voluntarily released custody of the child in accordance with chapter 233.

(4)  The parent has been convicted of the murder or the voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent.

(5)  The parent has been convicted of aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring in, or soliciting the commission of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent.

(6)  The parent has been convicted of a felony assault which resulted in serious bodily injury of the child or of another child of the parent.

b.  If any of the following conditions exist, the county attorney is not required to file a petition or join in an existing petition as provided in paragraph "a":

(1)  At the option of the department or by order of the court, the child is being cared for by a relative.

(2)  The department or a state agency has documented in the child's case permanency plan provided or available to the court a compelling reason for determining that filing the petition would not be in the best interest of the child. A compelling reason shall include but is not limited to documentation in the child's case permanency plan indicating it is reasonably likely the completion of the services being received in accordance with the permanency plan will eliminate the need for removal of the child or make it possible for the child to safely return to the family's home within six months.

(3)  The department has not provided the child's family, consistent with the time frames outlined in the child's case permanency plan, with those services the state deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child's home, and the limited extension of time necessary to complete the services is clearly documented in the case permanency plan.

3.  The department, juvenile court officer, county attorney or judge may authorize any competent person having knowledge of the circumstances to file a termination petition with the clerk of the court without the payment of a filing fee.

4.  A petition for termination of parental rights shall include the following:

a.  The legal name, age, and domicile, if any, of the child.

b.  The names, residences, and domicile of any:

(1)  Living parents of the child.

(2)  Guardian of the child.

(3)  Custodian of the child.

(4)  Guardian ad litem of the child.

(5)  Petitioner.

(6)  Person standing in the place of the parents of the child.

c.  A plain statement of those facts and grounds specified in section 232.116 which indicate that the parent-child relationship should be terminated.

d.  A plain statement explaining why the petitioner does not know any of the information required under paragraphs "a" and "b" of this subsection.

e.  A complete list of the services which have been offered to preserve the family and a statement specifying the services provided to address the reasons stated in any order for removal or in any dispositional or permanency order which did not return the child to the child's home

f.  The signature and verification of the petitioner.

232.112  Notice--service.

1.  Persons listed in section 232.111, subsection 4, shall be necessary parties to a termination of parent-child relationship proceeding and are entitled to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard, except that notice may be dispensed with in the case of any such person whose name or whereabouts the court determines is unknown and cannot be ascertained by reasonably diligent search. In addition to the persons who are necessary parties who may be parties under section 232.111, notice for any hearing under this division shall be provided to the child's foster parent, an individual providing preadoptive care for the child, or a relative providing care for the child.

2.  Prior to the service of notice on the necessary parties, the juvenile court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child if the child does not have a guardian or guardian ad litem or if the interests of the guardian or guardian ad litem conflict with the interests of the child. Such guardian ad litem shall be a necessary party under subsection 1.

Note: conform this to the "Attorney for a Baby" principles

3.  Notice under this section shall be served personally or shall be sent by restricted certified mail, whichever is determined by the court to be the most effective means of notification. Such notice shall be made according to the rules of civil procedure relating to an original notice where not inconsistent with the provisions of this section. Notice by personal delivery shall be served not less than seven days prior to the hearing on termination of parental rights. Notice by restricted certified mail shall be sent not less than fourteen days prior to the hearing on termination of parental rights. A notice by restricted certified mail which is refused by the necessary party given notice shall be sufficient notice to the party under this section.

232.113  Right to and appointment of counsel.

1.  Upon the filing of a petition the parent identified in the petition shall have the right to counsel in connection with all subsequent hearings and proceedings. If the parent desires but is financially unable to employ counsel, the court shall appoint counsel.

2.  Upon the filing of a petition the court shall appoint counsel for the child identified in the petition as a party to the proceedings. The same person may serve both as the child's counsel and as guardian ad litem.

Note: Make these two paragraphs conform to "attorney for a baby" principles

232.114  Duties of county attorney.

1.  Upon the filing of a petition the county attorney shall represent the state in all adversary proceedings arising under this division and shall present evidence in support of the petition.

2.  The county attorney shall represent the department in proceedings arising under this division. However, if there is disagreement between the department and the county attorney regarding the appropriate action to be taken, the department may request to be represented by the attorney general in place of the county attorney.

232.115  Reporter required.

Stenographic notes or electronic or mechanical recordings shall be taken of all court hearings held pursuant to this division unless waived by the parties. The child shall not be competent to waive the reporting requirement, but waiver may be made for the child by the child's counsel or guardian ad litem. Matters which must be reported under the provisions of this section shall be reported in the same manner as required in section 624.9. The child and parent shall be allowed to audio or video record the hearings.

(For explanation, see "Recording Hearings")

232.116  Grounds for termination.

1.  Except as provided in subsection 3, the court may order the termination of both the parental rights with respect to a child and the relationship between the parent and the child on any of the following grounds, but only if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the parent has inflicted, upon the child, life threatening, or serious, or permanent physical injury, or sexual abuse:

(For explanation, see "Termination!")

a.  The parents voluntarily and intelligently consent to the termination of parental rights and the parent-child relationship and for good cause desire the termination.

b.  The court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that the child has been abandoned or deserted.

c.  The court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is a newborn infant whose parent has voluntarily released custody of the child in accordance with chapter 233.

d.  The court finds that both of the following have occurred:

(1)  The court has previously adjudicated the child to be a child in need of assistance after finding the child to have been physically or sexually abused or neglected as the result of the acts or omissions of one or both parents, or the court has previously adjudicated a child who is a member of the same family to be a child in need of assistance after such a finding.

(2)  Subsequent to the child in need of assistance adjudication, the parents were offered or received services to correct the circumstance which led to the adjudication, and the circumstance continues to exist despite the offer or receipt of services.

e.  The court finds that all of the following have occurred:

(1)  The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.

(2)  The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for a period of at least six consecutive months.

(3)  There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the previous six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity to do so. For the purposes of this subparagraph, "significant and meaningful contact" includes but is not limited to the affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. This affirmative duty, in addition to financial obligations, requires continued interest in the child, a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and requires that the parents establish and maintain a place of importance in the child's life.

Note: Help me figure out how to heal this cruel wound. Look at the impossible burdens stacked on parents who oppose the system taking their children: starting with the ridiculous bills for psychiatrists, which if the parent doesn't pay, this paragraph says they aren't maintaining significant and meaningful contact with the child! And after the parent has been limited to an hour of "supervised" visits a month, then the parent is accused of failing to "establish and maintain a place of importance in the child's life", in the view of the psychologists hired to brainwash the child.

f.  The court finds that all of the following have occurred:

(1)  The child is four years of age or older.

(2)  The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.

(3)  The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.

(4)  There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102.

g.  The court finds that all of the following have occurred:

(1)  The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.

(2)  The court has terminated parental rights pursuant to section 232.117 with respect to another child who is a member of the same family.

(3)  There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to appropriate services which would correct the situation.

(4)  There is clear and convincing evidence that an additional period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation.

h.  The court finds that all of the following have occurred:

(1)  The child is three years of age or younger.

(2)  The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.

(3)  The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.

(4)  There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.

i.  The court finds that all of the following have occurred:

(1)  The child meets the definition of child in need of assistance based on a finding of physical or sexual abuse or neglect

as a result of the acts or omissions of one or both parents.

(2)  There is clear and convincing evidence that the abuse or neglect posed a significant risk to the life of the child or constituted imminent danger to the child.

(3)  There is clear and convincing evidence that the offer or receipt of services would not correct the conditions which led to the abuse or neglect of the child within a reasonable period of time.

j.  The court finds that both of the following have occurred:

(1)  The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96 and custody has been transferred from the child's parents for placement pursuant to section 232.102.

(2)  The parent has been imprisoned for a crime against the child, the child's sibling, or another child in the household, or the parent has been imprisoned and it is unlikely that the parent will be released from prison for a period of five or more years.

k.  The court finds that all of the following have occurred:

(1)  The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96 and custody has been transferred from the child's parents for placement pursuant to section 232.102.

(2)  The parent has a chronic mental illness and has been repeatedly institutionalized for mental illness, and presents a danger to self or others as evidenced by prior acts.

(3)  There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent's prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to be returned to the custody of the parent within a reasonable period of time considering the child's age and need for a permanent home.

l.  The court finds that all of the following have occurred:

(1)  The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96 and custody has been transferred from the child's parents for placement pursuant to section 232.102.

(2)  The parent has a severe, chronic substance abuse problem, and presents a danger to self or others as evidenced by prior acts.

(3)  There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent's prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to be returned to the custody of the parent within a reasonable period of time considering the child's age and need for a permanent home.

m.  The court finds that both of the following have occurred:

(1)  The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96 after finding that the child has been physically or sexually abused or neglected as a result of the acts or omissions of a parent.

(2)  The parent found to have physically or sexually abused or neglected the child has been convicted of a felony and imprisoned for physically or sexually abusing or neglecting the child, the child's sibling, or any other child in the household.

n.  The court finds that all of the following have occurred:

(1)  The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.

(2)  The parent has been convicted of child endangerment resulting in the death of the child's sibling, has been convicted of three or more acts of child endangerment involving the child, the child's sibling, or another child in the household, or has been convicted of child endangerment resulting in a serious injury to the child, the child's sibling, or another child in the household.

(3)  There is clear and convincing evidence that the circumstances surrounding the parent's conviction for child endangerment would result in a finding of imminent danger to the child.

2.  In considering whether to terminate the rights of a parent under this section, the court shall give primary consideration to the child's safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child. This consideration may include any of the following:

a.  Whether the parent's ability to provide the needs of the child is affected by the parent's mental capacity or mental condition or the parent's imprisonment for a felony.

b.  For a child who has been placed in foster family care by a court or has been voluntarily placed in foster family care by a parent or by another person, whether the child has become integrated into the foster family to the extent that the child's familial identity is with the foster family, and whether the foster family is able and willing to permanently integrate the child into the foster family. In considering integration into a foster family, the court shall review the following:

(1)  The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining that environment and continuity for the child.

(2)  The reasonable preference of the child, if the court determines that the child has sufficient capacity to express a reasonable preference.

c.  For a child who has been placed in foster family care, any relevant testimony or written statement provided by the child's foster parents.

3.  The court need not terminate the relationship between the parent and child if the court finds any of the following:

a.  A relative has legal custody of the child.

232.116(3)(b) (Termination of Parental Rights won't occur if:)

The child is over ten years of age and objects to the termination, or is less than ten years of age and objects now to the termination, objected during the initial involuntary removal from the home, and objected during the first seven hours of interviews.

