Deportation Brief

SUMMARY FOR LAWYERS: Immigrants applying from abroad have no constitutional rights. Their access may be restricted as Congress sees fit, so far as the Constitution and Courts are concerned. But applicants who reside here, even if they reside here illegally, have “fundamental rights” which cannot constitutionally be abridged except by laws which can pass “strict scrutiny”, according to Plyler v. Doe, 1982.

“Liberty” is an enumerated fundamental right. (It is also in the Declaration, where it is the second right listed.)

No one has asked the Court to rule on whether there is a sufficient “compelling government interest” to ration liberty through Numerical Limitations – a literal lottery of fundamental rights.

How about population reduction? Can such a government interest be asserted, as long as populations still shift from farms to cities, people regard as “luxuries” the technologies only possible through large, free, peaceful populations, and federal courthouses are placed in the largest cities?

Plyler mentions an additional test: the “cost to the nation”. Not only must the law not unnecessarily restrict rights, but it must not create unacceptable side effects which outweigh the law’s “compelling government interest”. The “cost to the nation” of Numerical Limitations is our national security. Border agents could easily catch our few thousand violent threats, if they weren’t overwhelmed by having to hunt down millions guilty of hard work. We would no longer have a huge illegal “haystack” in which violent criminals hide, if our “line” accommodated all who obey the same laws which citizens obey. 99% of our present illegal caseload would sign up to “be in the system”.

Can the court count, as a “compelling government interest”, the legislative goal of deporting millions of U.S. residents – or any other goal which is as a practical matter impossible, which has never been remotely met, which Congress refuses to seriously fund, and which would become theoretically possible only at the cost of our freedoms as we know them, through the complete loss of privacy and the absolute power of Big Brother’s national tracking bureaucracy over citizens in every area of life?

When congressional action has utterly and decisively abandoned a goal, can statements about congressional intentions, by a congressional minority, support the finding that the goal is a compelling government interest?

CONTENTS: Summary for Laymen 2 pages.Questions Presented, 1 page. Argument, 8 pages. Footnotes/Cites , 12 pages. Answers to Questions from Attorneys 6 pages.

Summary for Laymen:

“Rule of Law” is being sabotaged by immigration law that violates the Constitution.

The 14th Amendment is being plundered by “Numerical Limitations” on how many “illegals” can apply to remain here legally. The only “line” for them is the same short line we offer applicants from abroad. For Mexicans, the annual limit is so low that even if no one else applies from abroad, it will take about 100 years for slots to open up for all of them. Meanwhile many of them apply for those precious slots, and pay their fees, but can’t wait 100 years to join their “legal” families.

The 14th Amendment says “No State shall ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Unauthorized residents are under U.S. jurisdiction, according to several Supreme Court decisions (e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 1982), and thus any law that violates their “fundamental rights” is unconstitutional.

The Court lets Congress limit applicants from abroad. But the Court has protected several “fundamental rights” of unauthorized residents. Just not the liberty to be here and enjoy all other rights. No one has asked the Court to rule on whether the rationing of liberty, through Numerical Limitations, leaves any rights intact.

Liberty is not some mere “implied” right like abortion. It is “enumerated”. That is, it is specified in the Constitution. The Declaration of Independence even says it is a right granted, not just by our amendable Constitution, but by our Creator. And not to just a few, but to “all men”. (Which includes wo-men.)

Sometimes a “compelling government interest” requires restriction of even a fundamental right. For example, our free speech to yell the word “fire” must be restricted in a crowded theater, because of our “compelling interest” in preventing people from being trampled. But the Supreme Court wisely rules that any law restricting a “fundamental right” must be the “least restrictive” way to achieve its “compelling government interest”. The Court calls this the “strict scrutiny” test. Plyler v. Doe mentions an additional “cost to the nation” test: not only must the law not unnecessarily restrict rights, but it must not create unacceptable side effects which outweigh the law’s “compelling government interest”.

What “compelling government interest” justifies not just restricting, but utterly abolishing, through arrest and deportation, the liberty of millions of U.S. residents?

Not population reduction. Populations still shift from farms to cities. People regard as “luxuries” the technologies only possible through large, free, peaceful populations.

Not national security. Numerical Limitations cause national insecurity. Border agents could easily catch our few thousand violent threats, if they weren’t overwhelmed by having to hunt down millions who just want to work hard.

Can the court count, as a “compelling government interest”, the purported legislative goal of deporting millions of U.S. residents – or any other goal which is as a practical matter impossible, which has never been remotely met, which Congress refuses to seriously fund, and which would become theoretically possible only at the cost of our freedoms as we know them, through the complete loss of privacy and the absolute power of bureaucracy over citizens in every area of life?

Even the Electronic Employment Verification System, in the immigration bill that went down last June 28, was projected by the Congressional Budget Office to reduce the unauthorized population by only 11%.

If the Real ID Card, without which no man can drive, work, fly, bank, or enter a Federal court to sue those responsible, could only reduce the undocumented population by 11%, what more must be added to reduce it 100%? What must be added to the Real ID’s machine-readable digital photos linked to a nationwide database processed by facial recognition software? Surveillance cameras on every street corner, generating computer records of where every citizen goes?

Whatever it will take, it is too high a “cost to the nation”. We don’t appear able to restrict the liberties of our unauthorized residents except to the extent we restrict our own.

1. Are numerical limitations, which deny the fundamental right to Liberty to literally 99% of a group of 12 million U.S. Residents, permissible under the 14th Amendment "equal Protection" and 5th Amendment "due process" clauses?

2. If unadmitted adults merit no 14th Amendment protection because they have "broken the law", how about their unadmitted children who are incapable of the "criminal intent" to even be here, as Plyler v. Doe observes?

3. Shouldn't deprivation of the fundamental right to Liberty be reviewed by Strict Scrutiny?

4. Even under the Rational Basis test, can quotas, without which our Border Security problem would evaporate, pass the "cost to the nation" test of Plyler v. Doe?

5. Is there any "compelling government interest" that justifies retaining quotas which deny liberty to 12 million souls while perpetuating our terrible Border Security problem? How about the fear of population growth? Can the court document the greater harm of population growth, in view of the fact that Americans prefer the population density of cities to farms to this day, and every federal courthouse is situated in the centers of the largest cities? Isn't every other real and perceived immigration problem caused by quotas, and quickly curable by reasonable criteria?

6. Can the court count, as a "compelling government interest", the purported legislative goal of deportating 12+ million U.S. residents: or any other goal which is as a practical matter impossible, which has never been remotely met, which Congress refuses to seriously fund, and which would become theoretically possible only at the cost of our freedoms as we know them, through the complete loss of privacy and the absolute power of bureaucracy over citizens in every area of life? When congressional action has utterly and decisively abandoned a goal, can statements about congressional intentions, by a minority, support the finding that the goal is a compelling government interest?

No Court has reviewed the Constitutionality of numerical limitations. When it has mentioned them, it has been with disrespect, hinting that if it ever accepts jurisdiction it will overturn them. Interested lawyers can help by (1) purifying these arguments with your feedback and critiques; (2) using these arguments in a deportation hearing, after you are prepared to carry them all the way up; and (3) while waiting for the Court to accept jurisdiction, adding your voice towards consensus that numerical limitations are actually unconstitutional and Congress, and voters, are invited by the Court's silence to exercise their responsibility to repeal them. Let us declare that while numerical limitations are "the law", they are an unconstitutional law, repeal of which ought to be the top priority of those committed to "rule of law", and enforcement of which ought to shame any law-abiding citizen. Let's not forfeit title to the "rule of law" argument to the Deportation Dreamers.

SHAUGHNESSY v. MEZEI, 345 U.S. 206, 217 (1953) Dissent by Black “No society is free where government makes one person's liberty depend upon the arbitrary will of another. Dictatorships have done this since time immemorial. They do now. Russian laws of 1934 authorized the People's Commissariat to imprison, banish and exile Russian citizens as well as "foreign subjects who are socially dangerous."* Hitler's secret police were (start page 218) given like powers. German courts were forbidden to make any inquiry whatever as to the information on which the police acted. Our Bill of Rights was written to prevent such oppressive practices. Under it this Nation has fostered and protected individual freedom. The Founders abhorred arbitrary one-man imprisonments. Their belief was - our constitutional principles are - that no person of any faith, rich or poor, high or low, native or foreigner, white or colored, can have his life, liberty or property taken "without due process of law."

8. QUOTAS STINK, SAYS COURT

1952, HARISIADES v. SHAUGHNESSY, 342 U.S. 580, In their personal views, libertarians like Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis doubtless disapproved of some of these [immigration] policies [of Congress], departures as they were from the best traditions of this country and based as they have been in part on discredited racial theories or manipulation of figures in formulating what is known as the quota system. ...immigration laws have been crude and cruel,... have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, ....deemed to offend American traditions and ....jeopardize peace. In recognizing this power and this responsibility of Congress, one does not in the remotest degree align oneself with fears unworthy of the American spirit or with hostility to the bracing air of the free spirit. One merely recognizes that the place to resist unwise or cruel legislation touching aliens is the Congress, not this Court.

[[Notice the "if" clause: "IF entry quotas may be set by reference to nationality", (which of course is the way it is done), as if that authority is by no means assured! Yet no one has yet asked the Court to overturn Congress' policy, so this justice is dropping us a clue, a plea: "Please ask us!"]] From dissent: “It is also true that national origin can sometimes be a permissible consideration in immigration policy. But even IF entry quotas may be set by reference to nationality, national origin (let alone race) cannot control every decision in any way related to immigration.”

9. Neither State nor Congress can Deny Liberty to Illegals.

1952, HARISIADES v. SHAUGHNESSY, 342 U.S. 580, 598 (Dissent) "We have long held that a resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. He therefore may not be deprived either by the National Government or by any state of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Nor may he be denied the equal protection of the laws. ....He can live and work here and raise a family, secure in the personal guarantees every resident has and safe from discriminations that might be leveled against him because he was born abroad. Those guarantees of liberty and livelihood are the essence of the freedom which this country from the beginning has offered the people of all lands.

10. “Strict Scrutiny” or “Rational Basis”?

Plyler v. Doe 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982) Use of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" thus does not detract from, but rather confirms, the understanding that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State's territory. That a person's initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State's territorial perimeter. Given such presence, he is subject to the full range of obligations imposed by the State's civil and criminal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction -- either voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States -- he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may choose to establish.

Our conclusion that the illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases may claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection only begins the inquiry. The more difficult question is whether the Equal Protection Clause has been violated by the refusal of the State of Texas to reimburse local school boards for the education of children who cannot demonstrate that their presence within the [p216] United States is lawful, or by the imposition by those school boards of the burden of tuition on those children. It is to this question that we now turn.

III The Equal Protection Clause directs that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). But so too, "[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940). The initial discretion to determine what is "different" and what is "the same" resides in the legislatures of the States. A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill. In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, we thus seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.