(For explanation, see "Termination!")

c.  There is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.

d.  It is necessary to place the child in a hospital, facility, or institution for care and treatment and the continuation of the parent-child relationship is not preventing a permanent family placement for the child.

e.  The absence of a parent is due to the parent's admission or commitment to any institution, hospital, or health facility or due to active service in the state or federal armed forces.

f. The Department has manipulated the letter of the law to make the parent's access to the child only marginal, and less than meaningful.

232.117  Termination--findings--disposition.

1.  After the hearing is concluded the court shall make and file written findings.

2.  If the court concludes that facts sufficient to terminate parental rights have not been established by clear and convincing evidence the court shall dismiss the petition.

3.  If the court concludes that facts sufficient to sustain the petition have been established by clear and convincing evidence, the court may order parental rights terminated. If the court terminates the parental rights of the child's parents, the court shall transfer the guardianship and custody of the child to one of the following:

a.  The department of human services.

b.  A child placing agency or other suitable private agency, facility or institution which is licensed or otherwise authorized by law to receive and provide care for the child.

c.  A parent who does not have physical care of the child, other relative, or other suitable person.

4.  The court shall not order group foster care placement of the child which is a charge upon the state if that placement is not in accordance with the regional plan for group foster care established pursuant to section 232.143 for the departmental region in which the court is located.

5.  If after a hearing the court does not order the termination of parental rights but finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is a child in need of assistance, under section 232.2, subsection 6, due to the acts or omissions of one or both of the child's parents the court may adjudicate the child to be a child in need of assistance and may enter an order in accordance with the provisions of section 232.100, 232.101, 232.102, or 232.104.

6.  If the court orders the termination of parental rights and transfers guardianship and custody under subsection 3, the guardian shall submit a case permanency plan to the court and shall make every effort to establish a stable placement for the child by adoption or other permanent placement. Within forty-five days of receipt of the termination order, and every forty-five days thereafter until the court determines such reports are no longer necessary, the guardian shall report to the court regarding efforts made to place the child for adoption or providing the rationale as to why adoption would not be in the child's best interest.

7.  The guardian of each child whose guardianship and custody has been transferred under subsection 3 and who has not been placed for adoption shall file a written report with the court every six months concerning the child's placement. The court shall hold a hearing to review the placement at intervals not to exceed six months after the date of the termination of parental rights or the last placement review hearing.

8.  The guardian of each child whose guardianship and custody has been transferred under subsection 3 and who has been placed for adoption and whose adoption has not been finalized shall file a written report with the court every six months concerning the child's placement. The court shall hold a hearing to review the placement at intervals not to exceed twelve months after the date of the adoptive placement or the last placement review hearing.

9.  Hearings held under this division are open to the public unless the court, on the motion of any of the parties or upon the court's own motion, excludes the public. The court shall exclude the public from a hearing if the court determines that the possibility of damage or harm to the child outweighs the public's interest in having a public hearing. Upon closing the hearing, the court may admit persons who have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.

10.  If a termination of parental rights order is issued on the grounds that the child is a newborn infant whose parent has voluntarily released custody of the child under section 232.116, subsection 1, paragraph "c", the court shall retain jurisdiction to change a guardian or custodian and to allow a parent whose rights have been terminated to request vacation or appeal of the termination order which request must be made within thirty days of issuance of the granting of the termination order. The period for request for vacation or appeal by a parent whose rights have been terminated shall not be waived or extended and a vacation or appeal shall not be granted for a request made after the expiration of this period. The court shall grant the vacation request only if it is in the best interest of the child. The supreme court shall prescribe rules to establish the period of thirty days, which shall not be waived or extended, in which a parent whose parental rights have been terminated may request a vacation or appeal of such a termination order.

232.118  Removal of guardian.

1.  Upon application of an interested party or upon the court's own motion, the court having jurisdiction of the child may, after notice to the parties and a hearing, remove a court appointed guardian and appoint a guardian in accordance with the provisions of section 232.117, subsection 3.

2.  A child fourteen years of age or older who has not been adopted but who is placed in a satisfactory foster home may, with the consent of the foster parents, join with the guardian appointed by the court in an application to the court to remove the existing guardian and appoint the foster parents as guardians of the child.

3.  The authority of a guardian appointed by the court terminates when the child reaches the age of majority or is adopted.

232.119  Adoption exchange established.

1.  The purpose of this section is to facilitate the placement of all children in Iowa who are legally available for adoption through the establishment of an adoption exchange to help find adoptive homes for these children.

2.  An adoption information exchange is established within the department to be operated by the department or by an individual or agency under contract with the department.

a.  All special needs children under state guardianship shall be registered on the adoption exchange within sixty days of the termination of parental rights pursuant to section 232.117 or 600A.9 and assignment of guardianship to the director.

b.  Prospective adoptive families requesting a special needs child shall be registered on the adoption exchange upon receipt of an approved home study.

3.  To register a child on the Iowa exchange, the department adoption worker or the private agency worker shall register the pertinent information concerning the child on the exchange. A photo of the child and other necessary information shall be forwarded to the department to be included in the photo-listing book which shall be updated regularly. The department adoption worker or the private agency worker who places a child on the exchange shall update the registration information within ten working days after a change in the information occurs.

4.  The exchange shall include a matching service for children registered or listed in the adoption photo-listing book and prospective adoptive families listed on the exchange. The department shall register a child with the national electronic exchange and electronic photo-listing system if the child has not been placed for adoption after three months on the exchange established pursuant to this section.

5.  A request to defer registering the child on the exchange shall be submitted in writing and shall be granted if any of the following conditions exist:

a.  The child is in an adoptive placement.

b.  The child's foster parents or another person with a significant relationship is being considered as the adoptive family.

c.  A diagnostic study or testing is necessary to clarify the child's needs and to provide an adequate description of the child's needs.

d.  At the time of the request, the child is receiving medical care, mental health treatment, or other treatment and the child's care or treatment provider has determined that meeting prospective adoptive parents is not in the child's best interest.

e.  The child is fourteen years of age or older and will not consent to an adoption plan and the consequences of not being adopted have been explained to the child.

6.  The following requirements apply to a request to defer registering a child on the adoption exchange under subsection 5:

a.  For a deferral granted by the exchange pursuant to subsection 5, paragraph "a", "b", or "e", the child's guardian shall address the child's deferral status in the report filed with the court and the court shall review the deferral status in the six-month review hearings held pursuant to section 232.117, subsection 7.

b.  In addition to the requirements of paragraph "a", a deferral granted by the exchange pursuant to subsection 5, paragraph "b", shall be limited to not more than a one-time, ninety-day period unless the termination of parental rights order is appealed or the child is placed in a hospital or other institutional placement. However, if the foster parents or another person with a significant relationship continues to be considered the child's prospective adoptive family, additional extensions of the deferral request under subsection 5, paragraph "b", may be granted until sixty days after the date of the final decision regarding the appeal or until the date the child is discharged from a hospital or other institutional placement.

c.  A deferral granted by the exchange pursuant to subsection 5, paragraph "c", shall be limited to not more than a one-time, ninety-day period.

d.  A deferral granted by the exchange pursuant to subsection 5, paragraph "d", shall be limited to not more than a one-time, one-hundred-twenty-day period.

232.120  Preadoptive care--continued placement.

If a foster parent is providing preadoptive care to a child for whom a termination of parental rights petition has been filed, the placement of the child with that foster parent shall continue through the termination of parental rights proceeding unless the court orders otherwise based upon the best interests of the child.

DIVISION V

FAMILY IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE PROCEEDINGS

This entire section needs to be repealed. It is triggered by no more objectively definable a problem than "a breakdown in the relationship between parent and child", the same language in our divorce law!

232.122  Jurisdiction.

The juvenile court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over family in need of assistance proceedings.

232.123  Venue.

Venue for family in need of assistance proceedings shall be determined in accordance with section 232.62.

232.125  Petition.

1.  A family in need of assistance proceeding shall be initiated by the filing of a petition alleging that a child and the child's parent, guardian or custodian are a family in need of assistance.

2.  Such a petition may be filed by the child's parent, guardian or custodian or by the child. The judge, county attorney, or juvenile court officer may authorize such parent, guardian, custodian, or child to file a petition with the clerk of the court without the payment of a filing fee.

3.  The petition and subsequent court documents shall be entitled "In re the family of . . . . . . ."

4.  The petition shall state the names and residences of the child, and the child's living parents, guardian, custodian and guardian ad litem, if any and the age of the child.

5.  The petition shall allege that there has been a breakdown in the familial relationship and that the petitioner has sought services from public or private agencies to maintain and improve the familial relationship.

232.126  Appointment of counsel and guardian ad litem.

The court shall appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child at the hearing to determine whether the family is a family in need of assistance unless the child already has such counsel or guardian. The court shall appoint counsel for the parent, guardian or custodian if that person desires but is financially unable to employ counsel.

The court may appoint a special advocate, as defined in section 232.2, subsection 9, to act as guardian ad litem. The court appointed special advocate shall receive notice of and may attend all depositions, hearings, and trial proceedings to support the child and advocate for the protection of the child. The court appointed special advocate shall not be allowed to separately introduce evidence or to directly examine or cross-examine witnesses. However, the court appointed special advocate shall file reports to the court as required by the court.

Section History: Early form

232.127  Hearing--adjudication--disposition.

1.  Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall fix a time for a hearing and give notice thereof to the child and the child's parent, guardian or custodian.

2.  A parent without custody may petition the court to be made a party to proceedings under this division.

3.  The court shall exclude the general public from such hearing except the court in its discretion may admit persons having a legitimate interest in the case or the work of the court.

4.  The hearing shall be informal and all relevant and material evidence shall be admitted.

5.  The court may adjudicate the family to be a family in need of assistance and enter an appropriate dispositional order if the court finds:

a.  There has been a breakdown in the relationship between the child and the child's parent, guardian or custodian; and

b.  The child or the child's parent, guardian or custodian has sought services from public or private agencies to maintain and improve the familial relationship; and

c.  The court has at its disposal appropriate services for this purpose which can be made available to the family.

6.  If the court makes such a finding the court may order any or all of the parties to accept counseling and to comply with any other reasonable orders designed to maintain and improve the familial relationship. At the conclusion of any counseling ordered by the court, or at any other time deemed necessary, the parties shall be required to meet together and be apprised of the findings and recommendations of such counseling. Such an order shall remain in force for a period not to exceed one year unless the court otherwise specifies or sooner terminates the order.

7.  The court may not order the child placed on probation, in a foster home or in a nonsecure facility unless the child requests and agrees to such supervision or placement. In no event shall the court order the child placed in the state training school or other secure facility.

8.  The court shall not order group foster care placement of the child which is a charge upon the state if that placement is not in accordance with the regional plan for group foster care established pursuant to section 232.143 for the departmental region in which the court is located.