But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every classification. The Equal Protection Clause was intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental constitutional premises. Thus, we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a "suspect class," [n14] or that impinge upon [p217] the exercise of a "fundamental right." [n15] With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. In addition, we have recognized that certain forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances, we have sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a [p218] substantial interest of the State. [n16]

[[The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed an Iowa law barring illegals from getting drivers’ licenses, quoting Plyler in determining illegals are not a “suspect class” and travel is not a “fundamental right”, like abortion is. (I’m not making it up. Read it for yourself.) The Court further explains the difference between “strict scrutiny” and “rational basis”.]] 2005, Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 817, 819 (Iowa 2005) The classes argued in their brief that we should apply strict scrutiny in this case. However, at oral arguments, counsel correctly conceded that no suspect class or fundamental right was at issue in this case and that rational basis was the appropriate level of scrutiny. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2398, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 803 (1982) (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’”); id. at 218 n.15, 102 S. Ct. at 2395 n.15, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 799 n.15 (stating that fundamental rights are those explicitly or implicitly contained in the Constitution).

Under rational-basis review, the statute need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S. Ct. at 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 320. As the Supreme Court has explained:

Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses “distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement,” a State’s decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give rise to a constitutional violation. “Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Moreover, the State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the burden is upon the challenging party to negative (sic) “‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.’”

11. Even “rational basis”, and much more so “Strict Scrutiny”, weighs not only the “compelling government interest” served by letting the law stand, but also “its costs to the nation”.

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 203 (1982) In determining the rationality of the Texas statute, its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children may properly be considered.

(P. 221)...education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests....

Illiteracy is an enduring disability. The inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each and every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological wellbeing of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. [n20] What we said 28 years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), still holds true:

12. The Government's Solution must be "Effective"

13. The Legal Fiction of "Liberty" which Lasts Only Until the CIS Finds Them

THE LEGAL FICTION THAT ILLEGALS’ LIBERTY IS PROTECTED BY COURTS SHAUGHNESSY v. MEZEI, p. 220 Dissent by Jackson and Frankfurter “Realistically, this man is incarcerated by a combination of forces which keep him as effectually as a prison, the dominant and proximate of these forces being the United States immigration authority. It overworks legal fiction to say that one is free in law when by the commonest of common sense he is bound. Despite the impeccable legal logic of the Government's argument on this point, it leads to an artificial and unreal conclusion.3 We must (begin page 221) regard this alien as deprived of liberty, and the question is whether the deprivation is a denial of due process of law.

14. Jurisdiction over Congressional Immigration Law

[[Ed: This is Justice Frankfurter’s comprehensive list of the policies Congress can enact without Court jurisdiction to review. But no cites are given, and this is the only justice whose signature is on this list. The majority had concluded there was no 1^st Amendment problem, even had the deported communists been citizens; but Justice Frankfurter seems to be implying that even if the legitimate free speech rights of the communists been violated, the Court should have deferred to Congress and deported them anyway. If this is his meaning, he stands against every other court decision, which shows willingness to intervene (on behalf of aliens, whether legal or illegal, who are living here) if there are constitutional violations. But see how much contempt even this this extreme Congress-tolerant justice shows for Congress’ quota system! Even he would joyfully overturn it, should he see his way to jurisdiction over it. He says “what classes of aliens shall be allowed to enter and what classes of aliens shall be allowed to stay, are for Congress exclusively to determine”. This is generally but not absolutely true. It is probably no more true of immigration law than it is of civil rights, 1^st Amendment, abortion, or any other area of law where the Court has impacted Congress’ decisions: the Court doesn’t start out writing laws, but when it decides a law violates the Constitution, the law is defacto rewritten.]]

1952, HARISIADES v. SHAUGHNESSY, 342 U.S. 580 MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring. “It is not for this Court to reshape a world order based on politically sovereign States. In such an international ordering of the world a national State implies a special relationship of one body of people, i. e., citizens of that State, whereby the citizens of each State are aliens in relation to every other State. Ever since national States have come into being, the right of people to enjoy the hospitality of a State of which they are not citizens has been a matter of political determination by each State. (I put to one side the oddities of dual citizenship.) "Though as a matter of political outlook and economic need this country has traditionally welcomed aliens to come to its shores, it has done so exclusively as a matter of political outlook and national self-interest. This policy has been a political policy, belonging to the political branch of the Government wholly outside the concern and the competence of the Judiciary. (Paragraph) Accordingly, when this policy changed and the political and law-making branch of this Government, the Congress, decided to restrict the right of immigration about seventy years ago, this Court thereupon and ever since has recognized that the determination of a selective and exclusionary immigration policy was for the Congress and not for the Judiciary. "The conditions for entry of every alien, the particular classes of aliens that shall be denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such classification, the right to terminate hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which such determination shall be based, have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control. (Paragraph) The Court's acknowledgment of the sole responsibility of Congress for these matters has been made possible by Justices whose cultural outlook, whose breadth of view and robust tolerance were not exceeded by those of Jefferson. In their personal views, libertarians like Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis doubtless disapproved of some of these policies, departures as they were from the best traditions of this country and based as they have been in part on discredited racial theories or manipulation of figures in formulating what is known as the quota system. (Paragraph) But whether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether they may have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress. Courts do enforce the requirements imposed by Congress upon officials in administering immigration laws, e. g., Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, and the requirement of Due Process may entail certain procedural observances. E. g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276. But the underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall be allowed to enter and what classes of aliens shall be allowed to stay, are for Congress exclusively to determine even though such determination may be deemed to offend American traditions and may, as has been the case, jeopardize peace. In recognizing this power and this responsibility of Congress, one does not in the remotest degree align oneself with fears unworthy of the American spirit or with hostility to the bracing air of the free spirit. One merely recognizes that the place to resist unwise or cruel legislation touching aliens is the Congress, not this Court.

1985 JEAN v. NELSON, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) From dissent by Marshall, joined by Brennan: [[This selection articulates fairly clear criteria for what Congress can and cannot do in immigration policy if it wants to avoid being overturned. It takes a more restrictive view of what Congress can get away with than Frankfurter’s List. Actually the case directly reviews a decision by the Attorney General, from the Executive Branch. But it was resolved when the INS hurriedly rewrote regulations previously approved by Congress. Marshall writes that immigration officials become targets of the Court when their decisions seem more attributable to racial or nationality prejudice than to legitimate immigration goals. Otherwise, nationalities cannot be treated differently. Not addressed is how it is possible to treat immigrants of all nationalities to 1% of the liberty of citizens, while saying they are entitled to 100% of the liberty of citizens.]] This dissent is not the place to determine the precise contours of petitioners' equal protection rights, but a brief discussion might clarify what is at stake. It is clear that, consistent with our constitutional scheme, the Executive enjoys wide discretion over immigration decisions. Here, the Government would have a strong case if it showed that (1) refusing to parole Haitians would slow down the flow onto United States shores of undocumented Haitians, and that (2) refusing to parole other groups would not have a similar deterrent effect. Then, its policy of detaining Haitians but paroling other groups might be sufficiently related to the valid immigration goal of reducing the number of undocumented aliens arriving at our borders to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Another legitimate governmental goal in this area might be to reduce the time it takes to process applications for asylum. If the challenged policy serves that goal, then arguably it should be upheld, provided of course that it is not too underinclusive. It is also true that national origin can sometimes be a permissible consideration in immigration policy. But even if entry quotas may be set by reference to nationality, national origin (let alone race) cannot control every decision in any way related to immigration. For example, that the Executive might properly admit into this country many Cubans but relatively few Haitians does not imply that, when dealing with aliens in detention, it can feed Cubans but not feed Haitians. In general, national-origin classifications have a stronger claim to constitutionality when they are employed in connection with decisions that lie at the heart of immigration policy. Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) ("[D]ue process requires that [an agency's] decision to impose [a] deprivation of an important liberty . . . be justified by reasons which are properly the concern of that agency"). When central immigration concerns are not at stake, however, the Executive must recognize the individuality of the alien, just as it must recognize the individuality of all other persons within our borders. If in this case the Government acted out of a belief that Haitians (or Negroes for that matter) are more likely than others to commit crimes or be disruptive of the community into which they are paroled, its detention policy certainly would not pass constitutional muster.

1952, HARISIADES v. SHAUGHNESSY, 342 U.S. 580, 592 To arm all men for orderly change, the Constitution put in their hands a right to influence the electorate by press, speech and assembly. This means freedom to advocate or promote Communism by means of the ballot box, but it does not include the practice or incitement of violence.... We think the First Amendment does not prevent the deportation of these aliens.

1967, BOUTILIER v. IMMIGRATION SERVICE, 387 U.S. 118, 123 Petitioner says, even so, the [law barring immigrants with a "psychopathic personality"] is constitutionally defective because it did not adequately warn him that his sexual affliction at the time of entry could lead to his deportation. It is true that this Court has held the "void for vagueness" doctrine applicable to civil as well as criminal actions. See Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925). However, this is where "the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard . . . was so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all. . . ." In short, the exaction must strip a participant of his rights to come within the principle of the cases. But the "exaction" of 212 (a) (4) never applied to petitioner's conduct after entry. The section imposes neither regulation of nor sanction for conduct. In this situation, therefore, no necessity exists for guidance so that one may avoid the applicability of the law. The petitioner is not being deported for conduct engaged in after his entry into the United States, but rather for characteristics he possessed at the time of his entry. Here, when petitioner first presented himself at our border for entrance, he was already afflicted with homosexuality. The pattern was cut, and under it he was not admissible. The constitutional requirement of fair warning has no applicability to standards such as are laid down in 212 (a) (4) for admission of aliens to the United States. It has long been held that the Congress has plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, [Page 387 U.S. 118, 124] (1889)." [[The Court in this case remains willing to strike down a law that does not meet the "constitutional requirement of fair warning", even for a noncitizen, but even for citizens, the requirement doesn't apply to a regulation about health characteristics, which the immigrant is powerless to change regardless of how much warning he has. Notice that the Court remains willing to safeguard the Constitutional rights, even of an alien. Notice also that the Court says "Congress [can] make rules ...to exclude those [it doesn't want] but that doesn't mean that after Congress makes its rules the Court can't review their constitutionality! Because that is exactly what the Court did in this case! Although the Court found no Constitutional violation, it was willing to look for one.]]

1977, FIALLO v. BELL, 430 U.S. 787, 796 ...This is not to say, as we make clear in n. 5, supra, that the the Government's power in this area is never subject to judicial review. But our cases....are subject only to limited judicial review. [[Ed: Or, if it sounds plausible, that’s good enough.]] [ Footnote 8 ] The inherent difficulty of determining the paternity of an illegitimate child is compounded when it depends upon events that may have occurred in foreign countries many years earlier. Congress may well have given substantial weight, in adopting the classification here challenged, to these problems of proof and the potential for fraudulent visa applications that would have resulted from a more generous drawing of the line. Moreover, our cases clearly indicate that legislative distinctions in the immigration area need not be as "`carefully tuned to alternative considerations,'" Trimble v. Gordon, ante, at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976)), as those in the domestic area.

FROM THE DISSENT: (P. 805) I also have no quarrel with the principle that the essentially political judgments by Congress as to which foreigners may enter and which may not deserve deference from the judiciary. ....The simple fact that the discrimination is set in immigration legislation cannot insulate from scrutiny the invidious abridgment of citizens' fundamental interests.