9.  A child found in contempt of court because of violation of conditions imposed under this section shall not be considered delinquent. Such a contempt may be punished by imposition of a work assignment or assignments to benefit the state or a governmental subdivision of the state. In addition to or in lieu of such an assignment or assignments, the court may impose one of the dispositions set out in sections 232.100 to 232.102.

DIVISION VI

APPEAL

232.133  Appeal.

1.  An interested party aggrieved by an order or decree of the juvenile court may appeal from the court for review of questions of law or fact. However, an order adjudicating a child to have committed a delinquent act, entered pursuant to section 232.47, shall not be appealed until the court enters a corresponding dispositional order pursuant to section 232.52. An appeal that affects the custody of a child shall be heard at the earliest practicable time.

2.  Except for appeals from an order entered pursuant to section 232.117, appellate procedures shall be governed by the same provisions applicable to appeals from the district court. The supreme court may prescribe rules to expedite the resolution of appeals from final orders entered pursuant to section 232.117.

3.  The pendency of an appeal or application therefor shall not suspend the order of the juvenile court regarding a child and shall not discharge the child from the custody of the court or the agency, association, facility, institution or person to whom the court has transferred legal custody unless the appellate court otherwise orders on application of an appellant.

4.  If the appellate court does not dismiss the proceedings and discharge the child, the appellate court shall affirm or modify the order of the juvenile court and remand the child to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for disposition not inconsistent with the appellate court's finding on the appeal.

DIVISION VII

EXPENSES AND COSTS

232.141  Expenses.

1.  Except as otherwise provided by law, the court shall inquire into the ability of the child or the child's parent to pay expenses incurred pursuant to subsection 2 and subsection 4 and, after giving the parent a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the court may order the parent to pay all or part of the costs of the child's care, examination, treatment, legal expenses, or other expenses. An order entered under this section does not obligate a parent paying child support under a custody decree, except that part of the monthly support payment may be used to satisfy the obligations imposed by the order entered pursuant to this section. If a parent fails to pay as ordered, without good reason, the court may proceed against the parent for contempt and may inform the county attorney who shall proceed against the parent to collect the unpaid amount. Any payment ordered by the court shall be a judgment against each of the child's parents and a lien as provided in section 624.23. If all or part of the amount that the parents are ordered to pay is subsequently paid by the county or state, the judgment and lien shall thereafter be against each of the parents in favor of the county to the extent of the county's payments and in favor of the state to the extent of the state's payments.

2.  All of the following expenses are a charge upon the county in which the proceedings are held, to the extent provided in subsection 3:

a.  The fees and mileage of witnesses and the expenses of officers serving notices and subpoenas which are incurred by an attorney appointed by the court to serve as counsel to any party or to serve as a guardian ad litem for any child.

b.  Reasonable compensation for an attorney appointed by the court to serve as counsel to any party or as guardian ad litem for any child.

3.  Costs incurred under subsection 2 shall be paid as follows:

a.  A county shall be required to pay for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1989, an amount equal to the county's base cost for witness and mileage fees and attorney fees established pursuant to section 232.141, subsection 8, paragraph "d", Code 1989, for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1988, plus an amount equal to the percentage rate of change in the consumer price index as tabulated by the federal bureau of labor statistics for the current year times the county's base cost.

b.  A county's base cost for a fiscal year plus the percentage rate of change amount as computed in paragraph "a" is the county's base cost for the succeeding fiscal year. The amount to be paid in the succeeding year by the county shall be computed as provided in paragraph "a".

c.  Costs incurred for compensation of an attorney appointed by the court to serve as counsel to any party or guardian ad litem for any child shall be made in accordance with sections 13B.4 and 815.7.

d.  Costs incurred under subsection 2 shall be paid by the state. The county shall be required to reimburse the indigent defense fund for costs incurred by the state up to the county's base in subsection 2.

4.  Upon certification of the court, all of the following expenses are a charge upon the state to the extent provided in subsection 5:

a.  The expenses of transporting a child to or from a place designated by the court for the purpose of care or treatment.

b.  Expenses for mental or physical examinations of a child if ordered by the court.

c.  The expenses of care or treatment ordered by the court.

5.  If no other provision of law requires the county to reimburse costs incurred pursuant to subsection 4, the department shall reimburse the costs as follows:

a.  The department shall prescribe by administrative rule all services eligible for reimbursement pursuant to subsection 4 and shall establish an allowable rate of reimbursement for each service.

b.  The department shall receive billings for services provided and, after determining allowable costs, shall reimburse providers at a rate which is not greater than allowed by administrative rule. Reimbursement paid to a provider by the department shall be considered reimbursement in full unless a county voluntarily agrees to pay any difference between the reimbursement amount and the actual cost. When there are specific program regulations prohibiting supplementation those regulations shall be applied to providers requesting supplemental payments from a county. Billings for services not listed in administrative rule shall not be paid. However, if the court orders a service not currently listed in administrative rule, the department shall review the order and, if reimbursement for the service of the department is not in conflict with other law or administrative rule, and meets the criteria of subsection 4, the department shall reimburse the provider.

6.  If a child is given physical or mental examinations or treatment relating to a child abuse assessment with the consent of the child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian and no other provision of law otherwise requires payment for the costs of the examination and treatment, the costs shall be paid by the state. Reimbursement for costs of services described in this subsection is subject to subsection 5.

7.  A county charged with the costs and expenses under subsections 2 and 3 may recover the costs and expenses from the county where the child has legal settlement by filing verified claims which are payable as are other claims against the county. A detailed statement of the facts upon which a claim is based shall accompany the claim. Any dispute involving the legal settlement of a child for which the court has ordered payment under this section shall be settled pursuant to sections 252.22 and 252.23.

8.  This subsection applies only to placements in a juvenile shelter care home which is publicly owned, operated as a county or multicounty shelter care home, organized under a chapter 28E agreement, or operated by a private juvenile shelter care home. If the actual and allowable costs of a child's shelter care placement exceed the amount the department is authorized to pay in accordance with law and administrative rule, the unpaid costs may be recovered from the child's county of legal settlement. However, the maximum amount of the unpaid costs which may be recovered under this subsection is limited to the difference between the amount the department is authorized to pay and the statewide average of the actual and allowable rates in effect in May of the preceding fiscal year for reimbursement of juvenile shelter care homes. In no case shall the home be reimbursed for more than the home's actual and allowable costs. The unpaid costs are payable pursuant to filing of verified claims against the county of legal settlement. A detailed statement of the facts upon which a claim is based shall accompany the claim. Any dispute between counties arising from filings of claims pursuant to this subsection shall be settled in the manner provided to determine legal settlement in section 230.12.

232.142  Maintenance and cost of juvenile homes--fund.

1.  County boards of supervisors which singly or in conjunction with one or more other counties provide and maintain juvenile detention and juvenile shelter care homes are subject to this section.

2.  For the purpose of providing and maintaining a county or multicounty home, the board of supervisors of any county may issue general county purpose bonds in accordance with sections 331.441 to 331.449. Expenses for providing and maintaining a multicounty home shall be paid by the counties participating in a manner to be determined by the boards of supervisors.

3.  A county or multicounty juvenile detention home approved pursuant to this section shall receive financial aid from the state in a manner approved by the director. Aid paid by the state shall be at least ten percent and not more than fifty percent of the total cost of the establishment, improvements, operation, and maintenance of the home.

4.  The director shall adopt minimal rules and standards for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of such homes as shall be necessary to effect the purposes of this chapter. The rules shall apply the requirements of section 237.8, concerning employment and evaluation of persons with direct responsibility for a child or with access to a child when the child is alone and persons residing in a child foster care facility, to persons employed by or residing in a home approved under this section. The director shall, upon request, give guidance and consultation in the establishment and administration of the homes and programs for the homes.

5.  The director shall approve annually all such homes established and maintained under the provisions of this chapter. A home shall not be approved unless it complies with minimal rules and standards adopted by the director and has been inspected by the department of inspections and appeals.

6.  A juvenile detention home fund is created in the state treasury under the authority of the department. The fund shall consist of moneys deposited in the fund pursuant to sections 321.218A and 321A.32A. The moneys in the fund shall be used for the costs of the establishment, improvement, operation, and maintenance of county or multicounty juvenile detention homes in accordance with annual appropriations made by the general assembly from the fund for these purposes.

232.143  Regional group foster care budget targets.

1.  A statewide expenditure target for children in group foster care placements in a fiscal year, which placements are a charge upon or are paid for by the state, shall be established annually in an appropriation bill by the general assembly. The department and the judicial branch shall jointly develop a formula for allocating a portion of the statewide expenditure target established by the general assembly to each of the department's regions. The formula shall be based upon the region's proportion of the state population of children and of the statewide usage of group foster care in the previous five completed fiscal years and other indicators of need. The expenditure amount determined in accordance with the formula shall be the group foster care budget target for that region. A region may exceed its budget target for group foster care by not more than five percent in a fiscal year, provided the overall funding allocated by the department for all child welfare services in the region is not exceeded.

2.  For each of the department's regions, representatives appointed by the department and the juvenile court shall establish a plan for containing the expenditures for children placed in group foster care ordered by the court within the budget target allocated to that region pursuant to subsection 1. The plan shall include monthly targets and strategies for developing alternatives to group foster care placements in order to contain expenditures for child welfare services within the amount appropriated by the general assembly for that purpose. Each regional plan shall be established within sixty days of the date by which the group foster care budget target for the region is determined. To the extent possible, the department and the juvenile court shall coordinate the planning required under this subsection with planning for services paid under section 232.141, subsection 4. The department's regional administrator shall communicate regularly, as specified in the regional plan, with the juvenile courts within that region concerning the current status of the regional plan's implementation.

3.  State payment for group foster care placements shall be limited to those placements which are in accordance with the regional plans developed pursuant to subsection 2.

DIVISION VIII

RECORDS

232.147  Confidentiality of juvenile court records.

1.  Juvenile court records shall be confidential. They shall not be inspected and their contents shall not be disclosed except as provided in this section.

2.  Official juvenile court records in cases alleging delinquency, including complaints under section 232.28, shall be public records, subject to sealing under section 232.150. If the court has excluded the public from a hearing under division II of this chapter, the transcript of the proceedings shall not be deemed a public record and inspection and disclosure of the contents of the transcript shall not be permitted except pursuant to court order or unless otherwise provided in this chapter. Complaints under section 232.28 shall be released in accordance with section 915.25. Other official juvenile court records may be released under this section by a juvenile court officer.

3.  Official juvenile court records in all cases except those alleging delinquency may be inspected and their contents shall be disclosed to the following, and copies made available to parents at a cost commensurate with the fees of copy centers, without court order:

a.  The judge and professional court staff, including juvenile court officers.

b.  The child and the child's counsel.

c.  The child's parent, guardian or custodian, court- appointed special advocate, and guardian ad litem.

d.  The county attorney and the county attorney's assistants.

e.  An agency, association, facility or institution which has custody of the child, or is legally responsible for the care, treatment or supervision of the child.

f.  A court, court professional staff, and adult probation officers in connection with the preparation of a presentence report concerning a person who prior thereto had been the subject of a juvenile court proceeding.

g.  The child's foster parent or an individual providing preadoptive care to the child.