15. The Court's Jurisdictional Conundrum

JEAN v. NELSON, 472 U.S. 846, 876 (1985) Dissent of Marshall, with Brennan) Regardless of the proper treatment of constitutional challenges to entry decisions, unadmitted aliens clearly enjoy constitutional protections with respect to other exercises of the Government's coercive power within our territory. Of course, this does not mean that the Constitution requires that the rights of unadmitted aliens be coextensive with those of citizens. But, "[g]ranting that the requirements of due process must vary with the circumstances," the Court is obliged to determine whether decisions concerning the parole of unadmitted aliens are consistent with due process, and it cannot "pass back the buck to an assertedly all-powerful and unimpeachable Congress." Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1394 (1953) (discussing Knauff and Mezei). The proper constitutional inquiry must concern the scope of the equal protection and due process Page 472 U.S. 846, 877 rights at stake, and not whether the Due Process Clause can be invoked at all.

16. Illegal Children

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982) The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special members of this underclass. Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the product of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply [p220] with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal entrants. At the least, those who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not limited to, deportation. But the children of those illegal entrants are not comparably situated. Their "parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms," and presumably the ability to remove themselves from the State's jurisdiction; but the children who are plaintiffs in these cases "can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status." Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977). Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.

[V]isiting . . . condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth, and penalizing the . . . child is an ineffectual -- as well as unjust -- way of deterring the parent.

P. 202 Although undocumented resident aliens cannot be treated as a "suspect class," and although education is not a "fundamental right," so as to require the State to justify the statutory classification by showing that it serves a compelling governmental interest, nevertheless the Texas statute imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status. These children can neither affect their parents' conduct nor their own undocumented status.

P. 207 Finally, the court noted that, under current laws and practices, "the illegal alien of today may well be the legal alien of tomorrow," [n4] and that, without an education, these undocumented children, [a]lready disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack of English-speaking ability, and undeniable racial prejudices, . . . will become permanently locked into the lowest socio-economic class.”

P. 220 Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative goal. Nor is undocumented status an absolutely immutable characteristic, since it is the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action. But §21.031 is directed against children, and imposes its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little control. It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children for their presence within the United States. Yet that appears to be precisely the effect of §21.031.

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

QUESTION: If we can establish that all people have a constitutional right to liberty, then what is the definition exactly of liberty? What did the founding fathers intend when they gave us that right? Because I can see ICE and CIS easily arguing that they ARE giving immigrants “liberty” – liberty to go through the deportation procedure and be sent back home. Numerical limitations doesn’t take away THAT liberty. So, how does liberty translate to legal status in the U.S.? That’s my question. -A.N.

ANSWER: From footnote 4 (which you have already read): "The power of deportation is therefore an implied one. The right to life and liberty is an express one." (1952, Harisiades). Where is it "express"? The next sentence: "Why this implied power should be given priority over the express guarantee of the Fifth Amendment has never been satisfactorily answered."

The 5th Amendment (which is quoted side by side with the 14th very frequently in these excerpts): "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, LIBERTY, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

Amendment XIV. Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, LIBERTY, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

1. Notice that in the 1952 quote above, "liberty" is presumed to be the opposite of "deportation".

Can a policeman say "I am giving you the liberty to go to jail" without being LOL'd at? (Laugh Out Loud) Can the CIS claim it is giving immigrants the "liberty" to be deported? Even Tancredo would laugh, although for him the laughter would not be cynical but merry.

QUESTION: I see that you refer to Plyler vs. Doe – my concern there is that basing your argument on case-law rather than the Constitution itself makes for a weaker argument. But this is where my lack of legal expertise may get me down. I’m just speaking from my sense of how the legal system might work – not from a knowledge of how it actually DOES work. - A.N.

ANSWER: The importance of drawing an argument from the Supreme Court is that it is the Supreme Court to whom we appeal. Even if a right has no basis in the Constitution whatsoever, like the right to abortion, we read the Court's opinions about that "right" and get a better idea of how our appeal will proceed than if we read the Constitution.

QUESTION - OR, RATHER, CHALLENGE: I don’t really have time now to engage with this issue -- we’re working on one, maybe two, amicus briefs to the Supreme Court that are due very soon, on cases the Court will be hearing in the next few months, on top of all the other usual stuff. Totally off the top of my head, there is a lot of law about Congressional plenary power (meaning, basically, unrestricted) to decide who enters the US, and what in what categories and numbers. Remember that “aliens” seeking to enter may have some limited right to some procedure, but courts have held that whatever procedure Congress deems appropriate is enough -- and that’s procedural protections, which generally are considered an easier sell. What he’s talking about is a substantive right -- most courts have said there isn’t even a substantive right to remain here or for relief from removal, even for long-term LPRs -- whatever Congress says is enough, the Constitution doesn’t give more rights in that context either. And long-term LPRs within the country have more rights than people seeking to enter. It’s easy to say “unconstitutional” and yes, the quotas may seem unfair, but unfair is not necessarly unconstitutional. There are so many unfairnesses in the immigration system, as we know -- NACARA relief that only applies to people from some countries who entered / registered before certain dates, the diversity lottery, TPS from certain countries and not others etc. This is not to say these are good, and that we should accept them, but that challenges to the drawing up of these categories have failed because people wanting to enter the US have essentially no rights to complain. I hope this is helpful. (Anonymous immigration lawyer who argues before the Supreme Court)

ANSWER: You say “there is a lot of law about Congressional plenary power (meaning, basically, unrestricted) to decide who enters the US, and in what categories and numbers.” Just to be sure we agree on the obvious, of course you are talking about case law that gives Congress such power, not statutory law, since a law by Congress giving Congress unrestricted power would probably not scare anybody.

My treatment of this issue, which you may not have gotten to, was number 14-15 in the arguments and numbers 13-14 in the footnotes. But here are some more ideas along those lines. Of course, the cases I have cited are full of general statements about the broad power of Congress over immigration. One such is “(O)ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.’ Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).” On the other hand, “there may be actions of the Congress with respect to aliens that are so essentially political in character as to be nonjustifiable.’ Fiallo v. Bell, supra, 430 U.S. at 793, 97 S. Ct. at 1478.” Notice these two statements are (1) contradictory, which is made possible without embarrassment because they are (2) vague in scope, and (3) general.

Here are more cites about how much the Court adores Congress’ immigration whims, from the concurrence in Plyler v. Doe - notice the contradiction between the Fiallo quote above, in red, with the Fiallo quote below in red: “Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948). See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971) (regulation of aliens is ‘constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government’). The Court has traditionally shown great deference to federal authority over immigration and to federal classifications based upon alienage. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-589 (1952) (“It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference”). Indeed, even equal protection analysis in this area is based to a large extent on an underlying theme of preemption and exclusive federal power over immigration. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, supra, at 420 (the Federal Government has admitted resident aliens to the country “on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under nondiscriminatory laws,” and the States may not alter the terms of this admission). Compare Graham v. Richardson, supra, and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), and Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). Given that the States’ power to regulate in this area is so limited, and that this is an area of such peculiarly strong federal authority, the necessity of federal leadership seems evident. 2. I emphasize the Court’s conclusion that strict scrutiny is not appropriately applied to this classification. This exacting standard of review has been reserved for instances in which a ‘fundamental’ constitutional right or a ‘suspect’ classification is present. Neither is present in these cases, as the Court holds.”

Notice that for all these brave words about the supremacy of Congressional immigration whims, the conclusion in this concurrence, as well as in the majority opinion, is that “strict scrutiny” is still the appropriate standard for overturning one of these Congressional whims, if a “fundamental constitutional right” is before the Court. “Liberty” is certainly a fundamental right, but even though it permeated the setting for this case, the issue was not officially raised, so it occurred to no one to address it. Instead the only “right” addressed was public education.

In all these cases, the Court reviews the record seriously enough to give us confidence that were there a case for violation of fundamental rights, the Court would intervene. Where it does not, it is because it concludes the appellants have no case. Where there was no case, my impression was that the Court listed its reasons why the appellant didn’t have a legal leg to stand on, and then, just to remove any remote possibility of the buck stopping here, it tells the litigants that if, after all these legal arguments, they still have any fight left in them, they should go bother Congress. If the Court doesn’t want to help somebody, that’s where it will throw in an overstatement about how helpless it is because Congress has its hands tied. If it is itching to jump in where angels fear to tread, that’s where it will wave the “Congress is too political” flag. (“Congress is too political” - now the basis for overturning a law? Oh well. We’ll understand when we get to Heaven.)

My serious point is that overbroad statements like these are no guide to the Court’s readiness to intervene in a particular situation. Of much better guidance are its statements where it has intervened. Plyler v. Doe, for example, where it said “fundamental rights” merit “strict scrutiny”, even for unauthorized residents.

You write, “most courts have said there isn’t even a substantive right to remain here or for relief from removal, even for long-term LPRs -- whatever Congress says is enough”. Keep in mind that liberty is not merely a “substantive right”, which Plyler v. Doe treats as a right implied, but not specified, in the Constitution. “Liberty” is an enumerated right. It stands right there, in all its verbal glory, in the text of the Constitution; and, by the way, also in the Declaration of Independence, the foundation for our Constitution, as not merely enumerated as a right granted by a human Constitution, but the second most fundamental “inalienable right” granted by Almighty God which no man can lawfully deny!

Which raises the question, if a ruling has said residents have no “substantive right” to remain here, was the right to liberty, an enumerated right, ever raised in arguments? But then how is it possible for lawyers to stumble around between the lines of the Constitution, searching with Sherlock Holmes magnifying glasses for some implied right for residents to remain here, and miss “liberty”?

If you know any cases that explicitly say residents have no constitutional right to liberty, I will be grateful for the cites. If there is such a ruling, it will have had to sidestep a logical and surely inescapable contradiction between the fundamental right to Liberty for all U.S. Residents, guaranteed to them by the 14th Amendment “Equal Protection of the Laws”, even if they are “unauthorized” according to Plyler v. Doe, and Numerical Limitations which deny Liberty to over 99% of our unauthorized residents. I would LOVE to study how the Court managed such a feat.

(I realize the 14th amendment, read literally, restricted states, not Congress. Perhaps that is why the Court routinely cites the 5th Amendment “due process” clause together with the “equal protection” clause, as if the latter helps define the former.)

If there is no such explicit ruling yet, then I look forward to seeing how some future court will try to wiggle around this contradiction, after some brave attorney presents the principles in my brief. I would love to hear ANYONE explain their way around this contradiction.

Not that I don’t expect attempts. I had fun with a couple of them by the Iowa Supreme Court, in disposing of the right to a driver’s license for unauthorized residents. I put them in my P.S. in order to shorten this answer, in case you don’t want to take a little extra time for some humor.

I appreciate that many cases may be taken to implicitly be satisfied with whatever crumbs of Fundamental Rights which Congress chooses to ration out to U.S. Residents, because of the fact that it seems to occur to no one that liberty is a fundamental right that is inexcusably denied by Numerical Limitations.