4.  Official juvenile court records enumerated in section 232.2, subsection 38, paragraph "e", relating to paternity, support, or the termination of parental rights, shall be disclosed, upon request, to the child support recovery unit without court order.

5.  Pursuant to court order official records may be inspected by and their contents may be disclosed to:

a.  A person conducting bona fide research for research purposes under whatever conditions the court may deem proper, provided that no personal identifying data shall be disclosed to such a person.

b.  Persons who have a direct interest in a proceeding or in the work of the court.

6.  Inspection of social records and disclosure of their contents shall not be permitted except pursuant to court order or unless otherwise provided in this subsection or chapter.

If an informal adjustment of a complaint is made pursuant to section 232.29, the intake officer shall disclose to the victim of the delinquent act, upon the request of the victim, the name and address of the child who committed the delinquent act.

7.  Social records prior to adjudication may be disclosed without court order to the superintendent or superintendent's designee of a school district, authorities in charge of an accredited nonpublic school, or any other state or local agency that is part of the juvenile justice system, in accordance with an interagency agreement established under section 280.25. The disclosure shall only include identifying information that is necessary to fulfill the purpose of the disclosure. The social records disclosed shall be used solely for the purpose of determining the programs and services appropriate to the needs of the child or the family of the child and shall not be disclosed for any other purpose unless otherwise provided by law.

8.  All juvenile court records shall be made available for inspection and their contents shall be disclosed to any party to the case and the party's counsel and to any trial or appellate court in connection with an appeal pursuant to division VI of this chapter.

9.  The clerk of the district court shall enter information from the juvenile record on the judgment docket and lien index, but only as necessary to record support judgments.

10.  The state agency designated to enforce support obligations may release information as necessary in order to meet statutory responsibilities.

11.  Release of official juvenile court records to a victim of a delinquent act is subject to the provisions of section 915.24, notwithstanding contrary provisions of this chapter.

232.148  Fingerprints--photographs.

1.  Except as provided in this section, a child shall not be fingerprinted or photographed by a criminal or juvenile justice agency after the child is taken into custody.

2.  Fingerprints of a child who has been taken into custody shall be taken and filed by a criminal or juvenile justice agency investigating the commission of a public offense other than a simple misdemeanor. In addition, photographs of a child who has been taken into custody may be taken and filed by a criminal or juvenile justice agency investigating the commission of a public offense other than a simple misdemeanor. The criminal or juvenile justice agency shall forward the fingerprints to the department of public safety for inclusion in the automated fingerprint identification system and may also retain a copy of the fingerprint card for comparison with latent fingerprints and the identification of repeat offenders.

3.  If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that latent fingerprints found during the investigation of the commission of a public offense are those of a particular child, fingerprints of the child may be taken for immediate comparison with the latent fingerprints regardless of the nature of the offense. If the comparison is negative the fingerprint card and other copies of the fingerprints taken shall be immediately destroyed. If the comparison is positive, the fingerprint card and other copies of the fingerprints taken shall be delivered to the division of criminal investigation of the department of public safety in the manner and on the forms prescribed by the commissioner of public safety within two working days after the fingerprints are taken. After notification by the child or the child's representative that the child has not had a delinquency petition filed against the child or has not entered into an informal adjustment agreement, the fingerprint card and copies of the fingerprints shall be immediately destroyed.

4.  Fingerprint and photograph files of children may be inspected by peace officers when necessary for the discharge of their official duties. The juvenile court may authorize other inspections of such files in individual cases upon a showing that inspection is necessary in the public interest.

5.  Fingerprints and photographs of a child shall be removed from the file and destroyed upon notification by the child's guardian ad litem or legal counsel to the department of public safety that either of the following situations apply:

a.  A petition alleging the child to be delinquent is not filed and the child has not entered into an informal adjustment, admitting involvement in a delinquent act alleged in the complaint.

b.  After a petition is filed, the petition is dismissed or the proceedings are suspended and the child has not entered into a consent decree and has not been adjudicated delinquent on the basis of a delinquent act other than one alleged in the petition in question, or the child has not been placed on youthful offender status.

232.149  Records of criminal or juvenile justice agencies.

1.  The taking of a child into custody under the provisions of section 232.19 shall not be considered an arrest.

2.  Records and files of a criminal or juvenile justice agency concerning a child involved in a delinquent act are public records, except that release of criminal history data, intelligence data, and law enforcement investigatory files is subject to the provisions of section 22.7 and chapter 692, and juvenile court social records, as defined in section 232.2, subsection 31, shall be deemed confidential criminal identification files under section 22.7, subsection 9. The records are subject to sealing under section 232.150 unless the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction over the child so that the child may be prosecuted as an adult for a public offense.

3.  Notwithstanding subsection 2, if a juvenile who has been placed in detention under section 232.22 escapes from the facility, the criminal or juvenile justice agency may release the name of the juvenile, the facts surrounding the escape, and the offense or alleged offense which resulted in the placement of the juvenile in the facility.

232.150  Sealing of records.

1.  Upon application of a person who was taken into custody for a delinquent act or was the subject of a complaint alleging delinquency or was the subject of a delinquency petition, or upon the court's own motion, the court, after hearing, shall order the records in the case including those specified in sections 232.147 and 232.149 sealed if the court finds all of the following:

a.  Two years have elapsed since the final discharge of the person or since the last official action in the person's case if there was no adjudication and disposition.

b.  The person has not been subsequently convicted of a felony or an aggravated or serious misdemeanor or adjudicated a delinquent child for an act which if committed by an adult would be a felony, an aggravated misdemeanor or a serious misdemeanor and no proceeding is pending seeking such conviction or adjudication.

c.  The person was not placed on youthful offender status, transferred back to district court after the youthful offender's eighteenth birthday, and sentenced for the offense which precipitated the youthful offender placement.

However, if the person was adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by an adult would be an aggravated misdemeanor or a felony, the court shall not order the records in the case sealed unless, upon application of the person or upon the court's own motion and after hearing, the court finds that paragraphs "a" and "b" apply and that the sealing is in the best interests of the person and the public.

2.  Reasonable notice of the hearing shall be given to the person who is the subject of the records named in the motion, the county attorney, and the agencies having custody of the records named in the application or motion.

3.  Notice and copies of a sealing order shall be sent to each agency or person having custody or the records named therein.

4.  On entry of a sealing order:

a.  All agencies and persons having custody of records which are named therein, shall send such records to the court issuing the order.

b.  All index references to sealed records shall be deleted.

5.  The sealed records shall no longer be deemed to exist as a matter of law, and the juvenile court and any other agency or person who received notice and a copy of the sealing order shall reply to an inquiry that no such records exist, except when such reply is made to an inquiry pursuant to subsection 6.

6.  Inspection of sealed records and disclosure of their contents thereafter may be permitted only pursuant to an order of the court upon application of the person who is the subject of such records except that the court in its discretion may permit reports to be inspected by or their contents to be disclosed for research purposes to a person conducting bona fide research under whatever conditions the court deems proper.

232.151  Criminal penalties.

Any person who knowingly discloses, receives, or makes use or permits the use of information derived directly or indirectly from the records concerning a child referred to in sections 232.147 to 232.150 except as provided by those sections shall be guilty of a serious misdemeanor.

232.152  Rules of juvenile procedure.

Proceedings under this chapter are subject to rules prescribed by the supreme court under section 602.4201.

232.153  Applicability of this chapter prior to its effective date.

1.  Except as provided in subsections 2 and 3 of this section, this chapter does not apply to juvenile court cases brought prior to July 1, 1979 or to acts committed prior to July 1, 1979 which would otherwise bring a child or a child's parent, guardian or custodian within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to this chapter.

2.  In a case pending on or commenced after July 1, 1979, involving acts committed prior to July 1, 1979, upon the request of any party and the approval of the court:

a.   Procedural provisions of this chapter shall apply insofar as they are justly applicable.

b.  The court may order a disposition of the case pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.

3.  Provisions of this chapter governing the termination, modification or vacation of a dispositional order shall apply to persons to whom a dispositional order has been issued for acts committed prior to July 1, 1979, except that the maximum length of the order and the severity of the disposition shall not be increased. The provisions of this chapter shall not affect the substantive or procedural validity of a judgment entered before July 1, 1979, regardless of the fact that appeal time has not run or that an appeal is pending.

DIVISION IX

INTERSTATE COMPACT ON PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN

232.158  Interstate compact on placement of children.

The interstate compact on the placement of children is hereby enacted into law and entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in form substantially as follows: 

ARTICLE I--PURPOSE AND POLICY 

It is the purpose and policy of the party states to co-operate with each other in the interstate placement of children to the end that:

a.  Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment and with persons or institutions having appropriate qualifications and facilities to provide a necessary and desirable degree and type of care.

b.  The appropriate authorities in a state where a child is to be placed may have full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the proposed placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applicable requirements for the protection of the child.

c.  The proper authorities of the state from which the placement is made may obtain the most complete information on the basis of which to evaluate a projected placement before it is made.

d.  Appropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care of children will be promoted. 

ARTICLE II--DEFINITIONS 

As used in this compact:

a.  "Child" means a person who, by reason of minority, is legally subject to parental, guardianship or similar control.

b.  "Sending agency" means a party state, officer or employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency or other entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another party state.

c.  "Receiving state" means the state to which a child is sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought, whether by public authorities or private persons or agencies, and whether for placement with state or local public authorities or for placement with private agencies or persons.

d.  "Placement" means the arrangement for the care of a child in a family free or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution, but not in an institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective, or epileptic, in an institution primarily educational in character, or in a hospital or other medical facility. 

ARTICLE III--CONDITIONS FOR PLACEMENT 

a.  A sending agency shall not send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state a child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency complies with every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing the placement of children in the receiving state.

b.  Prior to sending, bringing or causing any child to be sent or brought into a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state written notice of the intention to send, bring, or place the child in the receiving state. The notice shall contain:

1.  The name, date and place of birth of the child.

2.  The identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian.

3.  The name and address of the person, agency or institution to or with which the sending agency proposes to send, bring or place the child.

4.  A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and evidence of the authority pursuant to which the placement is proposed to be made.

c.  Any public officer or agency in a receiving state which is in receipt of a notice pursuant to paragraph "b" of this article may request of the sending agency, or any other appropriate officer or agency of or in the sending agency's state, and shall be entitled to receive therefrom, such supporting or additional information as it may deem necessary under the circumstances to carry out the purpose and policy of this compact.

d.  The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child. 

ARTICLE IV--PENALTY FOR ILLEGAL PLACEMENT 

The sending, bringing, or causing to be sent or brought into any receiving state of a child in violation of the terms of this compact shall constitute a violation of the laws respecting the placement of children of both the state in which the sending agency is located or from which it sends or brings the child and of the receiving state. Such violation may be punished or subjected to penalty in either jurisdiction in accordance with its laws. In addition to liability for any such punishment or penalty, any such violation shall constitute full and sufficient grounds for the suspension or revocation of any license, permit, or other legal authorization held by the sending agency which empowers or allows it to place, or care for children. 

ARTICLE V--RETENTION OF JURISDICTION 

a.  The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine all matters in relation to the custody, supervision, care, treatment and disposition of the child which it would have had if the child had remained in the sending agency's state, until the child is adopted, reaches majority, becomes self-supporting or is discharged with the concurrence of the appropriate authority in the receiving state. Such jurisdiction shall also include the power to effect or cause the return of the child or its transfer to another location and custody pursuant to law. The sending agency shall continue to have financial responsibility for support and maintenance of the child during the period of the placement. Nothing contained herein shall defeat a claim of jurisdiction by a receiving state sufficient to deal with an act of delinquency or crime committed therein.

b.  When the sending agency is a public agency, it may enter into an agreement with an authorized public or private agency in the receiving state providing for the performance of one or more services in respect of such case by the latter as agent for the sending agency.

c.  Nothing in this compact shall be construed to prevent a private charitable agency authorized to place children in the receiving state from performing services or acting as agent in that state for a private charitable agency of the sending state; nor to prevent the agency in the receiving state from discharging financial responsibility for the support and maintenance of a child who has been placed on behalf of the sending agency without relieving the responsibility set forth in paragraph "a" hereof. 

ARTICLE VI--INSTITUTIONAL CARE OF DELINQUENT CHILDREN 

A child adjudicated delinquent may be placed in an institution in another party jurisdiction pursuant to this compact but no such placement shall be made unless the child is given a court hearing on notice to the parent or guardian with opportunity to be heard, prior to the child being sent to such other party jurisdiction for institutional care and the court finds that:

a.  Equivalent facilities for the child are not available in the sending agency's jurisdiction; and

b.  Institutional care in the other jurisdiction is in the best interest of the child and will not produce undue hardship. 

ARTICLE VII--COMPACT ADMINISTRATOR 

The executive head of each jurisdiction party to this compact shall designate an officer who shall be general co-ordinator of activities under this compact in the officer's jurisdiction and who, acting jointly with like officers of other party jurisdictions, shall have power to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this compact. 

ARTICLE VIII--LIMITATIONS 

This compact shall not apply to:

a.  The sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state by the child's parent, stepparent, grandparent, adult brother or sister, adult uncle or aunt, or guardian and leaving the child with any such relative or nonagency guardian in the receiving state.

b.  Any placement, sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state pursuant to any other interstate compact to which both the state from which the child is sent or brought and the receiving state are party, or to any other agreement between said states which has the force of law. 

ARTICLE IX--ENACTMENT AND WITHDRAWAL 

This compact shall be open to joinder by any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the consent of Congress, the government of Canada or any province thereof. It shall become effective with respect to any such jurisdiction when such jurisdiction has enacted the same into law. Withdrawal from this compact shall be by the enactment of a statute repealing the same, but shall not take effect until two years after the effective date of such statute and until written notice of the withdrawal has been given by the withdrawing state to the governor of each other party jurisdiction. Withdrawal of a party state shall not affect the rights, duties and obligations under this compact of any sending agency therein with respect to a placement made prior to the effective date of withdrawal. 

ARTICLE X--CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY 

The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

232.159  Financial responsibility.

Financial responsibility for any child placed pursuant to the provisions of the interstate compact on the placement of children shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of article V thereof in the first instance. However, in the event of partial or complete default of performance thereunder, the provisions of chapters 252 and 252A, fixing responsibility for the support of children also may be invoked.

232.160  Department of human services as public authority.

The "appropriate public authorities" as used in article III of the interstate compact on the placement of children shall, with reference to this state, mean the state department of human services and said department shall receive and act with reference to notices required by said article III.

232.161  Department as authority in receiving state.

As used in paragraph "a" of article V of the interstate compact on the placement of children, the phrase "appropriate authority in the receiving state" with reference to this state shall mean the state department of human services.

232.162  Authority to enter agreements.

The officers and agencies of this state and its subdivisions having authority to place children may enter into agreements with appropriate officers or agencies of or in other party states pursuant to paragraph "b" of article V of the interstate compact on the placement of children. Any such agreement which contains a financial commitment or imposes a financial obligation on this state or a subdivision or agency of this state shall not be binding unless it has the approval in writing of the administrator of child and family services in the case of the state and the county general assistance director in the case of a subdivision of the state.

232.163  Visitation, inspection, or supervision.

1.  Any requirements for visitation, inspection, or supervision of children, homes, institutions, or other agencies in another party state which may apply under the provisions of this chapter shall be deemed to be met if performed pursuant to an agreement entered into by appropriate officers or agencies of this state or a subdivision of this state as contemplated by paragraph "b" of article V of the interstate compact on the placement of children.

2.  If a child is placed outside the residency state of the child's parent, the sending agency shall provide for a designee to visit the child at least once every twelve months and to submit a written report to the court concerning the child and the visit.

232.164  Court authority to place child in another state.

Any court having jurisdiction to place delinquent children may place such a child in an institution of or in another state pursuant to article VI of the interstate compact on the placement of children and shall retain jurisdiction as provided in article V thereof.

232.165  Executive head.

As used in article VII of the interstate compact on the placement of children, the term "executive head" means the governor. The governor is hereby authorized to appoint a compact administrator in accordance with the terms of said article VII.

232.166  Statutes not affected.

Nothing contained in sections 232.158 to 232.165 shall be deemed to affect or modify the other provisions of this chapter or of chapter 600.

232.167  Penalty.

A person or agency which violates or aids and abets in the violation of any of the provisions of sections 232.158 through 232.166 commits a fraudulent practice.

232.168  Attorney general to enforce.

The attorney general may, on the attorney general's own initiative, institute any criminal and civil actions and proceedings under this division, at whatever stage of placement necessary, to enforce the interstate compact on the placement of children, including, but not limited to, seeking enforcement of the provisions of the compact through the courts of a party state. The department of human services shall cooperate with the attorney general and shall refer any placement or proposed placement to the attorney general which may require enforcement measures.

DIVISION X

INTERSTATE COMPACT ON JUVENILES

232.171  Interstate juvenile compacts.

The state of Iowa through its courts and agencies is hereby authorized to enter into interstate compacts on juveniles in behalf of this state with any other contracting state which legally joins therein in substantially the following form.

The contracting states solemnly agree: 

ARTICLE I--FINDINGS AND PURPOSES 

That juveniles who are not under proper supervision and control, or who have absconded, escaped or run away, are likely to endanger their own health, morals and welfare, and the health, morals and welfare of others. The co-operation of the states party to this compact is therefore necessary to provide for the welfare and protection of juveniles and of the public with respect to

1.  Co-operative supervision of delinquent juveniles on probation or parole;

2.  The return, from one state to another, of delinquent juveniles who have escaped or absconded;

3.  The return, from one state to another, of nondelinquent juveniles who have run away from home; and

4.  Additional measures for the protection of juveniles and of the public, which any two or more of the party states may find desirable to undertake co-operatively. In carrying out the provisions of this compact the party states shall be guided by the noncriminal, reformative and protective policies which guide their laws concerning delinquent, neglected or dependent juveniles generally. It shall be the policy of the states party to this compact to co-operate and observe their respective responsibilities for the prompt return and acceptance of juveniles and delinquent juveniles who become subject to the provisions of this compact. The provisions of this compact shall be reasonably and liberally construed to accomplish the foregoing purposes. 

ARTICLE II--EXISTING RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 

That all remedies and procedures provided by this compact shall be in addition to and not in substitution for other rights, remedies and procedures, and shall not be in derogation of parental rights and responsibilities. 

ARTICLE III--DEFINITIONS 

That, for the purposes of this compact, "delinquent juvenile" means any juvenile who has been adjudged delinquent and who, at the time the provisions of this compact are invoked, is still subject to the jurisdiction of the court that has made such adjudication or to the jurisdiction or supervision of an agency or institution pursuant to an order of such court; "probation or parole" means any kind of conditional release of juveniles authorized under the laws of the states party hereto; "court" means any court having jurisdiction over delinquent, neglected or dependent children; "state" means any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and "residence" or any variant thereof means a place at which a home or regular place of abode is maintained. 

ARTICLE IV--RETURN OF RUNAWAYS 

a.  That the parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to legal custody of a juvenile who has not been adjudged delinquent but who has run away without the consent of such parent, guardian, person or agency may petition the appropriate court in the demanding state for the issuance of a requisition for the juvenile's return. The petition shall state the name and age of the juvenile, the name of the petitioner and the basis of entitlement to the juvenile's custody, the circumstances of the juvenile's running away, the juvenile's location if known at the time application is made, and such other facts as may tend to show that the juvenile who has run away is endangering the juvenile's own welfare or the welfare of others and is not an emancipated minor. The petition shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicate, and shall be accompanied by two certified copies of the document or documents on which the petitioner's entitlement to the juvenile's custody is based, such as birth certificates, letters of guardianship, or custody decrees. Such further affidavits and other documents as may be deemed proper may be submitted with such petition. The judge of the court to which this application is made may hold a hearing thereon to determine whether for the purposes of this compact the petitioner is entitled to the legal custody of the juvenile, whether or not it appears that the juvenile has in fact run away without consent, whether or not the juvenile is an emancipated minor, and whether or not it is in the best interest of the juvenile to compel the juvenile's return to the state. If the judge determines, either with or without a hearing, that the juvenile should be returned, the judge shall present to the appropriate court or to the executive authority of the state where the juvenile is alleged to be located a written requisition for the return of such juvenile. Such requisition shall set forth the name and age of the juvenile, the determination of the court that the juvenile has run away without the consent of a parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to the juvenile's legal custody, and that it is in the best interest and for the protection of such juvenile that the juvenile be returned. In the event that a proceeding for the adjudication of the juvenile as a delinquent, neglected or dependent juvenile is pending in the court at the time when such juvenile runs away, the court may issue a requisition for the return of such juvenile upon its own motion, regardless of the consent of the parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to legal custody, reciting therein the nature and circumstances of the pending proceeding. The requisition shall in every case be executed in duplicate and shall be signed by the judge. One copy of the requisition shall be filed with the compact administrator of the demanding state, there to remain on file subject to the provisions of law governing records of such court. Upon the receipt of a requisition demanding the return of a juvenile who has run away, the court or the executive authority to whom the requisition is addressed shall issue an order to any peace officer or other appropriate person directing the officer or person to take into custody and detain such juvenile. Such detention order must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance hereunder. No juvenile detained upon such order shall be delivered over to the officer whom the court demanding the juvenile shall have appointed to receive the juvenile, unless the juvenile shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court in the state, who shall inform the juvenile of the demand made for the juvenile's return, and who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for the juvenile. If the judge of such court shall find that the requisition is in order, the judge shall deliver such juvenile over to the officer whom the court demanding the juvenile shall have appointed to receive the juvenile. The judge, however, may fix a reasonable time to be allowed for the purpose of testing the legality of the proceeding.

Upon reasonable information that a person is a juvenile who has run away from another state party to this compact without the consent of a parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to the juvenile's legal custody, such juvenile may be taken into custody without a requisition and brought forthwith before a judge of the appropriate court who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for such juvenile and who shall determine after a hearing whether sufficient cause exists to hold the person, subject to the order of the court, for the person's own protection and welfare, for such a time not exceeding ninety days as will enable the person's return to another state party to this compact pursuant to a requisition for the person's return from a court of that state. If, at the time when a state seeks the return of a juvenile who has run away, there is pending in the state wherein the juvenile is found any criminal charge, or any proceeding to have the juvenile adjudicated a delinquent juvenile for an act committed in such state, or if the juvenile is suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense or an act of juvenile delinquency, the juvenile shall not be returned without the consent of such state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment, detention or supervision for such offense or juvenile delinquency. The duly accredited officers of any state party to this compact, upon the establishment of their authority and the identity of the juvenile being returned, shall be permitted to transport such juvenile through any and all states party to this compact, without interference. Upon the juvenile's return to the state from which the juvenile ran away, the juvenile shall be subject to such further proceedings as may be appropriate under the laws of that state.

b.  That the state to which a juvenile is returned under this Article shall be responsible for payment of the transportation costs of such return.

c.  That "juvenile" as used in this Article means any person who is a minor under the law of the state of residence of the parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to the legal custody of such minor. 

ARTICLE V--RETURN OF ESCAPEES AND ABSCONDERS 

a.  That the appropriate person or authority from whose probation or parole supervision a delinquent juvenile has absconded or from whose institutional custody the delinquent juvenile has escaped shall present to the appropriate court or to the executive authority of the state where the delinquent juvenile is alleged to be located a written requisition for the return of such delinquent juvenile. Such requisition shall state the name and age of the delinquent juvenile, the particulars of the juvenile's adjudication as a delinquent juvenile, the circumstances of the breach of the terms of the juvenile's probation or parole or of the juvenile's escape from an institution or agency vested with the juvenile's legal custody or supervision, and the location of such delinquent juvenile, if known, at the time the requisition is made. The requisition shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicate, and shall be accompanied by two certified copies of the judgment, formal adjudication, or order of commitment which subjects such delinquent juvenile to probation or parole or to the legal custody of the institution or agency concerned. Such further affidavits and other documents as may be deemed proper may be submitted with such requisition. One copy of the requisition shall be filed with the compact administrator of the demanding state, there to remain on file subject to the provisions of law governing records of the appropriate court. Upon the receipt of a requisition demanding the return of a delinquent juvenile who has absconded or escaped, the court or the executive authority to whom the requisition is addressed shall issue an order to any peace officer or other appropriate person directing the officer or person to take into custody and detain such delinquent juvenile. Such detention order must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance hereunder. No delinquent juvenile detained upon such order shall be delivered over to the officer whom the appropriate person or authority demanding the juvenile shall have appointed to receive the juvenile, unless the juvenile shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of an appropriate court in the state, who shall inform the juvenile of the demand made for the juvenile's return and who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for the juvenile. If the judge of such court shall find that the requisition is in order, the judge shall deliver such delinquent juvenile over to the officer whom the appropriate person or authority demanding the juvenile shall have appointed to receive the juvenile. The judge, however, may fix a reasonable time to be allowed for the purpose of testing the legality of the proceeding.

Upon reasonable information that a person is a delinquent juvenile who has absconded while on probation or parole, or escaped from an institution or agency vested with the person's legal custody or supervision in any state party to this compact, such person may be taken into custody in any other state party to this compact without a requisition. But in such event, the person must be taken forthwith before a judge of the appropriate court, who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for such person and who shall determine, after a hearing, whether sufficient cause exists to hold the person subject to the order of the court for such a time, not exceeding ninety days, as will enable the person's detention under a detention order issued on a requisition pursuant to this Article. If, at the time when a state seeks the return of a delinquent juvenile who has either absconded while on probation or parole or escaped from an institution or agency vested with the juvenile's legal custody or supervision, there is pending in the state wherein the juvenile is detained any criminal charge or any proceeding to have the juvenile adjudicated a delinquent juvenile for an act committed in such state, or if the juvenile is suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense or an act of juvenile delinquency, the juvenile shall not be returned without the consent of such state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment, detention or supervision for such offense or juvenile delinquency. The duly accredited officers of any state party to this compact, upon the establishment of their authority and the identity of the delinquent juvenile being returned, shall be permitted to transport such delinquent juvenile through any and all states party to this compact, without interference. Upon the juvenile's return to the state from which the juvenile escaped or absconded, the delinquent juvenile shall be subject to such further proceedings as may be appropriate under the laws of that state.

b.  That the state to which a delinquent juvenile is returned under this Article shall be responsible for payment of the transportation costs of such return. 

ARTICLE VI--VOLUNTARY RETURN PROCEDURE 

That any delinquent juvenile who has absconded while on probation or parole, or escaped from an institution or agency vested with the juvenile's legal custody or supervision in any state party to this compact, and any juvenile who has run away from any state party to this compact, who is taken into custody without a requisition in another state party to this compact under the provisions of Article IV "a" or of Article V "a", may consent to the juvenile's immediate return to the state from which the juvenile absconded, escaped or ran away. Such consent shall be given by the juvenile or delinquent juvenile and the juvenile's counsel or guardian ad litem, if any, by executing or subscribing a writing, in the presence of a judge of the appropriate court, which states that the juvenile or delinquent juvenile and the juvenile's counsel or guardian ad litem, if any, consent to the juvenile's return to the demanding state. Before such consent shall be executed or subscribed, however, the judge, in the presence of counsel or guardian ad litem, if any, shall inform the juvenile or delinquent juvenile of the juvenile's rights under this compact. When the consent has been duly executed, it shall be forwarded to and filed with the compact administrator of the state in which the court is located and the judge shall direct the officer having the juvenile or delinquent juvenile in custody to deliver the juvenile to the duly accredited officer or officers of the state demanding the juvenile's return, and shall cause to be delivered to such officer or officers a copy of the consent. The court may, however, upon the request of the state to which the juvenile or delinquent juvenile is being returned, order the juvenile to return unaccompanied to such state and shall provide the juvenile with a copy of such court order; in such event a copy of the consent shall be forwarded to the compact administrator of the state to which said juvenile or delinquent juvenile is ordered to return. 

ARTICLE VII--CO-OPERATIVE SUPERVISION OF PROBATIONERS AND PAROLEES 

a.  That the duly constituted judicial and administrative authorities of a state party to this compact (herein called "sending state") may permit any delinquent juvenile within such state, placed on probation or parole, to reside in any other state party to this compact (herein called "receiving state") while on probation or parole, and the receiving state shall accept such delinquent juvenile, if the parent, guardian or person entitled to the legal custody of such delinquent juvenile is residing or undertakes to reside within the receiving state. Before granting such permission, opportunity shall be given to the receiving state to make such investigations as it deems necessary. The authorities of the sending state shall send to the authorities of the receiving state copies of pertinent court orders, social case studies and all other available information which may be of value to and assist the receiving state in supervising a probationer or parolee under this compact. A receiving state, in its discretion, may agree to accept supervision of a probationer or parolee in cases where the parent, guardian or person entitled to the legal custody of the delinquent juvenile is not a resident of the receiving state, and if so accepted the sending state may transfer supervision accordingly.

b.  That each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation and of supervision over any such delinquent juvenile and in the exercise of those duties will be governed by the same standards of visitation and supervision that prevail for its own delinquent juveniles released on probation or parole.

c.  That, after consultation between the appropriate authorities of the sending state and of the receiving state as to the desirability and necessity of returning such a delinquent juvenile, the duly accredited officers of a sending state may enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any such delinquent juvenile on probation or parole. For that purpose, no formalities will be required, other than establishing the authority of the officer and the identity of the delinquent juvenile to be retaken and returned. The decision of the sending state to retake a delinquent juvenile on probation or parole shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state, but if, at the time the sending state seeks to retake a delinquent juvenile on probation or parole, there is pending against the juvenile within the receiving state any criminal charge or any proceeding to have the juvenile adjudicated a delinquent juvenile for any act committed in such state, or if the juvenile is suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense or an act of juvenile delinquency, the juvenile shall not be returned without the consent of the receiving state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment, detention or supervision for such offense or juvenile delinquency. The duly accredited officers of the sending state shall be permitted to transport delinquent juveniles being so returned through any and all states party to this compact, without interference.

d.  That the sending state shall be responsible under this Article for paying the costs of transporting any delinquent juvenile to the receiving state or of returning any delinquent juvenile to the sending state. 

ARTICLE VIII--RESPONSIBILITY FOR COSTS 

a.  That the provisions of Articles IV "b", V "b" and VII "d" of this compact shall not be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.

b.  That nothing in this compact shall be construed to prevent any party state or subdivision thereof from asserting any right against any person, agency or other entity in regard to costs for which such party state or subdivision thereof may be responsible pursuant to Articles IV "b", V "b" or VII "d" of this compact. 

ARTICLE IX--DETENTION PRACTICES 

That, to every extent possible, it shall be the policy of states party to this compact that no juvenile or delinquent juvenile shall be placed or detained in any prison, jail or lockup nor be detained or transported in association with criminal, vicious or dissolute persons. 

ARTICLE X--SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS 

That the duly constituted administrative authorities of a state party to this compact may enter into supplementary agreements with any other state or states party hereto for the co-operative care, treatment and rehabilitation of delinquent juveniles whenever they shall find that such agreements will improve the facilities or programs available for such care, treatment and rehabilitation. Such care, treatment and rehabilitation may be provided in an institution located within any state entering into such supplementary agreement. Such supplementary agreements shall:

1.  Provide the rates to be paid for the care, treatment and custody of such delinquent juveniles, taking into consideration the character of facilities, services and subsistence furnished;

2.  Provide that the delinquent juvenile shall be given a court hearing prior to the juvenile being sent to another state for care, treatment and custody;

3.  Provide that the state receiving such a delinquent juvenile in one of its institutions shall act solely as agent for the state sending such delinquent juvenile;

4.  Provide that the sending state shall at all times retain jurisdiction over delinquent juveniles sent to an institution in another state;

5.  Provide for reasonable inspection of such institutions by the sending state;

6.  Provide that the consent of the parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to the legal custody of said delinquent juvenile shall be secured prior to the juvenile being sent to another state; and

7.  Make provision for such other matters and details as shall be necessary to protect the rights and equities of such delinquent juveniles and of the co-operating states. 

ARTICLE XI--ACCEPTANCE OF FEDERAL AND OTHER AID 

a.  This Article shall provide additional remedies, and shall be binding only as among and between those party states which specifically execute the same.

b.  All provisions and procedures of Articles V and VI of the Interstate Compact on Juveniles shall be construed to apply to any juvenile charged with being a delinquent by reason of a violation of any criminal law. Any juvenile charged with being a delinquent by reason of violating any criminal law shall be returned to the requesting state upon a requisition to the state where the juvenile may be found. A petition in such case shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction in the requesting state where the violation of criminal law is alleged to have been committed. The petition may be filed regardless of whether the juvenile has left the state before or after the filing of the petition. The requisition described in Article V of the compact shall be forwarded by the judge of the court in which the petition has been filed. 

OUT-OF-STATE CONFINEMENT AMENDMENT 

a.  Whenever the duly constituted judicial or administrative authorities in a sending state shall determine that confinement of a probationer or reconfinement of a parolee is necessary or desirable, said officials may direct that the confinement or reconfinement be in an appropriate institution for delinquent juveniles within the territory of the receiving state, such receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the sending state.

b.  Escapees and absconders who would otherwise be returned pursuant to Article V of the compact may be confined or reconfined in the receiving state pursuant to this amendment. In any such case the information and allegations required to be made and furnished in a requisition pursuant to such Article shall be made and furnished, but in place of the demand pursuant to Article V, the sending state shall request confinement or reconfinement in the receiving state. Whenever applicable, detention orders as provided in Article V may be employed pursuant to this paragraph preliminary to disposition of the escapee or absconder.

c.  The confinement or reconfinement of a parolee, probationer, escapee, or absconder pursuant to this amendment shall require the concurrence of the appropriate judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving state.

d.  As used in this amendment:  (1) "Sending state" means sending state as that term is used in Article VII of the compact or the state from which a delinquent juvenile has escaped or absconded within the meaning of Article V of the compact; (2) "receiving state" means any state, other than the sending state, in which a parolee, probationer, escapee, or absconder may be found, provided that said state is a party to this amendment.

e.  Every state which adopts this amendment shall designate at least one of its institutions for delinquent juveniles as a "Compact Institution" and shall confine persons therein as provided in paragraph "a" hereof unless the sending and receiving state in question shall make specific contractual arrangements to the contrary. All states party to this amendment shall have access to "Compact Institutions" at all reasonable hours for the purpose of inspecting the facilities thereof and for the purpose of visiting such of said state's delinquents as may be confined in the institution.

f.  Persons confined in "Compact Institutions" pursuant to the terms of this compact shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at any time be removed from said "Compact Institution" for transfer to an appropriate institution within the sending state, for return to probation or parole, for discharge or for any purpose permitted by the laws of the sending state.

g.  All persons who may be confined in a "Compact Institution" pursuant to the provisions of this amendment shall be treated in a reasonable and humane manner. The fact of confinement or reconfinement in a receiving state shall not deprive any person so confined or reconfined of any rights which said person would have had if confined or reconfined in an appropriate institution of the sending state; nor shall any agreement to submit to confinement or reconfinement pursuant to the terms of this amendment be construed as a waiver of any rights which the delinquent would have had if the delinquent had been confined or reconfined in any appropriate institution of the sending state except that the hearing or hearings, if any, to which a parolee, probationer, escapee, or absconder may be entitled (prior to confinement or reconfinement) by the laws of the sending state may be had before the appropriate judicial or administrative officers of the receiving state. In this event, said judicial and administrative officers shall act as agents of the sending state after consultation with appropriate officers of the sending state.

h.  Any receiving state incurring costs or other expenses under this amendment shall be reimbursed in the amount of such costs or other expenses by the sending state unless the states concerned shall specifically otherwise agree. Any two or more states party to this amendment may enter into supplementary agreements determining a different allocation of costs as among themselves.

i.  This amendment shall take initial effect when entered into by any two or more states party to the compact and shall be effective as to those states which have specifically enacted this amendment. Rules and regulations necessary to effectuate the terms of this amendment may be promulgated by the appropriate officers of those states which have enacted this amendment.

That any state party to this compact may accept any and all donations, gifts and grants of money, equipment and services from the federal or any local government, or any agency thereof and from any person, firm or corporation, for any of the purposes and functions of this compact, and may receive and utilize the same subject to the terms, conditions and regulations governing such donations, gifts and grants. 

ARTICLE XII--COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS 

That the governor of each state party to this compact shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this compact. 

ARTICLE XIII--EXECUTION OF COMPACT 

That this compact shall become operative immediately upon its execution by any state as between it and any other state or states so executing. When executed it shall have the full force and effect of law within such state, the form of execution to be in accordance with the laws of the executing state. 

ARTICLE XIV--RENUNCIATION 

That this compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each executing state until renounced by it. Renunciation of this compact shall be by the same authority which executed it, by sending six months' notice in writing of its intention to withdraw from the compact to the other states party hereto. The duties and obligations of a renouncing state under Article VII hereof shall continue as to parolees and probationers residing therein at the time of withdrawal until retaken or finally discharged. Supplementary agreements entered into under Article X hereof shall be subject to renunciation as provided by such supplementary agreements, and shall not be subject to the six months' renunciation notice of the present Article. 

ARTICLE XV--RENDITION AMENDMENT 

232.172  Confinement of delinquent juvenile.

In addition to any institution in which the authorities of this state may otherwise confine or order the confinement of a delinquent juvenile, such authorities may, pursuant to the out-of-state confinement amendment to the interstate compact on juveniles, confine or order the confinement of a delinquent juvenile in a compact institution within another party state.

DIVISION XI

VOLUNTARY FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT

232.175  Placement oversight.

Placement oversight shall be provided pursuant to this division when the parent, guardian, or custodian of a child with mental retardation or other developmental disability requests placement of the child in foster family care for a period of more than thirty days. The oversight shall be provided through review of the placement every six months by the department's foster care review committees or by a local citizen foster care review board. Court oversight shall be provided prior to the initial placement and at periodic intervals which shall not exceed twelve months. It is the purpose and policy of this division to assure the existence of oversight safeguards as required by the federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16), 627(a)(2)(B), and 675(1),(5), while maintaining parental decision-making authority.

232.176  Jurisdiction.

The court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over voluntary placement proceedings.

232.177  Venue.

Venue for voluntary placement proceedings shall be determined in accordance with section 232.62.

232.178  Petition.

1.  For a placement initiated on or after July 1, 1992, the department shall file a petition to initiate a voluntary placement proceeding prior to the child's placement in accordance with criteria established pursuant to the federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 627(a). For a placement initiated before July 1, 1992, the department shall file a petition to approve placement on or before September 1, 1992.

2.  The petition and subsequent court documents shall be entitled "In the interests of . . . . . , a child".

3.  The petition shall state the names and residence of the child and the child's living parents, guardian, custodian, and guardian ad litem, if any, and the age of the child.

4.  The petition shall describe the child's emotional, physical, or intellectual disability which requires care and treatment; the reasonable efforts to maintain the child in the child's home; the department's request to the family of a child with mental retardation, other developmental disability, or organic mental illness to determine if any services or support provided to the family will enable the family to continue to care for the child in the child's home; and the reason the child's parent, guardian, or custodian has requested a foster family care placement. The petition shall also describe the commitment of the parent, guardian, or custodian in fulfilling the responsibilities defined in the case permanency plan and how the placement will serve the child's best interests.

232.179  Appointment of counsel and guardian ad litem.

Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the child unless the court determines that the child already has a guardian ad litem who represents the child's best interests. If the child's parent, guardian, or custodian desires counsel but cannot pay the counsel's expenses, the court may appoint counsel.

232.180  Duties of county attorney.

Upon the filing of a petition and the request of the department, the county attorney shall represent the state in all adversary proceedings arising under this division and shall present evidence in support of the petition as provided under section 232.90.

232.181  Social history report.

Upon the filing of a petition, the department shall submit a social history report regarding the child and the child's family. The report shall include a description of the child's disability and resultant functional limitations, the case permanency plan, a description of the proposed foster care placement, and a description of family participation in developing the child's case permanency plan and the commitment of the parent, guardian, or custodian in fulfilling the responsibilities defined in the plan.

232.182  Initial determination.

1.  Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall fix a time for an initial determination hearing and give notice of the hearing to the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, counsel or guardian ad litem, and the department.

2.  A parent who does not have custody of the child may petition the court to be made a party to proceedings under this division.

3.  An initial determination hearing is open to the public unless the court, on the motion of any of the parties or upon the court's own motion, excludes the public. The court shall exclude the public from a hearing only if the court determines that the possibility of damage or harm to the child outweighs the public's interest in having an open hearing. Upon closing the hearing to the public, the court may admit those persons who have direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.

4.  The hearing shall be informal and all relevant and material evidence shall be admitted.

5.  After the hearing is concluded, the court shall make and file written findings as to whether reasonable efforts, as defined in section 232.102, subsection 10, have been made and whether the voluntary foster family care placement is in the child's best interests. The court shall order foster family care placement in the child's best interests if the court finds that all of the following conditions exist:

a.  The child has an emotional, physical, or intellectual disability which requires care and treatment.

b.  The child's parent, guardian, or custodian has demonstrated a willingness or ability to fulfill the responsibilities defined in the case permanency plan.

c.  Reasonable efforts have been made and the placement is in the child's best interests.

d.  A determination that services or support provided to the family of a child with mental retardation, other developmental disability, or organic mental illness will not enable the family to continue to care for the child in the child's home.

If the court finds that reasonable efforts have not been made and that services or support are available to prevent the placement, the court may order the services or support to be provided to the child and the child's family. If the court finds that the foster care placement is necessary and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian has not demonstrated a commitment to fulfill the responsibilities defined in the child's case permanency plan, the court shall cause a child in need of assistance petition to be filed.

5A.  If the court orders placement of the child into foster care, the court or the department shall establish a support obligation for the costs of the placement pursuant to section 234.39.

6.  The hearing may be waived and the court may issue the findings and order required under subsection 5 on the basis of the department's written report if all parties agree to the hearing's waiver and the department's written report.

232.183  Dispositional hearing.

1.  Following an entry of an initial determination order pursuant to section 232.182, the court shall hold a dispositional hearing in order to determine the future status of the child based on the child's best interests. Notice of the hearing shall be given to the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, and the department.

2.  The dispositional hearing shall be held within twelve months of the date the child was placed in foster care.

3.  A dispositional hearing is open to the public unless the court, on the motion of any of the parties or upon the court's own motion, excludes the public. The court shall exclude the public from a hearing if the court determines that the possibility of damage or harm to the child outweighs the public's interest in having an open hearing. Upon closing the hearing to the public, the court may admit those persons who have direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.

4.  The hearing shall be informal and all relevant and material evidence shall be admitted.

5.  Following the hearing, the court shall issue a dispositional order. The dispositional orders which the court may enter, subject to its continuing jurisdiction, are as follows:

a.  An order that the child's voluntary placement shall be terminated and the child returned to the child's home and provided with available services and support needed for the child to remain in the home.

b.  An order that the child's voluntary placement may continue if the department and the child's parent or guardian continue to agree to the voluntary placement.

c.  If the court finds that the child's parent, guardian, or custodian has failed to fulfill responsibilities outlined in the case permanency plan, an order that the child remain in foster care and that the county attorney or department file, within three days, a petition alleging the child to be a child in need of assistance.

6.  With respect to each child whose placement was approved pursuant to subsection 5, the court shall continue to hold periodic dispositional hearings. The hearings shall not be waived or continued beyond twelve months following the last dispositional hearing. After a dispositional hearing, the court shall enter one of the dispositional orders authorized under subsection 5.

7.  A dispositional hearing is not required if the court has approved the local citizen foster care review board review procedure, and all parties agree. This provision does not eliminate the initial judicial determination required under section 232.182.

DIVISION XII

JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM

This should be repealed - it takes all the taxpayer money not spent at the end of the year, and puts it in a pot for a few community activists to dream up creative "services". I think it ought to be returned to the general fund. Of course I've heard how unethical bureaucrats would rather waste it than return it, but if you stop aiming for the right target, you are sure to miss it.

232.188  Decategorization of child welfare funding.

1.  Decategorization of child welfare funding is intended to establish a system of delivering human services based upon client needs to replace a system based upon a multitude of categorical programs and funding sources, each with different service definitions and eligibility requirements. The purposes of decategorization include but are not limited to redirecting child welfare funding to services which are more preventive, family-centered, and community-based in order to reduce use of restrictive approaches which rely upon institutional, out-of-home, and out-of-community services.

2.  In partnership with an interested county or group of counties which has demonstrated the commitment and involvement of the affected county department of human services, juvenile court system, and board of supervisors, the department shall develop agreements providing for the decategorization of specific state and state-federal funding categories into a child welfare funding pool for that county or group of counties. A decategorization agreement shall require the decategorization program to be implemented by a decategorization governance board. The decategorization governance board shall develop specific, quantifiable short-term and long-term plans for enhancing the county's or group of counties' family-centered and community-based services and reducing reliance upon out-of-community care. The affected service systems shall include child welfare and juvenile justice systems. A decategorization agreement may vary depending upon the approaches selected by the county or group of counties which shall be detailed in an annual child welfare services plan developed by the decategorization governance board. A decategorization governance board shall involve community representatives and county organizations in the development of the plan.

3.  The child welfare funding pool shall be used by the county or group of counties to provide more flexible, individualized, family-centered, preventive, community-based, comprehensive, and coordinated service systems for children and families served in that area. The decategorization of the funding shall not limit the legal rights of those children and families to services, but shall provide more flexibility to the partnership county or counties in responding to individual and family needs.

4.  In a decategorization agreement, the department and the county's or group of counties' decategorization governance board shall agree on all of the following items:  the governance relationship between the department and the decategorization governance board; the respective areas of autonomy of the department and the board; the budgeting structure for the decategorization; and a method for resolving disputes between the department and the board. The decategorization agreement shall require the department and the decategorization governance board to agree upon a budget within sixty days of the date by which the regional group foster care budget targets are determined under section 232.143 for the fiscal year to which the budget applies. The budget may later be modified to reflect new or changed circumstances.

5.  The state shall provide incentives for a county or counties to participate in a decategorization agreement while maintaining an expectation that the service outcomes for children and families can be improved by the funding flexibility, and the redeployment of funding currently available for services within the system. Moneys in the child welfare funding pool established for a county or group of counties participating in a decategorization agreement which remain unobligated or unexpended at the end of a fiscal year shall remain available to the county or group of counties during the succeeding fiscal year to finance other child welfare service enhancements.

6.  Initially the department shall work with the five counties previously authorized under law to enter into decategorization agreements with the state. At a minimum, any of those counties may elect to use funding for foster care, family-centered services, subsidized adoption, child care, local purchase of service, state juvenile institution care, juvenile detention, department direct services, and court-ordered services for juveniles in the child welfare fund established for that county.

7.  The annual child welfare services plan developed by a decategorization governance board pursuant to subsection 2 shall be submitted to the department and the Iowa empowerment board. In addition, the decategorization governance board shall submit an annual progress report to the department and the Iowa empowerment board which summarizes the progress made toward attaining the objectives contained in the plan. The progress report shall serve as an opportunity for information sharing and feedback.

8.  A decategorization governance board shall coordinate the board's planning and budgeting activities with the community empowerment area board for the community empowerment area within which the decategorization county is located.

232.189  Reasonable efforts administrative requirements.

Based upon a model reasonable efforts family court initiative, the director of human services and the chief justice of the supreme court or their designees shall jointly establish and implement a statewide protocol for reasonable efforts, as defined in section 232.102. In addition, the director and the chief justice shall design and implement a system for judicial and departmental reasonable efforts education for deployment throughout the state. The system for reasonable efforts education shall be developed in a manner which addresses the particular needs of rural areas and shall include but is not limited to all of the following topics:

1.  Regular training concerning mental or emotional disorders which may afflict children and the impact children with such disorders have upon their families.

2.  The duties of judicial and departmental employees associated with placing a child removed from the child's home into a permanent home and the urgency of the placement for the child.

3.  The essential elements, including writing techniques, in developing effective permanency plans.

4.  The essential elements of gathering evidence sufficient for the evidentiary standards required for judicial orders under this chapter.

232.190  Community grant fund--future repeal.

1.  A community grant fund is established in the state treasury under the control of the division of criminal and juvenile justice planning of the department of human rights for the purposes of awarding grants under this section. The criminal and juvenile justice planning advisory council and the juvenile justice advisory council shall assist the division in administering grants awarded under this section. The departments of education, human services, public health, and public safety, and the governor's office of drug control policy shall advise the division on grant award criteria and performance measures for the programs. Not more than five percent of the moneys appropriated to the fund shall be used for administrative purposes.

2.  Any decategorization governance board organized in accordance with section 232.188 may apply to the division for a grant to fund juvenile crime prevention programs that emphasize positive youth development. The division shall adopt rules for awarding of grant moneys, including but not limited to data factors and a methodology for use in allocating moneys among the decategorization projects based upon a project's proportion of the state's population of children.

3.  Applications for moneys from the community grant fund shall demonstrate a collaborative effort by all relevant local government and school officials and service agencies with authority, responsibilities, or other interests within the decategorization project area. Proposed plans set forth in the applications shall reflect community-wide consensus in how to remediate community problems related to juvenile crime. Services provided under a grant through this program shall be comprehensive, preventive, community-based, and shall utilize flexible delivery systems and promote youth development. A plan for grant moneys under this section shall be a part of or be consistent with the annual child welfare services plan developed by the governance board of the decategorization project area and submitted to the department of human services and Iowa empowerment board pursuant to section 232.188.

4.  The division shall provide decategorization governance boards with information describing comprehensive community planning techniques and performance measures for this program. The division shall establish a monitoring system for this program that requires participating decategorization governance boards to report information with which to measure program performance. Applications for grant moneys shall state specific results sought to be obtained by any service or activity funded by a grant under this section and shall describe how their desired results are related to the program's performance measures.

5.  This section is repealed effective June 30, 2005. The division of criminal and juvenile justice planning shall annually submit a report to the general assembly by January 15 regarding the program's performance measures and the effectiveness of the services and activities funded under this section.

232.191  Early intervention and follow-up programs.

Contingent on a specific appropriation for these purposes, the department shall do the following:

1.  Develop or expand programs providing specific life skills and interpersonal skills training for adjudicated delinquent youth who pose a low or moderate risk to the community.

2.  Develop or expand a school-based program addressing truancy and school behavioral problems for youth ages twelve through seventeen.

3.  Develop or expand an intensive tracking and supervision program for adjudicated delinquent youth at risk for placement who have been released from resident facilities, which shall include telephonic or electronic tracking and monitoring and intervention by juvenile authorities.

4.  Develop or expand supervised community treatment for adjudicated delinquent youth who experience significant problems and who constitute a moderate community risk.

232.195  Runaway treatment plan.

A county may develop a runaway treatment plan to address problems with chronic runaway children in the county. The plan shall identify the problems with chronic runaway children in the county and specific solutions to be implemented by the county, including the development of a runaway assessment center.

232.196  Runaway assessment center.

1.  As part of a county runaway treatment plan under section 232.195, a county may establish a runaway assessment center or other plan. The center or other plan, if established, shall provide services to assess a child who is referred to the center or plan for being a chronic runaway and intensive family counseling services designed to address any problem causing the child to run away. A center shall at least meet the requirements established for providing child foster care under chapter 237.

2. a.  If not sent home with the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, a chronic runaway may be placed in a runaway assessment center by the peace officer who takes the child into custody under section 232.19, if the officer believes it to be in the child's best interest after consulting with the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. A chronic runaway shall not be placed in a runaway assessment center for more than forty-eight hours.

b.  If a runaway is placed in an assessment center according to a county plan, the runaway shall be assessed within twenty-four hours of being placed in the center by a center counselor to determine the following:

(1)  The reasons why the child is a runaway.

(2)  Whether the initiation or continuation of child in need of assistance or family in need of assistance proceedings is appropriate.

c.  As soon as practicable following the assessment, the child and the child's parents, guardian, or custodian shall be provided the opportunity for a counseling session to identify the underlying causes of the runaway behavior and develop a plan to address those causes.

d.  A child shall be released from a runaway assessment center, established pursuant to the county plan, to the child's parents, guardian, or custodian not later than forty-eight hours after being placed in the center unless the child is placed in shelter care under section 232.21 or an order is entered under section 232.78. A child whose parents, guardian, or custodian failed to attend counseling at the center or fail to take custody of the child at the end of placement in the center may be the subject of a child in need of assistance petition or such other order as the juvenile court finds to be in the child's best interest.

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