If liberty is indeed a fundamental right that is unconstitutionally denied by Numerical Limitations, it is remarkable that this never occurs to anyone, since the protection of the liberty of a U.S. resident would make the controversy over his lesser rights moot. (For example, deportation of the “spouse” of a homosexual, because homosexual marriages don’t count, would become a moot proceeding if the “spouse’s” right to remain here were established through the fundamental right of every U.S. Resident to Liberty.). But as remarkable as this is, the well known fact is that the Court will (and should) resist reaching larger questions than it is presented, and apparently NO ONE HAS PRESENTED to the Court the fundamental contradiction between “equal protection of the laws” for U.S. residents, and liberty-rationing Numerical Limitations.

I should list the important immigration cases upon which my brief is based, in case you are willing to suggest to me important cases I have missed: Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 1950; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 1952; Shaughnessy v. Mezzei, 1953; Boutilier v. INS, 1967; Fiallo v. Bell, 1977; Adams v. Howerton, 1982; Plyler v. Doe, 1982; Jean v. Nelson, 1985; INS v. Pangilinian, 1988; Commissioner INS v. Jean, 1990; INS v. National Center for Immigration, 1991; McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 1991; Reno, Attorney General, v. Flores, 1992; Hoffman Plastic v. National Labor Relations Board, 2002; Sanchez & Doe v. Iowa, 2005, Iowa Supreme Court (driver’s license case).

Perhaps my brief and your analysis are meshing poorly because I’m talking about 14th Amendment “equal protection of the laws” rights for residents, while you are talking about “aliens seeking to enter” (from abroad) who indeed have only, as you say, “some limited right to some procedure”. You add “people wanting to enter the US have essentially no rights to complain.” Obviously the 14th Amendment offers nothing to non residents, which is why my brief does not offer them anything either (directly). Remember also that my brief especially takes advantage of Plyler’s sympathy for children who have no capacity for “criminal intent” in coming here.

Another point about the “plenary power of Congress”: the Court has alleged this power is found in the Constitution. But before 1880 Congress hardly did anything about immigration: individual states had their individual immigration regulations, subject on occasion to Supreme Court review. New York v. Miln (1837), reversed in Passenger Cases (1849). State immigration laws were ended, not by Congress, but by the Supreme Court! Henderson v. Mayor of New York (1875).

The fact is that the Supreme Court leaves Congress alone only through great self restraint, which it exercises only sporadically, and there is plenty of reasoning within its rulings to encourage us to present Numerical Limitations, AS APPLIED TO RESIDENTS, for its review. But the Court won’t rule on them, if no one asks.

QUESTION: B-b-but immigrants don’t have a right to immigrate. - S.P.K.

ANSWER: True, they don’t. That is, not under anything in current American law. Furthermore, applicants to immigrate, who are living abroad while they apply, have no Constitutional rights whatsoever. But applicants who live here, even if “illegally”, have “fundamental rights” which our Courts say cannot be abridged except under Strict Scrutiny.

Numerical Limitations violates Spirit as well as Letter of 14th Amendment. It will surely seem to people used to the current reality in immigration law that I am straining for a loophole - a loophole in the sense of finding some sneaky legal device that can achieve a purpose alien to the spirit of the Constitution.

But the opposite is true. The 14th Amendment was enacted before 1882, when the first restriction on legal immigration was enacted, and it is difficult to read the absolute fairness in the Equal Protection Clause and justify any quota on anyone’s liberty. It is a conundrum, as argument #14 observes: “But the 14th and 5th Amendments are nothing if they accept either ‘limits’ or ‘quotas’ on constitutional rights. Rights that are not ‘coextensive with those of citizens’ are the rights of slaves. The language of the Equal Protection Clause is absolute: it is the exceptions justified by ‘rational basis’ or ‘strict scrutiny’ that are the loopholes. Common sense requires some limits on fundamental rights in some situations, in which case ‘strict scrutiny’ is a reasonable standard; but by that standard, the complete denial of liberty to over 99% of a U.S. resident population of 12+ million simply cannot be defended.”

At such point that you agree this is a strong case, the question may interest you: “OK, numerical limitations are unconstitutional. Should the Courts or Congress agree, will there be any law or Constitutional Amendment that can make it Constitutional again?”

Is it possible to amend the Constitution so we can still keep our freedoms, while constitutionally denying them to immigrants?

Is it possible to dumb down the 14th Amendment so it only applies to “me” and not “the other guy”? How about amending our 14th Amendment so it protects everybody but “illegals”?

How about if we amend “any person” so the Amendment reads “No State shall ...deny...the equal protection of the laws... to any person, except persons not born here who aren’t lucky enough to find a spot in our quota line before we slam it shut”?

The problem is that when we start a list of disapproved groups, others will finish it, who may not like us any more than we like them. God has drawn a line of protection around the rights of every person equally. Our nation was premised on this drawing of lines: “We hold these truths to be self evident, that ALL men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights...” Shall we say “but that doesn’t mean men not born here, whom we have not admitted to come”? If we say that, we try to move lines which God has drawn, to a place where God has decreed they most not be moved. We cannot push against God without injury to ourselves.

When we ourselves draw a line around others which God does not permit, just because we are the Majority, what answer will we have when a future majority wants to move God’s line around ourselves? Our own logic will condemn us! We will have no spirit then to defend our own rights. We will have no basis for challenging the legitimacy of their oppression of us!

If we deprive any group of persons of the equal protection of just “some” laws, what will prevent depriving that group of the equal protection of any laws? If we may withhold the protection of this law, why not the protection of that law?

If we depart just a little bit from God’s commandment to “have one manner of law, as well for the stranger [immigrant], as for one of your own country”, Leviticus 24:22, we undermine the laws which protect ourselves.

“They break our immigrations laws”, you point out. “Why may we not restrict their freedom, the same way we restrict the freedom of other criminals (by putting them in jail), without you calling that ‘unequal protection of the laws’?”

The difference between “illegals” and “criminals” is that criminals break laws which we do not break, while “illegals” live the same way we do. The only reason they are illegal, and we are not, is that we exempt ourselves from the laws which we enact against them.

They used to be called “hypocrites”, who accuse others of doing what they do themselves. But voters and lawmakers make it “illegal” for 12 million U.S. residents to do the same hard work the rest of us do. Then, because they persist in doing the same thing we do, we call them “criminals” and claim the moral high ground over them.

In other words, we classify our unwelcome neighbors as “illegal” on the basis of “laws” which violate the “Rule of Law”, as our Founders defined the phrase. But we have forgotten its meaning.

The phrase “rule of law” was coined by theologian Samuel Rutherford in his 1644 book “Lex, Rex”. Not “Rex Lex”, that previously unchallenged declaration that “the King is the Law”, also called “the Divine Right of Kings”, based on a careless reading of Romans 13:1. Rutherford’s title announces “The law is the king.” In other words, lawmakers are subject to their own laws; they cannot exempt themselves from the laws with which they bind others.

Rutherford used the phrase “rule of law” only once, in Question 26, “Whether the King be above the Law or no”. But the theme of his book was “no”: even the king is subject to the “rule of law”. The real “sovereign” is the people, who have a duty to resist any lawmaker, including any king, who defies the law.

The book might not have stirred such sensational controversy, had England not at the time had a king who did not agree with those principles, and who had never heard of Freedom of Speech.

Rutherford was imprisoned, and nearly lost his head over it. But his book helped spark English civil war which ended, 43 years later, with a Parliament powerful enough to restrain the king. Rutherford’s vision of a balance of powers influenced our own Constitution over a century later.

That little phrase, “rule of law”, as America’s Founders, including Rutherford, defined it, is the heart of our own Constitution. The whole point of our system of government is to make sure all lawmakers have to feast on whatever they dish out to others.

Our system accomplishes that pretty well. Except in immigration, where voters and lawmakers first create a lottery to determine which of their neighbors not to allow the same opportunities the rest of us have, and then preach against them for trying to improve their lives anyway.

We impose arbitrary, irrational quotas which limit legal residence to a lucky few. To call this “fair” or “impartial” or “equal protection of the laws” just because we let some come would be like calling slavery “freedom” because, after all, we let some of them buy their freedom, so everyone has the opportunity to be free!

We have no King who can lay legal burdens upon others which he himself does not have to touch. We are not governed by majorities, as in a pure democracy. Majorities can vote to hold slaves.

The Iowa Supreme Court (Footnote 10) tries to imagine that some “rights” are more “fundamental” than others. But when even the “smallest right” is protected unequally by law, from one group to another, justice is mocked, and profound injury done.

It’s not just that we are locked into an amendment enacted 140 years ago which we have no further interest in. We still want equal protection of the laws, even today. Not even the hardest hearted anti-immigrant wants it to be legal to murder “illegals”, or to steal from them, or torture them, or to literally enslave them. But we all know that without this in our Constitution, that is literally what would happen: it would literally be legal, once again, to own slaves. In fact, the main reason for the 14th amendment was to help the 13th Amendment finish outlawing slavery, by prohibiting state laws that discriminated against former slaves.

July 9, 1868, when the 14th Amendment was ratified, was 7 years before there was such a thing as an “illegal alien” in America! 1875 was the first law in America restricting the amount of immigration! There was no one at the border checking papers or keeping people from going wherever they liked. It was never illegal for anyone to come here, and it was certainly never illegal for anyone to get a job or to drive down the road! There was a distinction between citizens and non-citizens, but any non-citizen could quickly become a citizen if he liked. The only exception was for slaves, whom the 14th Amendment was designed to set free once and for all.

That’s why the 14th Amendment makes no distinction between persons born here or elsewhere; between citizens and noncitizens; between people here legally or illegally. All “persons” are equally protected by all laws which are Constitutional. If we want it to be otherwise, we should, deciding together as a nation, repeal the 14th Amendment, and live under tyranny, but at least legally. Until that happens, we should not tolerate a few officials simply ignoring it. That is the ultimate challenge to the Rule of Law, dwarfing anything “illegals” do, when we let our very judges ignore our very Constitution!

Can we limit rights for some without limiting our own? The answer is found in a parable. A young man picked up his sweetheart at her parent’s home. As they left, her father said something innocently, at which the young woman screamed in rage, before turning back with a sweet smile to her young man. Shortly afterward, the young man married the woman, confident that she was incapable of the same rage towards himself which he had seen towards her father. How did the story end? Was he right? Was her father surprised?

Is it possible to thoroughly hate an enemy, and thoroughly love a friend?

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Deportation Brief

Quotas: a challenge to the constitutionality of numerical limitations during a routine deportation hearing

CONTENTS: Summary for Laymen 2 pages.Questions Presented, 1 page. Argument, 8 pages. Footnotes/Cites , 12 pages. Answers to Questions from Attorneys 6 pages.

Summary for Laymen:

5. Liberty, Specifically, is Protected for Resident Aliens as Much as for Citizens

6. The Right of an Illegal to Liberty is Clearer than the Right of Congress to Deport Illegals

7. Liberty is not Liberty where it Depends on the Arbitrary Will of Another, such as in the Roll of the Quota Dice.

8. QUOTAS STINK, SAYS COURT

11. Even “rational basis”, and much more so “Strict Scrutiny”, weighs not only the “compelling government interest” served by letting the law stand, but also “its costs to the nation”.

12. The Government's Solution must be "Effective"

14. Jurisdiction over Congressional Immigration Law

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS